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Abstract 
This thesis examines how and theorises as to why performance auditing in the 
Fijian public sector was inexplicably discontinued in 1997.  The Fijian socio-
political history during, after and prior to the 1970-2000 period, in which the 
practice of performance auditing emerged, was implemented and was 
subsequently discontinued is explored.  The study draws on critical hermeneutics 
to interpret the text empirics, and informs the research findings using Roberts’ 
(1991, 1996, 2010) interpretation of accountability.   
The findings revealed that powerful actors and institutions such as the 
Auditors-General, Ministers of Finance, Public Service Commission, Public 
Accounts Committee members, auditees and the Asian Development Bank 
influenced the changes in public sector auditing in Fiji.  During the 1970-1997 
period Auditors-General (Bhim, Narain and Datt) held the government and the 
auditees to account by performing compliance to budget and financial attest 
audits.  Their efforts were constrained by the Ministers of Finance who withheld 
funds and the Public Service Commission, which failed to recruit sufficient staff. 
In 1995, Auditor-General Datt undertook performance auditing without a 
mandate, Auditors-General Datt and Jacobs efforts to seek a performance audit 
mandate were overlooked by the Minister of Finance (Kubuabola) during 1996-
1998.  In 1999, the Rabuka government enacted the new Public Finance 
Management Act, which provided the Auditor-General with limited scope for 
performance auditing.  The Chaudry government recalled this Act thus 
withholding the limited scope.  
The conclusions were the Auditors-General used accounting to make 
visible the conduct of the auditees during the 1970-1995 period.  The media 
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extensively publicised the audit findings and disclosures creating a perception of 
lack of accountability.  The successive indigenous Fijian led governments inspired 
by the need for political supremacy overlooked the audit findings and effectively 
deflected being held to account.  The spirit of the Westminster system of auditing 
was not honoured and served as a symbolic gesture.  During 1995-1996 Auditor 
General Datt overstepped the provisions of the 1970 Audit Act and implemented 
performance auditing thus incorporating non-accounting information to hold the 
accountors to account.  Literature on performance auditing indicates that this 
practice is widely accepted in most western democracies this is not so in Fiji, 
partly because of the dominance of tribal structures and asymmetrical power 
distributions.  
The implication for policy makers, government and the Auditor-General is 
that changes in audit scope be accompanied by changes in relevant statute.  
Socialising form of accountability accompanied with the traditional hierarchal 
form offers the potential to reduce the asymmetrical power distribution amongst 
the powerful actors in the public (audit) sector.  This combination also offers a 
greater chance to the accountee to effectively hold the accountor to account for 
both accounting and non-accounting performance.  Transparencies created by 
accounting be followed by consequences so that accountors take responsibility for 
their action.  The donor agency and other change agencies such as the Auditor-
General be sensitive to the unique political and cultural circumstances of the 
indigenous community in a less developed country such as Fiji. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to Thesis 
1.1 Overview  
The government, on behalf of the general populace manages public sector 
resources (Shim & Seigal, 1995).  According to Funnell and Cooper (1998), the 
government in the Westminster system is accountable to the public for managing 
and consuming the public resources.  Thompson (1996) claimed that public sector 
accountability is established through various over-seeing bodies; the Audit Office 
is one such body in a Westminster system (Funnell & Cooper, 1998).  The 
traditional function of these oversight bodies is to conduct ‘financial attest’ and 
‘compliance to budgetary appropriation’ audits of government expenditure and 
revenues, and this has extended to include performance auditing in most 
jurisdictions (Funnell & Cooper, 1998; Parker, 1990; Thompson, 1996). 
Performance auditing has been described as an independent evaluation of 
the economy and efficiency of auditee operations, and the effectiveness of 
programs in the public sector (English, 1990; Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Leeuw, 
1996; McRoberts & Hudson, 1985; O’Leary, 1996; Parker 1990; Thompson, 
1996).  Therefore, the belief is that the performance auditor will be able to hold 
the public sector managers accountable by undertaking such audits (English, 
1990; Jacobs, 1998; McRoberts & Hudson, 1985).  Such audits by the Auditor-
General (Fijian Auditor-General) may be presumed to use accounting information 
to reveal the conduct of the auditees with respect to management of the public 
sector.  As such, that which is made transparent will be only what is required by 
the accountor.  
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Several writers have claimed that the demand for economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness audits emerged as a result of calls by various social and political 
lobby groups for greater government accountability (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; 
Guthrie 1990; Leeuw, 1996; O’Leary, 1996).  Others have linked the emergence 
of performance or value for money audits to the rise of new public management 
(Grendon & Cooper, 2000; Jacobs, 1998; Pallot, 2003; Power, 1997).  Most have 
argued that the Auditors-General in various jurisdictions have been instrumental 
in the development and implementation of such audit practices and had 
retrospectively sought changes to audit legislation to mandate the practice 
(Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Pugh, 1987; Radcliffe, 1998; Yamamoto 
& Watanabe, 1989). 
The role of the Audit Office in Westminster type governance is to hold the 
executive accountable for the management and consumption of public sector 
resources to the public through the Parliament (Funnell & Cooper, 1998).  In 
satisfying this role the Audit Office in Fiji has been undertaking cash flow, 
compliance to budgetary appropriation and  financial attest audits of the Fijian 
public sector since 1874 (Nath, Van Peursem & Lowe, 2006).  During the 1995-
1996 period there was a change in the scope of traditional compliance to 
budgetary appropriation and financial attest auditing.  Auditor-General Datt 
implemented economy, efficiency and effectiveness audit in two public sector 
entities in 1996. Then in 1997, Datt discontinued the practice (Annual Report-
Audit Office, 1998).  He actively sought legislative authority to mandate such 
audits from 1996 until his retirement in November 1997.  Upon taking Office in 
late 1997, Auditor-General Jacobs also sought a mandate for such audits.  
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This study examines how and theorises as to why performance auditing for 
the Fijian public sector was inexplicably discontinued in 1997.  In doing so the 
study explores the Fijian socio-political and economic context during and prior to 
the 1970-2000 period of time during which the practice of performance auditing 
emerged, was implemented and was subsequently disestablished.  The study 
draws on critical hermeneutics to interpret the text empirics, and informs the 
research findings in Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2010) interpretation of accountability. 
1.2 Background of the Research 
The purpose of this section is to expose the contribution of this study within its 
historical, social and political context.  
 Fiji gained political independence from Britain in 1970. Ratu Sir Mara an 
indigenous Fijian chief was elected the first Prime Minister. Ratu Sir George 
Cakabau an indigenous Fijian chief was nominated the Governor General. After 
the 1987 military coup led by Rabuka the 1970 Constitution was abrogated, the 
Governor-General’s position abolished and Rabuka with the support of the Great 
Council of Chiefs, an apex body of the indigenous Fijain political system   
nominated Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, an indigenous Fijian and chief as the 
President. Fiji was expelled from the Commonwealth in 1987 and regained its 
membership after the democratically held general elections in 1997. Fiji was again 
expelled from the Commonwealth after the Bainimarama led military coup in 
2006. 
The Fijian public sector controls a very large and significant portion of 
Fiji's financial and human resources.  It employs about 40% of the total workforce 
and public sector spending amounts to about 25-35% on average of the gross 
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domestic product (Fiji Economic Statistics Quarterly, December 2007).  Despite 
the coups of 1987, 2000, and until the December 2006 coup by Bainimarama, 
governance in Fiji was still based on the Westminster system.   This study covers 
the period up to the year 2000.The Fijian Auditor-General reports on responsible 
government spending by undertaking financial statement attest and compliance to 
budget audits to provide assurances to the Parliament and the public on the use of 
budgetary appropriations.  According to the 1970 Fiji Audit Act, the Auditor-
General has to examine, inquire into and audit the public sector accounts, and 
prepare and present financial audit reports to the Fijian Parliament annually.  In a 
traditional sense, the processes of examination and inquiry into the public sector 
accounts provide the Audit Office or the Auditor-General with an opportunity to 
evaluate the disbursement of budgetary appropriations, form an opinion on his/her 
findings and compile a report on his/ her opinion ( Dittenhofer,2001; Funnell and 
Cooper 1998; Parker, 1990).  
 A hierarchical accountability structure is embedded in a Westminster 
system such as that which exists in Fiji.  This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.  
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Figure 1-1: The chain of political accountability. Adapted from Funnell and 
Cooper (1998, p. 29). 
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In the chain of accountabilities the public elects the members of 
Parliament and these members are ultimately accountable to the electorate.  The 
Ministers (who are in the government) are accountable for the conduct and the 
performance of their ministries in implementing the government policies, and are 
accountable to the Prime Minister.  As such, the Ministers are held accountable 
for the way in which the budgetary appropriations approved by Parliament are 
used to achieve the desired government policies (Funnell & Cooper, 1998).  The 
Permanent Secretaries for each of the government ministries and the heads of 
departments of each of the departments are accountable to their respective 
ministers for use and disbursement of public funds.    
The Fijian Auditor-General holds an independent Office (Fijian 
Constitution 1970, 1990, 1997) and therefore is not a part of this chain of political 
accountability.  Sections 167 and 168 of the Constitution ‘empower the Auditor-
General to hold the Government and the Ministers to account for compliance to 
budgetary appropriations’.  In accordance with the 1970 Audit Act, the Fijian 
Audit Office has been undertaking regular annual public sector financial statement 
audits of government ministries, departments, statutory bodies and local 
government authorities since 1970.  The financial statement audit reports provide 
an independent and professional assurance to the Parliament and the public that 
the budgetary appropriations provided to the public sector are used in accordance 
with the established rules and regulations such as the 1970 Fijian Audit Act, the 
1990 Fijian Public Finance and Management Act and the 1996 Public Enterprise 
Act. These Statutes empower the Fijian Auditor-General to undertake compliance 
to budgetary appropriations, annual financial statements audits and not 
performance audit.  
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In 1996, the Fiji Audit Office carried out performance audits in two major 
public sector entities and tabled these in Parliament.  Unlike the financial 
statement audits, these audits focused on how economically, effectively and 
efficiently the public sector resources were managed by the managers (Guthrie & 
Parker, 1999).  The performance audits were undertaken when the Fijian Audit 
Office was undergoing the institutional strengthening project funded by Asian 
Development Bank [ADB] during the 1995-1997 period (Staton & Partners, 
1997).  The ADB hired the Australian consulting firm, Staton and Partners to 
implement the project (Staton & Partners, 1997).  One of the requirements of this 
project was that the Fiji Audit Office staff be able to undertake economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness audits.  
The ADB hired Australian consultants provided the Audit Office staff with 
practical skills and knowledge to undertake such audits.  Although the ADB and 
the Australian consultants influenced the implementation of performance audit in 
at least two public sector entities in 1996, they were not able to influence the 
Rabuka (indigenous Fijian) government to provide the Fijian Auditor-General 
(Datt - Indo-Fijian) with a mandate for such audits.  After overthrowing the 
democratically elected government (Labour-Party - Indo-Fijian dominated but led 
by Bavadra, an indigenous Fijian) in 1987, Rabuka handed over the governance to 
interim caretaker Prime Minister Ratu Sir Mara (Indigenous Fijian and Tribal 
Chief).  While still serving in the Fiji Military Rabuka formed the political party, 
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) and participated in the 1992 general 
elections under the 1990 undemocratic Constitution.  The SVT party led by him 
won the 1992 general elections and remained in Office until May 1999.  
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In 1997, the practice of performance auditing was discontinued by the Fiji 
Audit Office.  Only two publicly published performance auditing reports were 
available up to 1999.  There is no documentary evidence as to why the 
performance-auditing programs were withdrawn.  The period 1995-1997 was 
therefore a unique period in Fiji’s accountability history and is well worth 
investigating.  A study on the processes of establishing and then later 
discontinuing the practice of performance auditing is a contribution to knowledge 
on what, why and who motivated these changes.  
1.3 Prior Research 
The discussion here establishes a gap in literature on emergence, implementation 
and an acceptance of the practice of performance auditing by countries following 
a Westminster system of auditing to which this research project will contribute.   
The emergence and implementation of economy, effectiveness  and 
efficiency audits in Westminster countries such as the United Kingdom (Flesher 
& Zarzeski, 2002; McCrae & Vada, 1997),  Australia (Flesher & Zarzeski, 
2002;Funnell, 1994;  Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Pugh, 1987),  Canada (Radcliffe, 
1998; Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989),  New Zealand (Yamamoto & Watanabe, 
1989; Jacobs 1998) and the United States (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Gendron, 
Cooper, & Townley, 2001; McCrae & Vada, 1997; Yamamoto & Watanabe, 
1989) have been documented in the accounting literature.  Some researchers have 
used interpretative perspectives grounded in the works of social theorists such as 
Porter (1981), Kingdon (1984), and Miller and Rose (1991, 1992) to explain the 
emergence of performance audit.  
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A few have analysed historical events and the notion of New Public 
Management1 to provide an understanding of how such practices evolved (Flesher 
& Zarzeski, 2002; Guthrie, 1990; Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989).  Some studies 
revealed that the Auditors-General used their power, influenced the development 
of and were instrumental in successfully seeking a mandate for such audits during 
the late 1990s (Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Radcliffe, 1998; Scanlan, 
1998; Hamburger, 1989).  Some have argued that the practice emerged to hold the 
public sector managers accountable for the use and management of resources 
(Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989; Pugh 1987).   
Table 1.1 provides a summary of seven prior studies identified from the 
extant literature review undertaken for this project.  These studies set the 
precedent for this research project and have contributed towards the researcher’s 
understanding of the emergence of performance auditing (Guthrie & Parker, 1999; 
Jacobs, 1998; Radcliffe, 1998; Scanlan, 1998, Hamburger, 1989).  These prior 
studies are relevant because they provide an understanding of historical 
developments in public sector audit practices in the Commonwealth countries 
which have a similar aim to the research undertaken in this project for Fiji.  
According to Guthrie and Parker (1999), and Jacobs (1998), the Auditors-
Generals in both Australia and New Zealand were most influential in introducing 
the practice of performance audits.  In the Commonwealth countries such as 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand the respective Audit 
Acts were changed to mandate such audits retrospectively and the practice was  
                                                 
1 New Public Management (NPM) has been moulded in the image of the private sector (Pallot, 2003). The emphasis in the 
use of public sector resources changed from a concern with legalistic conceptions of stewardship to the need to ensure that 
services were provided in the most efficient and effective manner. At the heart of these reforms has been a move away from 
an obsessive concern with accountability for inputs to outputs and outcomes. As such managers are encouraged to become 
results oriented (Funnell & Cooper, 1998, p. 8).  
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accepted by both the auditees and the government (Guthrie & Parker, 1999; 
Jacobs, 1998; Radcliffe, 1998; Scanlan, 1998; Parker, 1990) which did  not appear 
to be the case in the Fijian situation. This research project will contribute by 
filling this gap.  These selected studies have contributed to the literature on 
emergence and introduction of public performance audits by revealing that the 
practice developed within a socio-political and historical context (Guthrie & 
Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Radcliffe, 1998; Scanlan, 1998; Parker, 1990; 
Hamburger, 1990).  
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Table 1-1: Prior Research 
Aims/Objectives  Methodology  and  Methods Findings/Outcomes  References  
To examine the history of performance 
auditing in the Australian federal public 
sector by analysing four crucial events in the 
period 1973-1998 and struggles over the 
passage of the 1997 Audit Act. 
 
Porter’s (1981) framework for historical 
narrative. Historical explanation is 
concerned with explaining the dual nature of 
explanatory narrative, providing both story 
and explanation. Events therefore should not 
be simply understood as objects but rather 
as forms of temporal processes that explain 
conditions from which they arose.  
Methods: Longitudinal study of 
documentary evidence, Inquiry Reports, 
Audit Reports, Public Accounts Committee 
Reports, Audit Acts, and Financial 
Management and Accountability Act. 
The ‘construction’ of performance audits is both 
reflected by and influenced by the complexities 
of powers of the individuals and institutions 
involved with the practice.  
Most powerful individuals: Auditors-General, 
decided scope and the implementation. 
Powerful institutions:  Audit Office - nature and 
developments of audits. 
Executive: Control implementation through 
funding; 
Parliament’s interest fluctuated. 
Performance auditing is a social construct rather 
than a definitive performance review technology. 
Guthrie, J., & Parker, L. E. (1999). A 
quarter of a century of performance 
auditing in the Australian federal public 
sector: A malleable masque. Abacus, 35(3), 
302-332. 
To explain how the New Zealand Audit 
Office functioned as an epistemic community 
in the development and redevelopment of 
performance auditing by: (i) describing how 
such audit was used as a solution to address 
growing government expenditure, as a way to 
restore public confidence and to address 
demands for public accountability during 
1975-1991; and (ii) to investigate how public 
sector reforms during 1984-1994 redefined 
the role of such audits.  
Kingdon (1984, model p. 345). In this 
model the expert groups or epistemic 
communities compete to define the problem 
and to advocate their particular solutions.  
Methods: Reports from Auditor-General, 
published newspaper interviews and 
obituaries, six interviews over the 1994-
1997 period. 
The study concluded that the Auditor-General 
was instrumental in promoting such audits as a 
solution to hold the public sector to account.  Due 
to the public sector reforms such audit 
technologies were redefined to promote 
accountability by providing consultancy services 
and independent advisory support to 
parliamentary standing committees. 
Jacobs, K (1998). Value for money 
auditing in New Zealand: Competing for 
control in the public sector. British 
Accounting Review, 30(4), 343-360.  
 
To examine the processes of auditing change 
by studying the development of efficiency 
auditing in Alberta (a province in Canada). 
To analyse the political promotion of 
efficiency auditing in Alberta.  
Miller and Rose’s (1990, 1991) theoretical 
framework of governmentality. 
Methods: historical event analysis during 
1960-1970. Political documents and 
manifestos, audit reports, legislation, and 
newspaper articles.       
 
Auditing expanded into efficiency auditing in 
Alberta.  It was a political decision influenced by 
the Auditor-General and the notions of public 
sector reforms. The interpretation of efficiency 
auditing by the politicians and the Auditor-
General led to implementation and acceptance.  
Radcliffe,V.S.(1998). Efficiency audit: An 
assembly of rationalities and programmes. 
Accounting, Organisations and Society, 
23(940), 377-410.  
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Aims/Objectives  Methodology  and  Methods Findings/Outcomes  References  
To analyse the evolution of the role of the 
Auditor-General and the Queensland Audit 
Office.  
Accountability Framework 
Methods: descriptions and analysis of major 
events using audit reports, legislation and 
Committee reports from 1971-1991. 
The Parliament relies on the Auditor-General’s 
report for public sector accountability.  
The Auditor-General’s mandate was expanded to 
incorporate performance audits.   
The Auditor-General has to audit for efficiency 
and provide the Reports to Parliament. 
Scanlan, L. (1998). The role of the 
Auditor-General in the accountability 
framework and recent developments in 
Queensland. Accountability and 
Performance, 4(1), 53-73. 
Present a case study of two approaches to the 
developments of performance review 
practices in Australia.  
Highlight the contested nature of 
performance auditing by examining the 
institutional, organisational and technical 
arrangements. 
Explore theoretical issues associated with 
distinction between traditional and 
performance audit. 
  
A description of historical events. 
Sources of evidence: Audit reports and 
legislation.  
Performance auditing started with public sector 
reforms where entities had to identify their 
outputs in quantifiable terms. 
In 1984 the House of Representatives Committee 
on Expenditure imitated an efficiency review 
which expanded into performance auditing.  
Certain government agencies took exception to 
performance audits. There was conflict on who 
should undertake such audits as the Auditor-
General did not have a mandate. 
The issue of what constitutes performance 
auditing was not made clear. Lack of definitions 
of efficiency and effectiveness. The focus of such 
audits was on administrative efficiency rather 
than political accountability.  
Guthrie, L. D. (1990). The contested nature 
of performance auditing in Australia. In J. 
Guthrie, L. D. Parker, & D. Shand (Eds.), 
The public sector contemporary readings in 
accounting and auditing (pp. 273-283).  
Australia: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Publishers.   
i) To trace the international developments 
of the practice of Value for Money 
Auditing. 
ii)  Identify commonly accepted meaning. 
iii) Implication for Australia.   
Method: Literature Review.  Such audits began in USA after World War II by 
the General Accounting Office. By 1970 it was 
an accepted established  practice in the USA. 
Started in Canada in 1977 by the joint effort of 
the Auditor-General and the government. Became 
mandated.  
Started in UK in 1979 as a part of public sector 
reforms, laws mandated in 1983. 
Started in New Zealand between the years 1976-
1982 in response to increased public sector 
expenditure.  Mostly Auditor-General’s effort. 
Parker, L. (1990). Towards value for 
money audit policy. In J. Guthrie, L. D. 
Parker, & D. Shand (Eds.), The public 
sector contemporary readings in accounting 
and auditing (pp. 292-306).  Australia: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers.   
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Aims/Objectives  Methodology  and  Methods Findings/Outcomes  References  
Started in Australia in 1974 amongst controversy 
and many debates as to what constituted such 
audit and the role of the Auditor-General.  
Commonly accepted interpretation: audit for 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The 
meaning is dependent on the context within 
which auditing takes place and the type of entity 
or project being audited, but each of these is 
defined.   
  
To reveal how the practice of  performance 
auditing  developed under three different 
Auditors-General in Australia in terms of: i) 
what is  to be audited; ii) by whom; and iii) 
to what end?   
Documentary analysis. 
Audit Reports, Public Account Committee 
Reports; Hansard Reports, Committee of 
Inquiry Reports.  
During a period of 15 years, under three different 
Auditors-General, the focus on what constituted 
performance audits differed according to the 
Auditor-General’s interpretation of ‘what’ was 
audited.  
There was a shift in the focus of performance 
audits from accountability to the administrative 
efficiency with which resources were managed.  
There was no agreement on what a performance 
audit should be, or who should be undertaking 
such audits.  
Hamburger, P. (1990). In J. Guthrie, L. D. 
Parker, & D. Shand (Eds.), The public 
sector contemporary readings in accounting 
and auditing (pp. 324-342).  Australia: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers.   
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1.4 Research Contribution 
The prior studies explain the historical, socio-economic and political contexts 
within which performance auditing emerged and how various individuals and 
institutions influenced the processes in Western developed countries (Guthrie & 
Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998).  In these Western democracies, such audits have 
been widely accepted, albeit with different interpretations of how these were used 
as a tool by Parliament to hold the public sector managers and Ministers to 
account (Jacobs, 1998).  
This study contributes to the existing literature but with a difference: the 
focus of this study is on a small developing country which, despite facing four 
coups (2 military coups in 1987 led by Rabuka, civilian coup in 2000, led by 
Speight  and another military coup in 2006 led by Bainimarama) appeared to 
maintain the Westminster system of auditing.   
By employing a critical hermeneutical approach and being informed by 
Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2010) interpretation of accountability, in a developing 
country context, this study seeks to enhance an understanding of why performance 
auditing, a widely accepted practice in other Commonwealth and Western nations, 
was discontinued in Fiji.  The study makes another contribution by revealing how 
powerful individuals and institutions such as the Auditors-General, the auditees, 
the Ministry of Finance and the government exerted pressure and used their 
powers to influence the implementation but then ultimately also the withdrawal of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness audits.  
Using Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2010) critical interpretation of how 
‘accounting’ is substituted for ‘accountability’ in a hierarchical accountability 
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structure, the study exposes how accounting (auditing) is used by the Auditor-
General as a source of power and influence to permit some forms of 
accountability but not others.   
1.5 Motivation for this Research 
This research has been motivated by the researcher's personal and professional 
experiences with the Fiji Public Service.  The researcher was born and raised in 
Fiji experiencing the socio-political economic environment after independence in 
1970, during and after the 1987 military coups and the 2000 civil coup.   
As a civil servant in Fiji and later an academic at the University of the 
South Pacific the researcher has had professional interactions with the Fiji Audit 
Office  and  became aware of performance auditing being implemented by the Fiji 
Audit Office in 1996, and its discontinuance in 1997.  The reason for the 
discontinuation was not made public and there is virtually no research on why or 
how performance auditing was implemented and then withdrawn by the Fiji Audit 
Office, and why the Auditor-General was seeking legislative powers to implement 
performance auditing.  This gave the researcher an impetus to investigate the 
processes of implementation and withdrawal of performance auditing in the Fiji 
Public Sector.  
As a public servant the researcher remembers receiving the Fiji Public 
Service Commission's circular outlining the procedures to be followed while using 
public sector resources and public funds.  The consequences of overspending the 
budget allocation to the government departments were also outlined in the 
circulars.  Yet each year, the Fiji Auditor-General's financial Audit Report 
reported on mismanagement and overspending of funds by various public sector 
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entities.  The media extensively covered the Auditor-General's reports, usually 
reporting on the overspending of the budgetary allocations by various public 
sector entities and the government departments.  
The media publicity of the Audit Reports portrayed a lack of performance 
by the Fiji public sector.  Concerns over reasons for implementation and then the 
withdrawal of performance auditing by the Fiji Audit Office were the major 
motivating factors for this research. 
1.6 Aims and Objectives 
This study seeks to interpret how and why the practice of performance auditing 
was implemented in the Fijian public sector by the Audit Office in 1996 and then 
discontinued in 1997.  
1.6.1 Objectives of this research  
The purpose of this research is to be met via achievement of the following 
research objectives: 
 to evaluate the international and then the Fijian socio-political and 
economic history of performance auditing; 
 to investigate the meaning of performance auditing concepts within the 
performance auditing literature of the Anglo-American countries; 
 to evaluate the historical and regulatory practice of performance auditing 
within the Fijian socio-political and economic environment; 
 to identify and provide support for using a critical interpretative 
methodological lens for interpreting the events around the initiation, 
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undertaking and ultimate withdrawal of performance audit in the Fijian 
public sector; 
 to reveal and critically interpret the processes through which performance 
auditing was implemented, maintained and withdrawn in the Fijian public 
sector; and 
 to form conclusions regarding the meaning and implication of the findings.  
1.6.2 Key research questions    
To address the purpose of this research, the following key questions will guide the 
research process: 
 Why did the Fiji Audit Office undertake performance audit programs? 
 Who or what pushed for performance audits? 
 Who resisted performance audits? 
 What were the arguments from both sides?  
 What socio-political context resulted in the discontinuation of the 
practice?  
 How was accountability interpreted during the processes of emergence, 
implementation and withdrawal?  
The answers to these questions will provide an understanding of the 
processes and the practice by which performance auditing was undertaken and 
then withdrawn from the Fijian public sector during 1995-1997.  It will also help 
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in evaluating a context in which performance audit is unacceptable, despite being 
a generally accepted phenomenon in the public (audit) sector.  
1.7 Methodology 
Hermeneutics is the study of textual interpretation, of the manner in which we 
derive meaning from the unfamiliar, the alien (Boland, 1991, p. 439).  Critical 
hermeneutics seeks to unveil hidden meanings that serve the interests of the 
socially and politically powerful (Habermas, 1971; Ricoeur, 1980; Thompson, 
1981).  
The critical hermeneutics methodology is utilised to interpret and analyse 
the research findings.  Such a methodological approach allows the researcher to 
have opportunities to interpret and critically reflect upon the linkages between the 
‘text’ and the ‘context’ of the research (Herda, 1999; Prasad & Mir, 2002; Prasad, 
1999; Ricoeur, 1980).  To analyse the linkages between the text and the context, 
the researcher looks for a symbolic or metaphorical use of language (Herda, 1999; 
Prasad & Mir, 2002), thus seeking reality through interpretation of the text within 
the context in which it occurred.  Reality, therefore, is subjective and socially 
constructed and the researcher accepts such an assertion.  
Therefore, through text and contextual interpretation an understanding of 
how and why performance auditing was accepted and even desired by the 
Auditor-General and his staff, but not ultimately in practice, is achieved.  The 
critical reflection of the linkages between the text and the context also seeks to 
uncover the asymmetrical power relations that exist amongst the various 
individuals and institutions associated with economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
audits.  
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Roberts’ interpretation of accountability (1991, 2001a, 2001b, 2010) is 
also used to inform the research findings.   
1.7.1 Method 
Text2 or empirical information were collected from both primary and secondary 
sources which included public documents such as, Parliamentary Papers reports, 
Audit Reports, Public Accounts Committee Reports, media reports, relevant 
legislation, proposals for changes to legislation, and twenty interviews.  All these 
sources provided the text and the contextual information on the processes of 
emergence, implementation and withdrawal of performance auditing from the 
Fijian public sector during the 1995-1997 period.  
Data were analysed using a thematic approach as suggested by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) and Miles and Huberman (1994).  The themes were interpreted for 
meanings by situating them within the context in which they occurred.  In short, 
techniques that were cognisant to a critical hermeneutic study were used to collect 
and analyse empirical data. 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eleven inter-related chapters. Chapters four and five 
provide discussions on the historical events in Fiji which have significant impact 
on the political developments  and on public sector audit developments 
respectively. The discussions in these chapters have been used to provide an 
understanding of the Fijian socio-political history in the results chapters.  
                                                 
2  Text as used in the hermeneutics exposition – archival records and documents, legislation, reports (national and 
international), interviews, newspapers.    
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The analysis of audit developments provided in chapter five has been used to  
develop the  interview questions which form the evidence used in the results 
chapters. Therefore these are presented prior to the critical hermeneutics 
methodology and the methods chapters. The hermeneutical interpretations have 
been employed in the results chapters, namely eight, nine and ten.  The following 
is a summary of the coverage in each chapter.  
1.8.1 Chapter One: Overview of the thesis  
Chapter one introduces the study by providing the nature and background of the 
research.  It elaborates upon the research objectives, and the importance of the 
study.  The contribution of the thesis to performance auditing literature and a 
critical understanding of accountability in the context of a developing country 
public sector audit is also presented.  
1.8.2 Chapter Two: Accountability and Roberts’ interpretation  
Explanation and evaluation of Roberts’ interpretation of accountability to inform 
the interpretations arrived at by using critical hermeneutics methodology is 
presented in this chapter.  
1.8.3 Chapter Three: Literature on public sector performance auditing  
A review of the literature on the emergence, purpose and meaning of performance 
auditing in five Anglo-American countries is presented in this chapter.  For the 
purposes of this research, the commonly accepted interpretation of performance 
audits as audits for economy, efficiency and effectiveness as advocated in the 
literature, is accepted.  The evaluation of the literature presented in this chapter 
sets the rationale for an understanding of the socio-economic and political 
contexts within which such audits emerged globally.   
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1.8.4 Chapter Four: The Fijian socio-political and historical milieu  
The discussion in this chapter provides insights into the wider socio-political 
history to expose the context within which the Fijian-Auditor-General (Bhim 
[1970-1984], Narain [1984-1987], Datt [1987-1997], Jacobs [1997-2000]) 
discharged their accountability roles.   
1.8.5 Chapter Five: Public sector auditing in Fiji - tracing its 
development   
The narrative in this chapter traces the audit developments over a 120-year span to 
interpret the research empirics.  The rationale for including such an extensive 
period is to reveal how the roles of the Fijian Auditor-General expanded during 
the 1874-2000 period in terms of the following four themes: (i) 
Independence/authority of the auditor-general, (ii) scope of audit, (iii) reporting 
requirements thus establishing the ‘problem’ addressed in this research.  
1.8.6 Chapter Six: Methodology - critical hermeneutics     
The objective of this chapter is to present the methodological perspective and 
provide arguments as to why and how Critical hermeneutics serves the purpose of 
this research.  The chapter claims that reality is not objective but is subjectively 
construed by discourse (Herda, 1999; Prasad & Mir, 2002, Riceour 1980).  
1.8.7 Chapter Seven: Methods  
The methods of collecting and analysing text information which were employed 
to accomplish an empirical understanding of the process of emergence, 
implementation and discontinuation of performance auditing in the Fijian public 
sector during 1970-1997 are detailed in this chapter.  
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1.8.8 Chapter Eight: Results and Analysis – Emergence of performance 
auditing: (1970-1995) 
The analysis and interpretation of how and why the Auditors-General Bhim, 
Narain and Datt, influenced the emergence of public sector performance audits in 
Fiji during the 1970-1995 period is the primary focus of this chapter.   
1.8.9 Chapter Nine:  Results and analysis - Implementation of 
performance auditing (1995-1997)  
The text and contextual evaluations presented in this chapter provide an 
understanding of how Auditor-General Datt was influenced by exogenous factors 
to implement economy, efficiency and effectiveness audits in 1996.  
1.8.10 Chapter Ten: Results and analysis - Discontinuation of 
performance auditing (1997_2000) 
The discussions in this chapter reveal the processes in which attempts were made 
by individuals and institutions, which ultimately failed to grant the Auditor-
General the mandate for performance audits.   
1.8.11 Chapter Eleven: Discussion/Conclusion  
The discussion in this chapter presents the implications of using the critical 
hermeneutic methodology to reveal how various individuals and institutions tend 
to convey messages of accountability with respect to public sector performance 
auditing.  The contributions and the limitations of study are also highlighted.  This 
is followed by suggestions for future research.   
The purpose of this study is to provide an informed understanding of how 
and why the practice of performance auditing emerged, was implemented in 1996 
and was discontinued in 1997 in the Fijian public sector.  To lay down the 
theoretical foundation for informing such an understanding the next chapter 
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provides a discussion on Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2001b and 2010) interpretation of 
accountability.   
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Chapter 2 Accountability:  Roberts’ Interpretation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the theoretical insights which will inform the findings. 
The focus is on interpretations proposed by Roberts (1991, 1996, 2001, 2003, and 
2010), with a central argument that accountability is associated with moral issues 
to which accounting contributes but does not constitute.  
Roberts’ interpretation is used because he proposes that it is a person’s 
moral responsibilities to others that should ground accountability and shape a 
person as a subject.  An individual should consider the consequence of his/her 
actions on others because actions do not happen in isolation, thus creating an 
awareness of dependence (Roberts 2001b, 2003, 1991).  This is interpreted as a 
reciprocal obligation.  That is, how does my action affect me (self-interest) and 
how does it affect others?  How do I gain from my own conduct (account)?  How 
does the other benefit or not benefit?  The consideration for ‘others’ extends the 
focus beyond the self to others, causing an individual to take responsibility for the 
way his/her actions affect the other (Roberts 2003, 1991). 
He further argues that the relationship between self and accountability 
involves both ‘an exterior one that involves an encounter with others’ 
expectations and demands and an interior one that involves our self 
consciousness, our inward sense of moral obligation (the sense of self)’ (Roberts 
1996, p. 44).  The self, (our inward sense) ‘is discovered only in the process of 
being called to account by others and in the process has the effect of sharpening 
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and clarifying our sense of self, convincing us that our actions make a difference’ 
(Roberts, 1996, p. 44).  Such realisation leads to self-reflection on actions taken.  
Participants become the subjects of their actions.  In this way, being held to 
account by others can be seen to constitute the self (Roberts, 1996) because the 
participants see themselves in the way they made themselves visible to others.  As 
such, accountability goes beyond the normative values of economic rationalisation 
and stewardship to incorporate our moral values.    
The notion of accountability with moral responsibilities will be used to 
critically evaluate accountability practices in the Fijian public (audit) sector.  
Roberts’s interpretation illuminates how the notion of accountability without a 
moral sense of responsibility and consequence weakens real accountability. The 
discussions in this thesis will provide an understanding of how the Auditor-
Generals, the auditees, the Minister of Finance, the members of the Public 
Accounts Committee  used accounting information to portray different ways of 
being held to account by the Auditor-General without having to bear any 
consequences for their actions.     The chapter is organised as follows.  The next 
section provides an explanation of the generally accepted meaning of 
accountability and is followed by an explanation of Roberts’ interpretation.  A 
conclusion is drawn to explicate the rationale for using Roberts’ interpretation. 
2.2 Generally Accepted Meaning of Accountability   
Accountability is commonly referred to as a ‘process of being called to account to 
some authority for one’s action’ (Jones, 1992, p.73; also see Mulgan, 2000; Parker 
& Gould, 1999; Munro, 1996; Sinclair, 1995; Roberts & Scapens, 1985; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  According to Mulgan (2000), this definition encompasses the 
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following four processes.  First, the process is external in that the account is given 
to another person, outside the person being held accountable.  This implies there 
is an external scrutiny of the account by a superior to hold a subordinate to 
account.  The subordinate is obligated to demonstrate the reasonableness of 
his/her action to those to whom he/she is accountable (Shearer, 2002), but is not 
driven by his/her inner consciousness or inner moral values.    
Secondly, the process involves a social interaction and exchange between 
two parties.  In this relationship one party calls to account and is the accountee or 
account receiver (the person to whom accountability is due).  The other party 
responds and provides the account, and is the accountor or the account provider 
(the person held to account).  In this account giving and receiving process a form 
of principal-agent relationship is formed, in that those acting on behalf of another 
group or person, report back to the group or person, or are responsible to them in 
some way (Hughes, 2003).  
Thirdly, in an accountability relationship the accountee has the authority to 
receive information and the accountor has the duty to supply the required 
information.  The accountor is obligated to explain and justify his/her conduct to 
the accountee, who has the right to demand explanations, pose questions, pass 
judgments and impose sanctions on the accountor.  The accountee’s role in 
passing judgement can be related to making decisions and controlling the 
activities of the accountor, indicating superiority (Parker & Gould, 1999; Mulgan, 
1997).  
The final element in the process involves the account provider (accountor) 
being answerable to the account receiver (accountee) and being responsible for 
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the content of the report (Parker & Gould, 1999).  The report provides information 
on what was done, how the demands of the accountee were met, which activities 
were undertaken and how, allowing for evaluation of the accountor’s 
performance.  Such reports are usually formal and are conventionally seen as 
coded representation often in terms of numbers/financial statements (Munro, 
1996).   
In being responsible for the content of the report, the accountor is duty 
bound to provide answers to questions of why or why not particular actions were 
undertaken and reported (Lehmann, 1999).  In being answerable, the accountor, 
the Fijian public sector managers in this case, face the consequences arising out of 
his/her responsibility for the content of the report.  The consequence is determined 
by the accountee, who has the right to hold the accountor to account and impose 
sanctions (Mulgan, 2000).   
This generally accepted interpretation of accountability is normative and 
tends to be non-critical.  The focus is on a formal relationship between the 
accountor and the accountee thus embracing external scrutiny only.  The 
accountor is held to account by the acountee only on the report (account) provided 
by the accountor.  This can be interpreted as an encouragement to the accountor to 
provide limited reporting, that is report on only what is required.  The accountee 
therefore will only consider the evidence in the report to decide on the 
consequences or sanctions to impose on the accountor (Roberts, 1996, 1991).  In 
this context the accountor may not self-reflect on his/her action and consider the 
consequences of his/her action on others instead the accountor focuses on making 
him/herself look good by illustrating that he/she was meeting the accounteer’s 
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expectation (Roberts 1996, 1991, 2003).  This exposes how individuals or groups 
give an account of and for their daily lives, and in doing so produce and reproduce 
their individual and collective identities (Munro, 1996).  However, such 
normative understandings of accountability fail to consider the moral or ethical 
obligations associated with individual actions and account.  An accountee-
accountor relationship is likely to be shaped by the content of the report, which 
does not necessarily contain the consequences of the accountor’s actions on 
others.  In such situations the reports, such as those produced by the Fijian public 
sector managers or officials, will portray the successes and the accountor’s 
performance will be either sanctioned or rewarded based on the success stories 
portrayed by accounting numbers which according to Roberts (2001a) encourage 
narcissism.  
2.3 Roberts’ Interpretation of Accountability   
Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2005, 2009) expositions draw a 
contrast between a formal hierarchical system of accountability [individualising] 
and an informal dialectic, socialising form.  The former is perceived to be 
normative, based on calculative accounting where the accountee judges the 
accountor’s conduct by an external scrutiny of the accounts presented (Collier, 
2005).  The latter is based on a conversational sense-making narrative [dialectic] 
(Collier, 2005).  Roberts’ socialising form of accountability provides a critical 
lens on the traditional normative view.  An interpretation of the two forms is 
presented as they will be applied to the Fijian situation. 
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2.3.1 Individualising form 
An individualising form of accountability is associated with a formal hierarchical 
organisational structure where accounting plays a central role.  The organisational 
structure portrays hierarchical power, and individuals are viewed as either 
subordinates or superiors.  The superiors try to hold on to power, or, like their 
subordinates, aspire to achieve power by climbing the corporate ladder.  
Accounting reports play a pivotal role in a hierarchical system by providing ‘a 
visibility through which others view, judge and compare individual and group 
performance’ (Roberts, 1991, p. 363; also see Caker, 2007).  In this context 
accounting serves to produce and reproduce an individualised sense of self 
because individual success is measured by accounting numbers and these 
represent the individual.  
When organisational activity is represented by accounting, people view 
themselves as objects of accounting (Roberts, 1996).  According to Caker such 
perceptions,  
force individuals to continuously report performance through accounting 
reports hence people must handle this system to avoid negative evaluation 
or use this opportunity to promote their self interest (Caker, 2007, p. 146).  
 
That is, self-serving individuals will learn to discern which information to disclose 
and which to conceal, as only information which indicates good conduct or 
success will be desired by those using accountability for individualized motives.  
These processes often push individuals to place more focus on themselves 
(Roberts, 2001a) at the expense of cooperation with others, thus occluding a moral 
sense of responsibility.    
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The individualising effects of accountability remind the individual that the 
security of self is dependent on the standards set for performance (Roberts, 2001b, 
2003).  The self-serving individual therefore can act in a purposive and 
instrumental manner, competing with others in securing the self-interest via terms 
of the objective standards of expected performance.  The preoccupation of how 
one is judged in comparison to others leads to a neglect of one’s responsibility to 
others in the pursuit of self-interest (Roberts, 2001b).  The self- serving individual 
remains involved with the production and reproduction of a sense of self as 
singular, solitary and self-serving within only an external and instrumental 
relationship to others (Roberts, 1991, 2001a).  
Such individualistic behaviour is embedded in the accountability processes 
based on economic rationalisation in which a principal-agent relationship exists 
(Roberts, 2001b, 2003).  The agent (accountor) is held to account by the principal 
(accountee) via account giving using accounting information.  Accounting 
information is perceived to make transparent the conduct of the accountor, yet it is 
but a smokescreen for ‘real ‘accountability.  
2.3.2 Socialising form 
A socialising form of accountability informs one of the consequences for others of 
one’s actions, thereby dragging one out of one’s self-absorption (Roberts, 2010).  
This process gives rise to a sense of interdependence between self and others 
(Roberts, 2001), and hence suggests that accountability is associated with one’s 
moral responsibility to others.  An interpretation of the socialising form of 
accountability is important because it provides an insight into why accountability 
without moral responsibility is inconsequential (unintelligent accountability).  
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According to Roberts (1991, 2001) a socialising form of accountability is 
based on reporting done by dialogue, explanations or stories in instances where 
there is equality of power:   
socialising forms of accountability, associated with face to face 
accountability between people of relatively equal power, constitute a sense 
of the interdependence of self and other, both instrumental and moral. 
(Roberts, 2001b, p. 1547). 
Communication through dialogue with a relative absence of a formal 
power differential allows for open discussion, where one party questions, seeks 
answers and clarifications, and the other party provides answers and justifications 
without the fear of appraisal.  In this context there is potential for individuals 
(auditors and auditees) to engage fully as a person with another and with the self, 
thereby offering a fuller sense of personal recognition and identity.  The openness 
of communication and interaction ‘draws people into a deeper sense of their 
relatedness to each other’ (Roberts, 2001b, p. 1554).  The recognition of 
interdependence of self and others generates an understanding of reciprocity 
beyond the instrumental/individual interest and develops a sense of personal 
obligation and concern for others.  The concern for others is what makes an 
individual feel responsible for the consequences of his/her actions.    
Individualising and socialising forms of accountability are interdependent 
and are likely to prevail simultaneously within an organisation (Caker, 2007; 
Roberts, 2001a).  For example, public sector audits can both appear to be and be a 
form of accountability in that the financial statement audits have the potential of 
mirroring individual forms of accountability.  Whereas the discourse that takes 
place between the auditor and the auditee when the former seeks clarifications 
from the latter on concerns regarding compliance or record  keeping opens the 
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potential for a socializing from of accountability.  Both form therefore can be 
sources of an identity that people develop at work and may contribute positively 
to organisational performance.  There is, however, a potential risk that one form 
will dominate the other (Roberts, 2001a).  In a hierarchical organisation, the 
individualising form would dominate because performance is managed by 
accounting (Caker, 2007; Collier, 2005).  Self-serving individuals therefore would 
use accounting information to make visible their success, thus catching the eye of 
the powerful individuals.  This self-serving behaviour would lead to an 
asymmetrical distribution of power.     
Roberts (2001a) suggests that in order to avoid the potential tension that 
may arise from the two forms of accountability, the organisation should develop 
rules to support the socialising form.  The rules should ensure the independence of 
the actors who take moral responsibility for the consequences of their actions for 
others (Roberts, 2001).  This implies that the accountee (such as the public, the 
Parliament) should not penalise the accountor (such as the public sector manager, 
official), who uses his/her moral values to decide what to disclose in a report.  It 
can be that the disclosure portrays a negative image of the organisation.  It is 
argued that rules supporting real accountabilities would avoid differences in 
power distribution thus encouraging fair and frank communication.  
2.4 Accounting and Accountability 
According to Roberts (1991, 1996, 2001a) accounting plays a central role in an 
accountability relationship because the accountees, who hold the accountors to 
account, perceive it as authoritative and providing a mirror image of the 
organisation’s activities.  The implication is that accounting makes visible the 
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activities of the organisation.  The contents of the reports are therefore viewed as 
projecting transparency of business operations and achievement of performance 
standards (Roberts, 2001b).  The audit adds reliability to that which is being made 
transparent. 
Transparency literally means the ability of light to pass through something 
so that objects behind it can be seen (Roberts, 2010).  It creates a perception that 
one can judge the conduct of an organisation by scrutinising the accounting 
report.  Metaphorically, then, accounting is seen as laying bare and making visible 
the organisation’s activities (Roberts, 2010).   
Accounting is a vital resource in an accountability relationship (Roberts, 
1991, 2001a) as it forms the content of the report.  The accountee uses this content 
to hold the accountor to account.  However, in a hierarchical accountability 
system, there is potential for the accountor to know which information is needed 
to be held to account.  The accountor, therefore, will disclose only selected 
information, which makes the accountor look good in the eyes of the accountee 
(the powerful individuals).  In this context, however, accounting information that 
is disclosed to the accountor offers a transparency which is not sincere.  The 
accountor can  conceal negative or sub-standard performance, through for 
example, not being subjected to performance audit; thus distorting real 
accountability.  
Roberts (1991, 1996, 2009, 2010) also emphasises that producing accounts 
that are not used for consequences is an empty gesture.  In an accountability 
relationship, when holding the accountor to account, the accountee seeks 
explanations, clarification and justifications for the reporting and the content of 
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the report.  These processes are undertaken by the accountee in order to evaluate 
the performance of the accountor against the set standards and to determine the 
consequences to be imposed.  Consequences, such as published audit opinions are  
important as they are intended to change the conduct of the accountee.  
The failure of the accountee to impose consequences can create a potential 
for the accountor to produce reports for appearances only (Roberts, 2009).  The 
lack of action on the accountee’s part signals to the management (accountor) that 
as long as financial reports are prepared that meet the required reporting 
standards, then his/her obligation to report is complete.  Consequences are 
recognised in the normative literature but here the critical implications of its 
absence are made known.  
Further, management also know which accounting information is used to 
measure (audit) financial performance, so there is potential for management to 
ensure that the reports contain this information.  As such, reporting by 
management is then undertaken to positively portray how they managed the 
resources.   
When individuals are held to account using ‘standards that accounting 
embodies and advertises’ (Roberts, 2001, p. 117), then the surveillance that 
accounting makes possible singles individuals out and leaves individuals 
permanently, and at times anxiously, preoccupied with how they are seen, only 
securing themselves by meeting the expectations of authoritative others (Roberts, 
2001).  Individuals therefore secure legitimacy by meeting authoritative 
expectations of others.  
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The implication is that the individual will feel threatened with exclusion if 
he/she does not perform as required.  The individual will be tempted to keep 
information to his/her self, competing with others while hoping that others’ 
performances are worse than his or hers.  The individual’s desire to be seen as a 
success reflects a narcissistic vulnerability towards the existence-conforming look 
of others (Roberts, 2001).  Self-obsession with personal success reflected by 
accounting performance standards drives a person to disregard the consequences 
of his/her actions for others.  In this context the individual’s moral sensibilities are 
blunted and the individual does not feel responsible for others but seeks to self 
maximise utility from accounting.  
2.5 Summary  
Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2001, 2009) interpretation of accountability,  grounded in 
moral responsibility  contributes to an understanding  of how accounting and 
reporting without responsibility,  and consequence  such as audit and audit 
reporting can be used as a smokescreen to divert attention from the real needs of 
accountability.  His exposition on accounting used as transparency without 
consequences exposes the narcissism associated with promoting self-interest. 
Roberts’ exposition on accountability will be used to inform actions relating to the 
Fijian public sector performance audit (1970-1999).  
The next chapter analyses the emergence of public sector performance 
auditing in five Anglo-American countries and indicates the location of this thesis 
in that literature.  
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Chapter 3 Literature on Public Sector Performance Auditing 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Performance auditing has been described as an independent evaluation of the 
economy and efficiency of auditee operations, and the effectiveness of programs 
in the public sector (Norton & Smith, 2008; English, 2007; English, Guthrie, 
Broadbent, & Laughlin, 2010; Guthrie & Parker, 1999; O'Leary, 1996; Leeuw, 
1996; Thompson, 1996; Parker, 1990; English, 1990; McRoberts & Hudson, 
1985).  The primary objective of this chapter is to review the extant Anglo-
American literature on public sector performance auditing to identify the socio-
political and economic characteristics which appear to have influenced the 
emergence of performance auditing in five Anglo-American countries.  Such an 
analysis provides an understanding of why performance auditing developed in the 
way it did.  The chapter also seeks to develop an understanding of the role and 
practice of performance auditing in the public sector context.  The perceived 
objectives of performance auditing emerge as promoting accountability in the 
Anglo-American literature studied; these are therefore identified and their 
associated meanings evaluated, in the context of performance auditing. 
The literature review on performance auditing was limited to the United 
States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (U.K.), Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
The choice was limited to these countries because, with the exception of the U.S., 
the other four are based on the Westminster system of governance and have an 
Auditor-General (AG) who audits government expenditure and revenue.  This 
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aspect allows for reasonable comparability.  In the U.S., the General Auditing 
Office (GAO) and the Comptroller-General (CG) audit the government 
expenditure and revenues. According to Parker (1990), the U.S. is considered to 
have the most developed practice of performance auditing in the public sector 
context, and therefore the U.S. has been added. 
This chapter is structured in the following way: first the importance of the 
public sector is explained so that the role of the audit office and the auditor-
general is contextualised.  Second, an analysis of the current literature on 
emergence of public sector performance auditing in Anglo-American countries 
and third, an interpretation of the objectives of performance auditing as implicated 
in the existing literature is provided. 
3.2 Public Sector and Public Sector Audit  
Shim and Seigal (1995) and Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) suggest that the public 
sector is usually considered to be that part of the economy which is traditionally 
managed and controlled by the government on behalf of the citizenry.  The 
government therefore makes decisions on the use of, and is responsible for, the 
consumption of public sector resources (Jones & Pendlebury, 1992).  
The government, while managing and controlling public sector resources, 
is seen by the public as using the resources for the benefit of the public and 
creating value for the resources ( Barton, 2009; Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992; 
English, 2007, 1990).  According to Jones and Pendlebury (1992) and Musgrave 
and Musgrave (1984), the government controls public sector resources and uses 
them to fulfill certain economic roles in order to improve the welfare of the 
citizenry.  
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Hercok (1989) notes that the traditional role of the public sector is to 
improve the welfare of citizens by delivering goods and services that may not be 
provided by the private sector, at a price that makes them accessible to all.  
Common examples of such goods and services are education, health, defence, and 
transportation.  This is essentially a ‘public good’ concept and therefore such 
goods are recognized as public goods and have the characteristics of non-
excludability and non-rivalness (Malkin & Wildvasky, 1991).  Non-excludability 
indicates that no beneficiary can be excluded from using the good, and non-
rivalness indicates that the cost of producing the good does not increase as 
consumption of the good increases.  The prices of these public goods or social 
necessities, like health, education and mode of public transportation, are not 
necessarily determined by market forces.  In most cases the government is the 
primary supplier of public goods (Hercok,1989).  
Jones and Pendlebury (1992) and Hercok (1989) state that the central or 
the local government funds the broad provision of public goods in most countries.  
It is claimed by Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) that the government gets its 
funding from various sources - the most important being taxes and rates paid by 
the public.  The government, while controlling and using public sector resources 
and finances, is expected to be accountable to the public (Barton, 2009; Broadbent 
& Guthrie, 1992; English, 1990; Hercok, 1989).  
The performance auditing literature suggests that the government is 
accountable to the public through oversight bodies in most jurisdictions; one such 
oversight body is the Office of the Auditor-General (Barton, 2009; Lee, 2008; 
Norton & Smith, 2008; Funnell & Cooper, 1998; Radcliffe, 1998; Thompson, 
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1996; Funnell, 1994; Persaud & McNamara, 1993, 1994; Hamburger, 1989; 
Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989).  The oversight bodies are known by different 
names in different jurisdictions.  For example, in countries that are based on the 
Westminster system of governance, the most common oversight body is  called 
the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) or the National Audit Office (NAO), 
and in the U.S. they are known as the Office of the Comptroller-General (OCG) 
and the General Accounting Office (GAO) (English, Guthrie, Broadbent, & 
Laughlin, 2010; Christensen & Skaerbaek, 2007; Dittenhofer, 2001; Burrowes & 
Persson, 2000; McCrae & Vada, 1997; Parker & Guthrie, 1991; McRoberts & 
Hudson, 1985). 
The public sector provides the citizens with much desired social 
necessities and the funding for the provision of these social necessities is through 
public finance (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1984).  Therefore, while using and 
controlling public sector resources, the government in most jurisdictions is 
expected to be accountable to the public by the oversight bodies (Dittenhofer, 
2001; McCrae & Vada, 1997; Parker, 1990; Taylor, 1996).  The provision of 
public goods and public sector accountability are two themes central to the 
literature describing the role of performance auditing in the public sector. 
3.3 The Role of the Public Sector Performance Auditor  
Literature on performance auditing in the public sector suggests that the roles of 
the performance auditor are to: (i) examine the records of the auditee; (ii) form an 
opinion based on results of the examination; (iii) write a report based on the 
opinion; (iv) present the report to Parliament or Congress and (v) carry out a 
follow-up of the performance audit report recommendations (Ling, 2003; Morin, 
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2001; Wheat, 1991; Pendlebury & Shriem, 1990; Hamburger, 1989; Adams, 
1986).  The performance auditor does so to evaluate the performance of 
management and the use of public sector resources.  It is claimed that the 
performance auditor's report will lead to improvements in public sector 
performance because the performance auditor is expected to identify and indicate 
inefficient and/or ineffective practices and would therefore suggest strategies for 
improvements (Barton, 2009; Lee, 2008; Thompson, 1996; Taylor, 1996; Adams, 
1986).  In Roberts (1996, 2010) terms, the performance audit enables a verified 
report and therefore more real ‘transparency’.  
Authors generally agree that the performance auditor examines the 
auditee's records in terms of the objectives of performance auditing (Daujotaite & 
Macerinskiene; 2008; Morin, 2001; Parker & Guthrie, 1991; Hatherly & Parker, 
1990).  According to Parker and Guthrie (1991) and Pugh (1987), an examination 
of the auditee's records are carried out to arrive at a decision and form an opinion 
on how the management of a public sector entity has used  resources to achieve 
the objective/s of the entity.  
Jacobs (1998), Taylor (1996), McCrae and Vada (1997), and Parker and 
Guthrie (1991), state that the performance auditor expresses his/her opinion on 
how he/she thinks the management of the public sector entity has used resources 
to achieve the objectives of the entity.  The performance auditor also forms an 
opinion on the adequacy of the internal control procedures used to achieve the 
objective of the entity in terms of economy and efficiency.   
After reaching an opinion on how the resources have been used, the 
performance auditor is usually expected to compile a report based on that opinion 
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(Lee, 2008; Funnell & Cooper, 1998). According to Funnell and Cooper (1998) 
and McCrae and Vada (1997), the performance audit report is an evaluation of 
management's decisions on the usage of an entity's resources to achieve its 
specified objectives.  Therefore, the performance audit report reveals the 
performance auditor's opinion on the usage of the public sector resources, and 
whether the stated objectives of the entity have or have not been achieved.  
McCrae and Vada (1997), Taylor (1996), Wheat (1991), and Pendlebury and 
Shriem (1991, 1990), claim that the performance auditor in his/her report 
recommends ways by which the performance of the entity can be improved.  This 
suggests that the perceived role of the performance auditor as described in the 
literature studied, is both to hold the auditee to account and to advise on future 
actions. 
According to the performance auditing literature, the performance audit 
report, once compiled, is presented to parliament in countries that follow a 
Westminster system of governance (Lee, 2008; Funnel & Cooper, 1998; Parker & 
Guthrie, 1991), or, in the U.S., to Congress (Burrowes & Persson, 2000; 
Thompson, 1996).  Performance audit reports, once presented to Parliament or 
Congress, make public the performance of public sector entities.  These reports 
also provide an opportunity for members of parliament or congress to comment on 
and debate the performance auditor's findings and opinions.  
McCrae and Vada (1997) and Pendlebury and Shriem (1991, 1990) 
propose that the performance auditor's role includes a follow-up activity as the 
final stage of the performance audit program.  The follow-up activity focuses on 
the recommendations the performance auditor had suggested in his/her report 
 42 
 
regarding the management and the performance of the respective public sector 
entity.  The purpose of the follow-up activity according to Pendlebury and Shriem 
(1991, 1990), is to investigate: i) whether the recommendations suggested by the 
performance auditor to improve the management and the performance of the 
public sector entity have been implemented and ii) (if yes) to determine if the 
recommendations improved the management and performance of the entity.   
The follow-up activity carries the performance auditor's role into involving 
actions beyond and above forming an opinion.  Therefore, it is distinguished from 
the role of the external financial auditor.  In a public sector context, the 
performance auditor systematically evaluates the auditee's management and 
control of public sector resources and the performance of the public sector entity 
(Barton, 2009; Lee, 2008; Parker & Guthrie, 1991).  This is important in terms of 
discussions to follow on the implementation and discontinuation of performance 
and not financial audit in Fijian public sector during 1995-1997.  
The themes of provision of public goods, and public sector accountability 
appear to be central to understanding the perceived roles of performance auditor 
as described in the literature studied.  Based on these themes the performance 
auditor performs the various roles, as has been described, with an intention of 
determining effective and efficient resource management in the public sector.   
3.4 Emergence of Performance Auditing  
An evaluation of the performance auditing literature identified eight possible 
socio-political and economic influences that characterised the emergence and 
practice of performance auditing in the Anglo-American public sector.  The 
influences are: auditor-general; central and local governments; government fiscal 
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policies; pressure from lobby groups; review committees; statutes and legislation; 
the public sector accounting profession; and the reorganisation of the audit 
office/general accounting office.  These influences and their nation based sources, 
are summarised and presented in Table 3-1.  
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Table 3-1: Major Socio-Political and Economic Themes  
The socio-political and 
economic themes  
Descriptions of content  Countries  References  
U 
S 
A 
U 
K 
C 
A 
N 
A 
U 
S 
T 
N 
Z 
1.  Auditor-General  
influence  
Including performance auditing reports as a part of 
formal reporting but independent of annual audit 
report. 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Burrowes & Persson (2000); Dittenhofer (2001); 
Flesher & Zarzeski (2002); Glynn (1991); Grendon, 
Cooper, & Townley (2001); Guthrie (1990a); 
Guthrie & Parker (1999); Hamburger (1989); 
Jacobs (1998);  Lee (2008); Morin (2001); 
Radcliffe (1998); Taylor (1996);  Skene (1985); 
Wheat (1991). 
Personal and professional influence of Auditors-
General.  √ √ √ √ √ 
2. Central government and 
local governments 
influences. 
Central government request for control on public 
sector entities. √   √  
Adams (1986);  Barton (2009); Broadbent & 
Guthrie (1992); Burrowes & Persson (2000); Dillon 
(1985); English (1990); Flesher & Zarzeski (2002); 
Guthrie (1990a, 1990b); Jacobs (1998);  Lee 
(2008); Niesner (1999); Pendlebury & Shriem 
(1990);  Norton & Smith (2008); Pugh (1987); 
Skene (1985); Wheat (1991); Yamamoto & 
Watanabe (1989). 
Review of 1972 Local Government Act in 1982 
(U.K.).  
 √    
Improve financial management and efficacy. √ √ √ √ √ 
Economic reforms in the public sector.  √ √ √ √ √ 
Shift in public administration from resource 
allocation based on equity to concepts of efficiency 
in the management of public sector resources. 
√ √ √ √ √ 
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The socio-political and 
economic themes  
Descriptions of content  Countries  References  
U 
S 
A 
U 
K 
C 
A 
N 
A 
U 
S 
T 
N 
Z 
3.  Government fiscal 
policy.  
Growth of public sector and increases in   
government spending. √ √ √ √ √ 
Barton (2009); Broadbent and Guthrie 
(1992); Burrowes and Persson (2000); 
Dittenhofer (2001); Heaton, Savage and 
Welch (1993);  Lee (2008); Persaud and 
McNamara (1993, 1994); Wheat (1991); 
Yamamoto and Watanabe (1989).  
4.  Pressure from lobby 
groups.  
Calls from social and political lobby groups for 
greater government accountability in the 
management of public sector resources at national 
level due to: 
     
Barton (2009); Burrowes & Persson (2000); 
Dittenhofer (2001); Flesher & Zarzeski 
(2002); Glynn (1982); Guthrie and Parker 
(1999); Keen (1999); Yamamoto & 
Watanabe (1989).  
i)  increased public awareness of government 
fiscal policy; √ √ √ √ √ 
ii)  the increase in government spending; √ √ √ √ √ 
iii)  increase in taxes to fund new public sector 
programs;    √ √  √ 
iv ) at local government level, ratepayers called for 
accountability due to increase in local 
government spending and the likelihood of 
increases in local taxes to fund local 
government spending; 
√ √ √ √ √ 
v)  performance audit issues used to lobby political 
support in the State of Alberta in Canada.   √   
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The socio-political and 
economic themes  
Descriptions of content  Countries  References  
U 
S 
A 
U 
K 
C 
A 
N 
A 
U 
S 
T 
N 
Z 
 
5.  Review committees set 
up by government.  
Treadway Commission in U.S. 1976.  √     
Broadbent & Guthrie (1992); Burrowes & 
Persson (2000); Guthrie &Parker (1999); 
Heaton, Savage, &Welch (1993); Norton & 
Smith (2008);  Persaud & McNamara 
(1993/1994); Wheat (1991). 
Review Committee reports which recommended 
ways to improve public sector accountability for 
example, Coombs Commission 1976 in Australia.  
   √  
Review Committee set up by the government and 
the public sector auditing profession to develop 
performance audit standards 1993.  
√     
6.  Legislation, new and/or  
changes to Public 
Sector Audit Act, 
Finance Act, Local 
Government Act -
basically political 
processes. 
Enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
1977 in U.S.- prohibiting bribes in various forms.  √     
Barton (2009); Broadbent &Guthrie 
(1992); Burrowes & Persson (2000); Glynn 
(1991); Heaton, Savage, &Welch (1993); 
Jacobs (1998); Martin &Walsh (1996); 
McCrae and Vada (1997); McRoberts 
&Hudson (1985); Persaud & McNamara 
(1993/1994); Pitman & Sanford (1994); 
Radcliffe (1998); Root (1983); Sporkin 
(1998); Wheat (1991). 
Changes to the U.K. National Audit Act 1983, as a 
result of change the UK. Auditor-General was given 
the mandate to undertake performance audit. 
 √    
Local Government Finance Act 1982 U.K.  √    
Changes to Australian Audit Act 1979 - change 
provided authority to the Auditor-General to 
undertake performance audit.  
   √  
Changes to the Canadian Auditor General Act.    √   
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The socio-political and 
economic themes  
Descriptions of content  Countries  References  
U 
S 
A 
U 
K 
C 
A 
N 
A 
U 
S 
T 
N 
Z 
Changes to the New Zealand Public Finance Act 
1982.      √ 
7.  Influence of the public 
sector accounting 
profession. 
Public sector audit profession contributed to 
promulgation of the public sector auditing 
standards.  
√ √ √ √ √ 
Broadbent &Guthrie (1992); Burrowes & 
Persson (2000); Dittenhofer (2001); Flesher 
& Zarzeski (2002); Keen (1999); Morin 
(2001); Nobles et al. (1993); Wheat (1991). 
Formation of taskforce in USA to put forward a 
comprehensive definition of performance auditing 
and review the scope of performance auditing 
practices.  
√     
8.  Reorganisation of the 
Office of the Auditor-
General or the General 
Accounting Office, or 
Office of the Auditor-
General/National Audit 
Office.  
Reorganisation of the Audit Office or General 
Accounting Office led to the extended the scope of 
audit, which included performance auditing.  
√ √ √ √ √ Barton (2009); Broadbent & Guthrie (1992); 
Burrowes & Persson (2000); Dittenhofer 
(2001); Flesher & Zarzeski (2002); Heaton, 
Savage, & Welch (1993); Keen (1999); Lee 
(2008);  Persaud & McNamara (1993/1994).  
National Audit Office developing and providing 
guidance and auditing statements on the conduct of 
appropriate performance auditing.  
√ √ √ √ √ 
Socio-Political and Historical themes labeled as 2, 6 and 8 have been combined by most writers as public sector reforms. I have included aspects of reform in all three depending on the contribution to each. 
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The themes are presented roughly in order, as I perceive it to be, from the 
most influential to the least influential.  A discussion on the order of the themes is 
presented below, followed by a brief description of how the table was constructed 
and then an analysis of the themes is provided.    
3.5 Order of Influence  
The themes are the sources of influences for emergence of economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness audits identified from the extant literature review of the five 
selected countries.  The descriptions of these influences in the literature was 
identified and considered in terms of each of their contributions towards the 
emergence of such audits.  
Themes one and two take up the idea of influence.  The AG/GAO 
leadership is considered most important, primarily because in all the countries 
studied for this research the AG/ GAO was appointed under law and authorised to 
undertake public sector auditing.  Central and local government elected parties are 
placed second on the list, as these institutions are recipients of audit reports and, 
in their quest to strengthen control over public sector resources, they have to 
ensure that those resources were used for the intended purposes.   
Increased government spending (theme three) is significant because it 
raises the issues of budgetary control and accountability.  This is followed by 
pressure from lobby groups (theme 4), through their demands of accountability, 
and traditional audits that focus on the stewardship function instead of 
performance. The Review Committees (theme five), influence the emergence of 
performance auditing by suggesting changes in the legislation.  The statutes and 
legislation (theme 6) provide the AG/GAO with statutory rights to undertake 
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performance auditing.  The public sector accounting profession (theme 7) add 
credence to the practice of performance auditing by promulgating the appropriate 
auditing standards.  The reorganisation of the OAG/ OCG/OIG (theme 8) enables 
certain audit staff to be responsible for performance auditing.  It is important to 
take into account that most of these influences take place simultaneously and also 
cross nationally so some common experiences emerge, in providing a scope for 
performance auditing. 
3.5.1 Auditor-General/General Accounting Office influence  
There are claims that the AG/CG in particular for most countries, and the GAO in 
the U.S., greatly influenced the practices of performance auditing (Lee, 2008; 
Morin, 2004, 2001; Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Burrowes &Persson, 2000; 
Dittenhofer, 2001; Radcliffe, 1998; Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992; Guthrie, 1990a).  
The AG/ GAO/CG have either voluntarily or on the request of the central 
government incorporated performance auditing by reporting audit findings on 
public sector resource management and by associating these findings with issues 
of accountability (Burrowes & Persson, 2000; Keen, 1999; Heaton, Savage & 
Welch, 1993; Parker & Guthrie, 1991).  By incorporating issues of performance in 
the audit reports the auditor-general/comptroller-general was performing the 
authorised role of an oversight body and was informing the ‘users’ of the audit 
reports on how public sector resources were managed.  Therefore, it appears that 
the AG/CG raised concerns on the management of public sector resources and 
these concerns warranted reactions from the users of the performance audit 
reports.  A perception similar to these, as will be seen, is created in Fiji.  
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Literature on performance auditing in the Australian and Canadian public 
sector indicates that the auditors-general had significant personal and professional 
influence on the emergence of performance auditing (Barton, 2009; Lee, 2008; 
Morin, 2004; 2001; Radcliffe, 1998; Hamburger, 1989; Adams, 1986; McRoberts 
& Hudson1985; Glynn, 1982).  For example, Hamburger (1989) claims that the 
practice and development of performance auditing at the Australian National 
Audit Office (ANAO) was significantly influenced by the professional and 
personal attitudes and competence of the three auditors-general over a span of 
fifteen years.  Hamburger’s (1989) study outlines how each of the AGs influenced 
the shifts in the focus of public sector auditing from auditing for probity and 
compliance to auditing for performance in terms of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  The study explains how the different Australian AGs influenced 
the interpretations of the term performance audit.  It also indicates that as the 
OAG became influential in one aspect of performance auditing, for example, 
auditing for economy, the other aspect of auditing, such as efficiency auditing, 
was incorporated. Taylor (1996) describes the conflicts he as the Australain 
Auditor-General encountered with the executive and in particular with the 
‘Department of Finance during 1989-1992’ (p.150).The conflict arose when 
Taylor sought the right to report his audit findings ‘directly to the Australian 
Parliament  instead of presenting the reports to the Minister of Finance’(Taylor, 
1996, p.150).   The conflict was resolved when the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
supported Taylor’s submission to the Australian Parliament in seeking the above 
right in 1993 (Taylor, 1996)  Such actions and activities enabled the acceptance of 
performance auditing in the Australian public sector.  
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In the Canadian context, performance audits conducted by the Canadian 
Auditor-General and the Federal Audit Office during the years 1973 to 1978 had a 
focus on the use and management of public sector resources (Morin, 2001, 2004; 
McRoberts & Hudson, 1985).  In regard to the state of Alberta, the literature 
suggests that the Alberta Auditor-General influenced the practice and 
development of performance audits via extensive levels of reporting on public 
sector resource management and use of appropriated funds (Radcliffe, 1998).  For 
example, the Alberta AG’s audit findings during the 1960 and 1970 period 
focussed on the ‘non productive payment’ items which did not produce public 
benefits (Radcliffe, 1998) and on issues of lack of accountability in the 
management of public sector resources (Morin, 2001, 2004; Radcliffe, 1998). 
The Alberta AG’s audit findings of 1960s and 1970s (Radcliffe, 1998) and 
in 1980’s to 1990 (Morin, 2004) on the management and administration of (or 
lack of) public sector resources appealed to the ‘users’ of the audit reports.  The 
‘users’ in terms of the political parties, the government administrators, managers 
and taxpayers were positively receptive to the audit report findings and demanded  
more accountability from the government (Radcliffe, 1989).  This is seen 
paralleled in the Fijian context and is explored later in the research.  The AG of 
Alberta was able to use the traditional audit mandate to report the audit findings in 
such an extensive manner as to incorporate performance auditing with the 
traditional probity and compliance auditing. 
In the case of the U.S., Congress had requested the GAO after World War 
II to undertake ‘management audit’ of government owned companies for control 
purposes (Norton & Smith, 2008; Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002).  Though the 
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Congress initiated performance auditing, the GAO decided what constituted 
performance auditing (Wheat, 1991).  In doing so the GAO determined the 
‘objective’ of performance auditing and to some extent also developed a 
‘framework’ and practice/ structure of performance auditing.   
According to Wheat (1991), changes in the leadership and staffing at the 
GAO over the period 1960 -1980 contributed to the emergence of performance 
auditing in the U.S.   Over the period 1960-1980 the CG/IG shifted the audit focus 
from auditing of vouchers and forming normative judgements on legality or 
illegality of transaction to auditing entity performance (Wheat, 1991). Thompson 
(1996) and Wheat (1991) claim that during this period the GAO published 
Standards for Audit of Government Organisations Programs, Activities and 
Functions (which was later revised and became known as Yellow Book in 1972).  
This indicates that through the CG’s leadership, which normally acts on the 
Congress’ instruction, was able to extend the scope of its audit function and 
provided the users of the audit reports with a greater insight into public sector 
effectiveness.  
The AG/GAO/CG influence on the emergence of performance auditing 
was probably the most significant of all role makers in all the countries studied.  
This is because the OAG/GAO and the State Audit Office had the legislative 
mandate to undertake and extend the scope of traditional audit to audit for 
accountability.  In most countries the OAG/GAO/OCG appears to have selected 
an agency and decided the objectives and scope of performance auditing.  This is 
a powerful role indeed.  The Fijian Auditors-General followed similar trends as 
will be seen in later chapters.  
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3.5.2 Central and local government influence   
Central and local governments also influenced the emergence of public sector 
performance audits overseas  by: (i) requesting the respective OAG/GAO to 
perform an audit on the management and control of public sector resources; (ii) 
nominating Committees and Commission (Norton & Smith, 2008; Burrowes & 
Persson, 2000; Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Dillon, 1985); (iii) amending or changing 
audit legislations, (Jacobs, 1998; McCrae & Vada, 1997) and (iv) changing the 
organisational form of government/ministerial departments from departments to 
statutory  entities with a focus on commercial practice and performance (Norton 
& Smith, 2008; Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992).  The requests for performance audits 
and the nominations of the Committees/Commissions appear to have been 
motivated by the Government’s need to ensure that the public sector entities were 
achieving the purposes for which the resources were entrusted to them.  In 
requesting performance audit reports from the National Audit Office/ General 
Accounting Office, the central and local governments were signalling an 
acceptance of performance auditing and its outcomes.   
For example, the U.S. Congress requested the General Accounting Office 
to undertake performance auditing in government-owned corporations to improve 
financial and management efficacy (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Burrowes & 
Persson, 2000).  The reason given for this request was explained by managers of 
the government-owned corporations that these were exempt from normal 
congressional control (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002).  This indicates that the U.S. 
Congress found such audits to be a powerful means for holding public sector 
managers to account, a practice not shared by the Fijian Parliament as will be 
revealed.   
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According to Heaton, Savage and Welch’s (1993) survey of performance 
auditing in the U.S. municipal governments, it is claimed that certain local 
government authorities, namely the city councils of Lafayette, Louisiana and St. 
Petersburg, Florida, had included performance audit as a requirement in their 
1990 city charter.  This can be interpreted to mean that events at national level had 
a trickledown effect at the local level of government as most local authorities 
developed a charter that required performance audits.  
In the U.K. the local and central government authorities influenced the 
emergence of performance auditing by undertaking a review of the 1972 Local 
Government Finance Act in 1982 and of the 1982 National Audit Act (Grimwood 
& Tomkins, 1986).  These reviews provided the AG with the mandate for 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness audits.  
The need for the 1982 review of the Local Government Finance Act and 
the changes to the Audit Act in 1983 authorising the AG to undertake 
performance auditing, can be linked to Broadbent and Guthrie’s (1992) 
arguments.  These state that the government was changing the organisational form 
of traditional government departments to that of statutory bodies whereby the 
statutory bodies had to operate according to the ‘rules’ of a ‘commercial entity’, in 
particular with a focus on outputs.  At local government level for example, 
services like refuse collection were provided on a commercial basis in most 
municipalities (Pendlebury & Shriem, 1990; 1991) and the local government 
municipalities used the performance auditing as a means of demonstrating the 
effectiveness with which the resources were managed and the outputs achieved.  
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Thus, the local government administrators shifted the focus from administration 
of public sector resources to performance of public sector resources.  
Literature suggests that both the central and local governments contributed 
to the emergence of public sector performance auditing by acting as a catalyst in 
various ways.  These were by requesting the GAO/NAO/OAG to conduct 
performance audits, nominate Committees/Commissions to recommend ways to 
improve public sector accountability, and /or regulate changes to the audit or 
finance acts.  A common feature amongst the jurisdictions studied indicates that 
the central government’s acceptance of and contributions to the development of 
performance auditing had a direct ‘trickle down’ influence at the local 
government level.  Whether these events have a parallel in the Fijian context, is 
yet to be seen.  
3.5.3 Fiscal policy 
Government fiscal policy, in terms of increasing government expenditure 
(Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989) combined with the growth in the size of the 
public sector (Jacobs, 1998; Wheat, 1991), contributed to the emergence of 
performance auditing.  In countries like the U.S, U.K, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, increased government spending led to situations whereby governments 
had to raise taxes to fund the increased spending and new public sector projects 
(Baton, 2009; Lee, 2008; Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989).  In order to raise taxes 
and sustain the public sector growth, government was expected to demonstrate 
that public funds and resources were used in an accountable manner and not with 
extravagance or waste (Ling, 2003; Jacobs, 1998; Wheat, 1991).  
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Skene (1985) suggests that during the 1970s when New Zealand was 
experiencing public sector growth with a consequent increase in government 
spending, the AO took it upon itself to comment on government expenditures 
which it thought were wasteful or extravagant.  By providing the government with 
reports on departments and entities which used the resources in a wasteful and 
extravagant manner the AO signalled to the government how they could cut back 
on un-necessary spending.  There are suggestions in the literature that the New 
Zealand government took steps to cut back budgetary allocations to government 
departments and in the late 1980s there was a reduction in the size of the public 
sector (Pallot, 2003; Jacobs, 1998; Skene, 1985).  The Central government’s fiscal 
policy implementation combined with the audit findings on the management of 
resources during the 1970s contributed to the growth of performance auditing in 
the New Zealand public sector.   
According to Wheat (1991), the state and local governments in the U.S. 
faced major financial constraints during the 1970s.  Federal government grants 
were reduced and the taxpayers resisted tax increases (Raaum & Soniat, 1993; 
Wheat, 1991).  As a result, the state and local governments shifted their focus 
from the provision and delivery of services to efficiencies (Raaum & Soniat, 
1993) thus promoting performance audits.  
3.5.4 Lobby group influence  
Increased government spending and large budget deficits have also responded to 
lobby groups and the public demands for greater government accountability as to 
the use of public sector resources in many countries (Barton, 2009; Flesher & 
Zarzeski, 2002; Keen, 1999; Wheat, 1991; English, 1990; Glynn, 1982).  In 
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countries like the U.S., the U.K. and Canada, the increase in government spending 
signalled to the taxpayers the possibilities of increases in the taxes and rates 
(Thompson, 1996; Yamamoto & Watanabe 1985).  Tax increase concerns 
(Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1985) fuelled by media reports of wasteful and 
extravagant management of resources (Radcliffe, 1998; Jacobs, 1998) may have 
raised awareness of public sector resource management and, as a consequence, the 
public, the taxpayers, the political lobby groups and others called for greater 
accountability (Burrowes & Persson, 2000; Jacobs, 1998; Yamamoto & 
Watanabe, 1989). 
  Some writers have opined that the politicians representing the taxpayers 
and acting as a lobby group (the U.S., the U.K., Canada and New Zealand) used 
the AO/GAO reports to question the performance of the public sector in the 
Congress/Parliament (Burrowes & Persson, 2000; Jacobs, 1998; Thompson, 
1996). In turn the governments relied on the audit reports to answer the concerns 
raised by the politicians (Radcliffe, 1998; Skene, 1985).  Such reliance have 
provided an impetus to the AG/CG to extend the scope of traditional audit to 
performance audit.  
Morin (2004) and Radcliffe (1998) suggest that the emergence of 
performance auditing in the Canadian state of Alberta was influenced by 
politicians.  During the 1960 and the 1970 state elections the Albertan politicians, 
while campaigning for electoral votes used the issue of public sector resource 
(mis)management (Radcliffe, 1998).  By questioning the resource (mis) 
management issue, multi-party politicians suggested that the government is be 
able to improve public sector accountability through the practice and development 
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of performance audit.  This is supported by Jacobs (1998) and Thompson (1996) 
who claim that the politicians used the audit reports to indicate to the government 
the issues of public sector accountability and the impending tax burden on the 
taxpayers to support increases in public spending. 
The media is also viewed as a lobby group which has contributed to the 
development of performance auditing by publicising the audit findings.  There are 
claims that the media was instrumental in publishing the audit reports from the 
OAG/GAO on issues of wasteful and extravagant use of public sector resources 
(Burrowes & Persson, 2000; Thompson, 1996; Jacobs, 1998).  In publicising the 
audit reports and highlighting waste in the public sector, the media would  have 
inspired the politicians and the taxpayers demand for greater public sector 
accountability.  
The politicians who are usually viewed as the taxpayer representatives, 
and the media as a means of publicising information, both contributed to the 
development of performance auditing by raising issues of accountability and by 
calling for an accountable government.  Hence most public sector entities were 
subjected to performance auditing.  The Fijian case as will be seen the lobby 
group influence was not strong.  
A culmination of factors led the government in Australia during the 1970s 
and 1980s and the Congress in U.S. after World War II, to set up review 
committees to address the issues of public sector efficacy and auditing (Flesher & 
Zarzeski, 2002; Guthrie, 1990a).  The general purpose of the review committee 
was to suggest ways to improve public sector accountability via financial 
management reforms or auditing (Burrowes & Persson, 2000; Guthrie & Parker, 
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1999; Persaud & McNamara 1993, 1994; Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992; Wheat, 
1991).  For example, during World War II, the U.S. Congress felt that there was a 
lack of financial and management control in federal-owned companies which 
were exempt from Congressional control.  To seek a remedy, a Congressional 
Review Committee was commissioned in 1945 Chaired by Harry F. Byrd.  The 
Committee recommended that the GAO audit all government corporations for 
efficacy of financial management and internal controls (Flesher & Zarzeski, 
2002).  In 1945, the U.S. Congress passed the Government Corporation Control 
Act, which incorporated the Review’s recommendations and the federal 
government owned corporations were subjected to mandatory performance 
auditing.   
In the Australian context, review committees contributed to the emergence 
of public sector performance auditing at both the federal and state government 
levels (Barton, 2009; Guthrie, 1990b).  According to Guthrie and Parker (1999), 
the Australian government had established a royal commission to investigate 
efficiency in the Australian government administration after World War I because 
of the economic crisis.  The authors’ claim that the Royal Commission on Public 
Expenditure of the Commonwealth of Australian with a View to Efficiency and 
Economy (RCPECA, 1919) had indicated that Australia had as much a need for 
‘an auditor of economic efficiency, as for an auditor of accuracy and honesty’ 
(Guthrie & Parker, 1999, p. 309).  This indicates that the foundation for public 
sector performance auditing was laid as early as 1919.  Despite this, 
recommendation the Australian Audit Office did not actively pursue performance 
auditing until the 1970s (Guthrie & Parker, 1999).   
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The literature informs that during the 1970s the AAO actively engaged in 
performance auditing and as a result, issues of public sector resource management 
and administration and whether the AAO be given the mandate to undertake 
performance auditing surfaced in the Australian public sector (Guthrie & Parker, 
1999; McCrae & Vada, 1997).  To address this, the Australian government set up 
RCAGA (the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration) in 
1974. 
In its Review Report, the RCAGA recommended that the OAG be given 
the powers to undertake public sector performance audits and the focus of such 
audits be on ‘departmental performance’ of the public sector entity and not the 
government policy (Dillon, 1985).  The RCAGA contributed by recommending 
changes to the 1901 Audit Act which would allow the OAG to undertake 
economy, effectiveness and efficiency audits (Dillon, 1985).  
The suggestions of review committees paved the way for the continuance 
of performance auditing in most countries.  There are assertions in the literature 
that the central governments of the U.K., New Zealand and Canada had also 
nominated and set up review committees to address the issues of public sector 
administration and changes in legislation to expand the scope of public sector 
auditing (Flesher & Zazeski, 2002).  In most cases the review committees had 
suggested possible changes to legislation and statutes which would give the AO/ 
GAO the authority to undertake mandatory performance auditing.  
3.5.5 Statutes and legislation (part of reforms)  
The political processes in almost all the countries studied led to situations in 
which changes were made to the statutory acts relating to public sector audits or 
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finance so as to expand the scope of traditional public sector audit.  Changes to 
the respective acts provided statutory authority to the AG/CG to undertake 
performance auditing (Barton, 2009; Norton & Smith, 2008; Burrowes & Persson, 
2000; Sporkin, 1998; Jacobs, 1998; Radcliffe, 1998; McCrae & Vada 1997; 
Martin & Walsh, 1996).  For example, in New Zealand the Audit Office 
undertook voluntary performance auditing from 1972 and this appears to have 
influenced the changes to the 1969 Public Finance Act.  The literature suggests 
that changes were made to the Public Finance Act in 1977 to provide the auditor-
general with the authority to undertake performance auditing, and in 1989 the 
Public Finance Act was amended, providing the auditor-general with a mandate to 
conduct performance auditing (Jacobs, 1998; Skene, 1985).  In 2001, the Public 
Audit Act was revised and the AG was given the statutory mandate to undertake 
public sector performance audits (Public Audit Act, 2001).  
In the U.K., the Local Government Finance Act 1972 was reviewed in 
1982, and consequently performance auditing was incorporated as part of the 
Local Government Finance Act (Pendlebury & Shriem, 1990).  In 1983 the 
National Audit Act was amended to provide the auditor-general and the National 
Audit Office with a mandate to undertake performance auditing in the U.K. public 
sector (Norton & Smith, 2008; Burrowes & Persson, 2000; Pendlebury & Shriem, 
1990).   
In the U.S., the outcomes of the Congressional 1976 Treadway 
Commission’s recommendations on ‘fraudulent financial reporting’ (Sweeney, 
1989) resulted in changes to the legislation for controlling fraudulent practices, for 
example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (Sporkin, 1998; Gray, 1990; 
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Root, 1983; Kim & Barone, 1981).  The purpose of this Act was to prohibit U.S. 
corporations from bribing foreign government officials and political parties within 
and outside the U.S. in an effort to win or retain business deals and other such 
illegal actions (Martin & Walsh, 1996; Peele, 1988; Root, 1983).  It is probable 
that the mandatory implementation of this Act strengthened the development of 
performance auditing, by the requirement that during an ‘audit’ process the GAO 
focuses on administration, management and funding or financing of the political 
campaigns, political agencies and other government agencies which engaged in 
foreign financial dealings.  Furthermore and because ‘performance audits uncover 
waste and fraud’ (Thompson, 1996, p. 14) and  given that the purpose of the 1977 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is to prohibit fraudulent financial practices, it is 
probable that a performance audit would be one way to detect such problems in 
the public sector.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 requires report on the internal audit 
of systems and so this further strengthens the need for performance audits.   
In most countries, changes to the legislation provided the AG/CG with 
authority to perform mandatory audits of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
for most public sector entities.   
3.5.6 Public sector accounting profession 
The public sector accounting profession in countries like the U.S., Australia and 
Canada generally contributed towards the evolution of performance auditing by 
promulgating public sector auditing standards and by identifying appropriate and 
acceptable performance auditing practices (Keen, 1999; Nobles et al., 1993; 
English, 1990; Glynn, 1982).  In Australia the ANAO used the 1986 International 
Congress of Supreme Audit Institution’s (INTOSIA) definition of performance 
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auditing (Guthrie & Parker, 1999).  The ANAO may have taken this approach to 
provide an ‘acceptable practice’ in line with international practices and 
description of performance auditing.  
The Association of Government Accountants in the U.S. formed a task 
force to put forward a comprehensive definition of the term performance auditing 
and to review the scope of performance auditing practices (Nobles et.al., 1993).  
Furthermore, Burrowes and Persson (2000), point to the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants’ report outlining the conduct of performance audits 
for both private and public sector entities in 1982.  This indicates that the 
accounting profession was inspiring the development and practice of performance 
auditing by providing extensive practice guidelines.  
Similar claims have been made as to the Australian, Canadian and U.K. 
public sector accounting professions (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; English, 1990; 
Glynn, 1982).  It can probably be implied that the public sector accounting 
professions in most countries were  maintaining the credibility of the profession 
by ensuring that performance auditing was undertaken within an accepted ‘frame’ 
or boundary of practice.  
3.5.7 Restructured audit offices (part of reforms) 
In countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand the NAO/GAO was 
reorganised and restructured during the 1970s and 1980s to establish special 
units/sections to undertake public sector performance auditing (Dittenhofer, 2001; 
Jacobs, 1998; Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992).  For example, a performance audit 
section was established within the ANAO in 1978 (Hamburger, 1989), and the 
NZAO in 1987 (Jacobs, 1998).  Establishing a  ‘performance audit unit’ within 
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the National Audit Office in the Australian and New Zealand context implies that 
the AO was seeking a mandate beyond the traditional attest audit and was 
intending to devote existing resources to performance audit programs.  
According to Jacobs (1998), the NZAO had started reorganising its 
structure in 1986 to form a performance audit unit and in 1987 the Major Projects 
Unit was established.  The unit was staffed by accountants and non-accountants to 
undertake performance audit projects in the New Zealand public sector (Jacobs, 
1998).  Developments in New Zealand public sector auditing have led to a 
situation where performance auditing is an official mandate of the Office of the 
Auditor-General (Public Audit Act, 2001).  
In the U.S. at municipal level, city councils established internal audit 
sections responsible for undertaking performance audits (Dittenhofer, 2001).  This 
is specific to GAO authority or investigations and reveals economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness audits at other levels.   
Reorganising audit offices to create a place for performance auditing 
indicates a wider acceptance of performance auditing as an integral part of the 
public sector accountability.  Re-organisation has occurred in both Australia 
(Funnell, 1997; Hamburger, 1989) and in New Zealand (Jacobs, 1998) in the 
1990’s.  Yet while the re-organising process is likely to be itself a response to 
other influences such as the presence of a strong auditor general or the existence 
of economic or political problems, the very act of re-organising may itself be an 
influence.  Re-organisation permits other and peripheral changes, such as 
establishing a distinct role for performance audit, to occur.  So whether these 
changes to performance audit were brought about by other influences, or whether 
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they came about as a part of the change itself, the very act of change appears to 
have played a part in influencing the role of performance audit in the public 
sector.   
3.5.8 Conclusion on sources of influence  
The emergence and development of the practice of performance auditing was a 
mixture of social, political and economic processes.  Developments were 
influenced by input from the auditor-general/comptroller general, the national and 
local governments, government fiscal policies, pressure for greater government 
accountability from lobby groups, the review committees set by government, 
changes in statutes and legislations, the public sector accounting profession and 
the restructure of the audit office.  
There are also a couple of other points that speak of influence or of the 
effect of that influence.  It is noted that the timing of some of the events - such as 
restructuring or legislation or social lobbies - was almost simultaneous in many of 
the countries studied.  While there is little evidence to be confident of the cause, 
such a coincidence  does speak of the power of international networks or common 
economic events.  It also appeared to be the case that performance auditing was 
generally promoted by the OAG/GAO - a strong influence (as perceived by the 
literature) - and subsequently accepted by the government and the various 
stakeholders, including the public, as a means of addressing public sector resource 
management or accountability concerns.  Finally, and ultimately, the emergence 
of performance auditing is a key element in public sector auditing.  The traditional 
audit scope has expanded from compliance and financial statement audits to 
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audits for performance.  The international environment in which the Fijian 
government finds itself during 1995-1999 is one therefore that foments change. 
3.6 Objectives of Performance Auditing 
The concepts of economy, efficiency and effectiveness frequently emerged as the 
objectives of public sector performance auditing (English, Guthrie, Broadbent,  & 
Laughlin, 2010; Daujotaite & Macerinskiene, 2008; Lee, 2008; Radcliffe, 1998; 
Funnell, 1997; Leeuw, 1996; English, 1990; Guthrie, 1990; Parker, 1990; 
McRoberts & Hudson, 1985).  The following interprets how the terms economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness are used in the public sector performance auditing 
literature.  Conclusions are drawn as to implications for performance audit 
expectations in Fiji.  
3.6.1 Economy 
Several writers on public sector performance auditing hold the view that economy 
is associated with acquiring and minimising the cost of input used to achieve the 
objectives of the public sector entity without compromising the quality of the 
output (Daujotaite & Macerinskiene, 2008; Lee, 2008; Gendron, Cooper & 
Townley, 2001; McCrae & Vada, 1997; O'Leary, 1996; Taylor, 1996; Jones & 
Pendlebury, 1992; Glynn, 1991, 1989; Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989).  This 
explanation focuses on the costs of acquiring the inputs to achieve the objectives 
of the public sector entity.  Input in the public sector context would be the volume 
and the price or cost of resources consumed to achieve service objectives of an 
entity (Daujotaite & Macerinskiene, 2008; Jones & Pendlebury, 1992).   
There are assertions that ‘economy’ is linked with ‘efficiency’ in the 
practice of public sector performance auditing (Daujotaite & Macerinskiene, 
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2008; Dittenhofer, 2001; Persaud & McNamara, 1993, 1994; Grimwood & 
Tomkins, 1986; McRoberts & Hudson, 1985; Prasser, 1985).  The link is implicit 
in the focus on minimising costs, and the usage of the input in achieving the 
objective of the entity.  The primary focus for both economy and efficiency is the 
input.  Some writers also hold the view that both economy and efficiency focus on 
acquiring inputs and are concerned with protecting and using public sector 
resources (Dittenhofer, 2001; Persaud & McNamara, 1993, 1994). 
Explanations are offered that performance auditing includes both economy 
and efficiency without specific distinction between the two (Daujotaite & 
Macerinskiene, 2008; Dittenhofer, 2001; Persaud & McNamara, 1993, 1994).  
Instead, their claim is economy and efficiency are together determined by 
establishing: i) whether the entity is acquiring, protecting and using its resources 
economically and efficiently; ii) the causes of inefficiencies or uneconomical 
practices and iii) whether the entity has complied with laws and regulations on the 
matters of economy and efficiency.  
There are indications that economy may be associated with inputs but the 
interpretations vary.  The purpose and meaning of economy in the public sector 
context does not appear to be fully resolved but  generally refers to inputs. 
3.6.2 Efficiency 
Most writers on the public sector performance auditing literature do not rigidly 
distinguish between economy and efficiency.  Instead, they advocate the view that 
efficiency includes economy (Grendon, Cooper & Townley, 2001; McCrae & 
Vada, 1997; O'Leary, 1996; Jones & Pendlebury, 1992; Glynn, 1991, 1989; 
Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989; Prasser, 1985).  Viewing efficiency as an input-
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output relationship suggests that efficiency is results-oriented and that the result 
(output) may depend on the volume of input consumed for a given output.  
There are claims that efficiency is seen as managing the resources within 
an entity, where the management has control over the resources (Daujotaite & 
Macerinskiene, 2008; Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989).  This indicates that there is 
no undue external or political pressure on the management to use and manage the 
resources of an entity in a particular way.  In such instances the management is  
seen to be responsible for achieving the objectives of the entity in an efficient and 
effective way.  Management therefore, is accountable to the public via the 
government, on the use and management of public sector resources.  
In the Australian context, most writers on public sector performance 
auditing have used Cutt's (1977) description of efficiency to provide an insight 
into the perceived purpose of performance auditing (McCrae & Vada, 1997; Pugh, 
1987; Parker & Guthrie, 1991; Glynn, 1987, 1989, 1991; Dillon, 1985).  Cutt 
(1977, cited by Dillon, 1985), describes efficiency at three levels.  
Level 1 Efficiency:  
The lowest level of accountability may be seen as fixed or fiduciary 
accountability, which is defined exclusively in terms of actual expenditure 
of funds and procedures by which that expenditure is accounted for.  
 
Level 2  Efficiency: 
…. may be defined in terms of the ratio of some physical measure of 
output from the activity or program to the costs of that activity or program. 
 
Level 3  Efficiency or effectiveness accountability: 
Effectiveness may be broadly defined to refer to the degree of success an 
organisation enjoys in doing whatever it is trying to do…. as distinct from 
efficiency II, efficiency III requires that the output measures reflect the 
attainment of the objectives of the activity or program in question. (Dillon 
1985, p.250) 
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According to some authors (McCrae & Vada, 1997; Guthrie & Parker, 
1990; Glynn, 1991, 1989, 1987; Pugh, 1987), efficiency at levels 1 and 2 can be 
evaluated by a performance auditor.  Level 1 efficiency focuses on the actual 
amount of expenditure incurred to acquire the inputs, and the performance auditor 
evaluates the cost and the quality of inputs.  Level 2 efficiency, as described by 
Cutt (1977), focuses on the input-output relationship with the intention to 
maximise output.  Efficiency at levels 1 and 2 focus on the inputs and the outputs 
and do not appear to empower the auditor-general to question policy (Daujotaite 
& Macerinskiene, 2008).  Perhaps as a result, efficiency at these levels is accepted 
as a purpose of performance auditing in the Australian context (McCrae & Vada, 
1997; Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Pugh, 1987).  
Some writers hold the view that efficiency at level 3, as described by Cutt 
(1977), need not be considered as a purpose of performance auditing in the 
Australian public sector (McCrae & Vada, 1997; Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Dillon, 
1985; Pugh, 1987).  Efficiency at level 3 raises questions about the government's 
policy implementations.  For example, the 1979 Australian Audit Act does not 
empower the Australian Auditor-General to question the efficiency of government 
policies.  In the performance auditing literature the meaning of efficiency, like the 
meaning of economy, is somewhat vague.  However, efficiency as used in the 
performance auditing literature generally focuses on the input-output relationship. 
3.6.3 Effectiveness  
Effectiveness is concerned with the consideration of the success of, or the extent 
to which outputs achieve the intended or desired goals of a public sector entity 
(Daujotaite & Macerinskiene, 2008; Funnell & Cooper, 1998; McCrae & Vada, 
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1997; O'Leary, 1996; Glynn 1991, 1989; Yamamoto & Watanabe, 1989; 
McRoberts & Hudson, 1985).  Therefore effectiveness focuses on the relationship 
between the outputs and the objectives of a public sector entity.  In examining 
effectiveness, the performance auditor focuses on the objective/s of an entity and 
evaluates how the outputs have contributed towards the achievement of the 
entity's objective/s. 
McRoberts and Hudson (1985) claim that in public sector performance 
auditing, the effectiveness of a program can be assessed by evaluating and 
reviewing four basic issues regarding the programme.  These issues include: (i) 
the degree to which the programme continues to make sense and addresses a 
continuing need; (ii) the degree to which the programme's objectives are being 
met; (iii) the assessment of the programme's intended or unintended effects and 
(iv) the relative cost-effectiveness of the present method of delivering the 
programme.  This explanation suggests that effectiveness in performance auditing 
has a  focus beyond the inputs, outputs and aims of a programme; it can also 
include a political assessment on the need or desirability of continuing a 
programme in the public sector.  As with economy and efficiency, there are 
multiple meanings associated with effectiveness, some of which are linked to the 
political as well as the objective assessment of analysis. 
3.7 Summary 
Over time, performance auditing appears to have become an accepted part of the 
public sector auditing process and practices in most Anglo-American countries.  
This study indicates that the offices of the auditors-general or their equivalents in 
the U.S. largely undertake performance auditing in various forms but that, as a 
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result of events and influences over time, public sector auditing has extended 
beyond the traditional oversight role.  The scope of public sector audits has 
expanded beyond and above checking for regulatory and procedural compliance, 
to enhancing accountability in the management of public sector resources.  It can 
be generally concluded that the practice and the objectives of performance 
auditing are still developing.  
The practices and the processes of public sector performance auditing have 
been influenced from several sources throughout the countries studied.  For 
example, auditors-general or  accountings general inspired practices and 
influenced the emergence and development of performance auditing by 
undertaking such audits a part of regular public sector financial statement and 
compliance audits.  These practices were further expanded by the audit offices 
and the GAO (U.S) with the formulation of techniques for undertaking economy, 
effectiveness and efficiency audits.  In most cases the practice was influenced by 
public demand and public sector budgetary constraints.  Other common factors 
were the existence of public sector economic reforms, and the influence of central 
and local governments and the public sector accounting profession.   
The various sources of change continue to emerge.  For example, public 
sector auditing professions in most countries studied develop acceptable practices 
on an ongoing basis and appropriately define what constitutes performance 
auditing.  It is possible that the various socio-economic and political factors 
within different countries will continue to affect the practice of performance 
auditing.  Future development and practices will  continue to be influenced by the 
socio-economic and political environment within the public sector.  
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This chapter has reviewed the literature on the emergence of performance 
auditing in five Anglo-American countries, four of which follow the Westminster 
system of auditing.  The review has revealed that the practice of performance 
auditing has been widely accepted in these Western countries and has grown.  The 
governments in these countries changed the Audit Act or legislation to mandate 
such audits.  These trends indicate growth in performance audits in western 
democracies.  They do not however reveal declines or ‘discontinuation’ of such 
audits.  In this, Fiji seems unique.  By analysing this counter trend, this thesis 
uniquely brings a critical - interpretative understanding to such events taking 
performance audits in a completely different and unexpected direction.  This is the 
contribution of this project.  The next chapter provides insights into the broader 
socio-political history in which the Fijian public sector is embedded to expose the 
influences on the Audit Office.  
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Chapter 4 The Fijian Socio-Political and Historical Milieu 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The discussion in this chapter provides insights into the wider social, historical 
and political systems within which the Fijian Audit Office performs its 
constitutional accountability role.  The activities of the Fijian Auditors Generals 
(Bhim [1970-1984], Narain [1984-1987], Datt [1984-1997], Jacobs [1997-2000] 
and Vatuloka [2000-2009]) and the wider milieu are perceived to be intertwined. 
The qualitative literature generally holds that society, politics and history 
are not separable and therefore economic issues and events cannot be 
meaningfully investigated or understood without contextualisation within its 
broader socio-political history (Baxter & Chua, 2003; Deegan 2002; Herda, 
1999).  The wider social and political system therefore influences the changing 
role of the Fijian Auditor-General.   
  The discussion in the next section is an introduction to Fiji’s geography, 
landownership and population.  This is followed by a discussion on the pre-
cession period (before 1874) to establish the indigenous Fijian political structure 
and rights to landownership.  An evaluation of the post cession period (1874-
1970) is offered next to expose the legacies of the British colonial system.  This is 
followed by an evaluation of the 1970-2000 period to reveal how the tribal Fijian 
political structure influenced governance in democratic Fiji.  Conclusions drawn 
evaluate the context in which the Fijian Audit Office and the Auditor-General 
undertook audits.    
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4.2 Geography and Demography  
The Fiji Islands comprise 300 small reef-fringed islands which are spread over 
250, 000 square miles, of which only 7,050 square miles constitutes dry land.  The 
two biggest islands of the group are Viti Levu with a land mass of approximately 
4,011 square miles and Vanua Levu with a land mass of 2,173 square miles.  
About 83% of the dry land is owned by the native Fijian landowners and is held in 
custody by the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) on behalf of the landowners 
(Davies, 2005).  The NLTB was set up by the Colonial Administrators in the 
1940’s to ‘lease the inalienable land to Indian sugar-cane farmers and is seen by 
the indigenous Fijians as protective of their interest’ (Ghosh, 2004, p. 114).  The 
other 10% is Crown land and is either owned by the government, the rich Indo-
Fijians or the overseas investors.  Of the ‘7 % freehold land initially owned by the 
Europeans, about 4% has been returned to NLTB as Crown land after the Qarase-
led government’s Native Land Trust Amendment Act no 12 of 2002’ (Davies, 
2004, p.58).   
Such stringent landownership and tenure rules portray the Indo-Fijians and 
other minority population as landless.  These groups either have to lease land from 
NLTB for agricultural purposes or engage in commercial activities such as 
banking, education, other service provisions, manufacturing or securing public 
service jobs to earn their livelihood (Gosh, 2004; Kumar & Prasad, 2002).   
The land-ownership issue is a politically and economically contentious 
one for both the Fijians and the Indo-Fijians (Pangerl, 2007; Norton, 2002).  The 
former associate land-ownership with political and economic security whereas the 
latter view the lack of ownership as economic insecurity.  In the Fijian social 
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structure land is associated with their heritage, is communally owned by the tribe 
(Yavusa/clan) and the clan members identify themselves with their piece of land 
(Tuimaleali’ifano, 2000).  The Fijian perception of landownership can be 
interpreted as being innate because their social structure is based on land 
ownership and this is used to trace their ancestry (lineage) thus legitimating 
‘kinship’.  
According to Tuimaleali’ifano (2000, p. 253) ‘the ratu (chief) of the tribe 
and the vunua (land owning unit with a common ancestor) provide the foci of 
hereditary authority’ and this fosters political aspirations.  Chiefly titles and power 
are hereditary in Fiji.  Chiefs strengthen the kinship based political structure 
within the Fijian vanua through strategic marriage alliances, use of religion, blood 
ties and personal ability (Tuimaleali’ifano, 2000).  This model is used by the 
Chiefs to promote Fijian paramountcy and legitimise Fijian interest.  Such a social 
system promotes a complex political structure and yet governance in Fiji prior to 
and after independence and the coups is based on a Westminster system of 
Parliament and the rules and regulations used to manage the Fijian public sector 
are also based on the British and Western type developed democratic countries.  
Fiji witnessed four coups within a period of twenty years reflecting the influence 
of the indigenous tribal system of politics.  Hence, the political structures in Fiji 
are conflicted and create political and economic contention. 
The current population of Fiji is approximately 850,000 (Fiji Bureau of 
Statistics, 2010).  Of this, Fijians comprise 58% of the total population, whilst the 
Indo-Fijian make up 37% and other races such as, Europeans, Chinese, Rotumans 
and small island immigrants comprise the remaining 5%.   Before the 1987 coup, 
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the Indo-Fijian population was dominant making up approximately 48% of the 
entire population.  There are therefore two dominant ethnic groups with differing 
aspirations which lead to tensions but which also creates a potential for 
democracy to peacefully resolve the tensions.  
The annual population growth rate in Fiji is about 1.4 % while the annual 
Gross Domestic per capita income is about F$ 4050 (UNDP Report, 1990-2009). 
English is the official language in Fiji and the current workforce is perceived to be 
well educated (McMaster, 2001).  The next section provides a description of the 
political and social systems in Fiji prior to her cession to Britain in 1874.   
4.3 Pre-Cession Era 
It is claimed that the native Fijians inhibited the Fiji islands sometimes during the 
1600’s (Derrick, 1968; Wright, 1931; Scarr, 1984).  They settled along the coastal 
areas in small groups on the two main islands Viti Levu and Vanua Levu and 
were mostly seafarers and warriors (Derrick, 1968) relying on the sea and the 
coastal area for foods.  These natives lived in small tribes and each was ruled by a 
chief who dominated the tribal decision making and led the tribe to wars with the 
neighboring tribe in an effort to extend their coastal boundary thus gaining 
political status amongst the neighboring tribes.  The victorious tribe took over the 
other’s land and the clan thus extended their claims over both and extended their 
kinship by marriage.  The members of the ‘tribe paid “homage and tribute to the 
chief, thus elevating the chiefly position to that of a god’” (Derrick, 1968, p. 11). 
In deference to this ‘god’, all decisions made by him were accepted by the clan 
members without question (Scarr, 1984) thus silence can be interpreted as 
obedience.  The chief therefore was never wrong.  The indigenous population in 
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Fiji pay the same type of obedience to the decisions made by their Ratus (chiefs) 
even in a democratic society as reflected by claims in the literature that the 1987 
coup led by Rabuka was initiated by the Chiefs who had lost the seats in the 1987 
democratically held general elections (Robertson, 1998; Scarr, 1984).  
To amass landownership and elevate their political status, the tribes were 
constantly at war.  It is claimed that in the western regions of Viti Levu, after the 
tribal war, the victors killed and ate the defeated chief and the warriors and kept 
their skulls as  trophies (Kerr & Donnelly, 1972).  This reflects the power of the 
warrior tribes and their affiliation to land ownership.  The tribe’s loyalty therefore 
was to their Chief or the chief the tribe.  This illuminates why the indigenous 
population wish to have an indigenous Chief as the Fijian Prime Minister and 
President of Fiji.    
According to Derrick, (1968) and Kerr & Donnelly (1972), the tribal 
chiefs formed strategic alliances through marriages to maintain landownership.  
Kinship therefore is significant to the Fijian social structure.  Kinship, either by 
birth or by marriage, allows the tribal members of each of the tribes to lay claims 
to the tribal land ownership.  This also fosters a bond allowing the tribal members 
to take the belongings or use the resources owned by the members without 
seeking permission.  This builds on the communal relationship within the tribes 
and strengthens their political power.  
White settlers, mostly traders and those in search of riches, had inhibited 
Fiji as early as 1820 (Derrick, 1968).  The traders were engaged in exporting 
sandalwood, bech-de-mer and cotton to Britain and Australia.   During the 1830s 
and 40s, one of the Eastern Viti Levu Chief’s Cakabou acquired considerable 
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political strength with the help of white settlers who provided him with guns and 
ammunition.   
To protect his tribe and their land ownership from other tribes Cakabou 
formed the Armed Native Constabulary (ANC) in 1871 (retrieved from 
http://www.rfm.mil.fj/news/history.html, 26 November 2010).  He did this with 
the help of the White settler community.  The ANC was officially recognised by 
the Colonial Administers when Fiji was ceded to Britain in 1874 and hence gained 
legitimacy, and was seen by the other tribes as a powerful institution.  This laid 
the foundation of the Fiji Military Forces as they were known after Independence.  
It is claimed that the native Fijians were in contact with the Tongans and 
the Samoans and that the former had considerable influence on the tribes who 
inhabited the eastern coastlines of the Fijian archipelago (Scarr, 1984).  As a 
result one of the Tongan Prince’s Ma’afu made his home in Fiji during the 1830s 
(Derrick, 1968) and had formed a tribe in Western Viti Levu.  As time went by he 
extended his tribe to include the other western tribes and influenced the Northern 
chiefs to join his chiefdom.  
As tribal chiefs and warriors, Ma’afu and Cakabou were equally strong, 
both feared one another and were feared by the weaker tribes and the White 
settlers (Vunivalu, 1957).  Tribal war for political and social supremacy between 
the two in 1874 caused a lot of damage and this included destruction of the White 
settlers properties.  One such property belonged to the United States Consul [John 
Brown Williams] who sought compensation from Cakabou for US $38,531 
(Derrick, 1968).  Cakabou pleaded inability to pay and in the fear of losing 
landownership ceded Fiji to Britain on 10 October, 1874.  Hence legal rights often 
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associated with democracy, while appeared but were not always respected in 
practice The discussion that follows next explains significant events during the 
post cession period.  
4.4 Post Cession 1874-1970  
After the 1874 cession, Fiji was governed by a British appointed Governor-
General, Sir Arthur Gordon, and British rules and regulations were enforced.  To 
hold law and order Sir Gordon, involved the Fijian Tribal Chiefs in administering 
the political affairs of Fiji.  He gained their support and created a perception 
amongst the indigenous population that their Chiefs were their rulers.  
To protect the Fijian land and to ensure that the land belonged to the 
indigenous community, Sir Gordon established the Native Land Trust Board, 
which still exists.  The White settlers started commercial farming and they 
decided not to employ the indigenous Fijians as laborers.  It seems that either the 
Colonial administrators were not keen to allow the warriors on the land for fear of 
warfare or the native Fijians were not a cheap labour force. 
 The Indians were brought to Fiji from India by the British Colonialists to 
work on the sugar-cane fields under the so-called Indentured Labour System in 
1945 (Ghosh, 2004).  Upon completion of their contracts the indentured labourers 
were given the option to either stay in Fiji or to go back to India.  Those who 
stayed behind did not have the right to purchase or own land (Davies, 2005; 
Ghosh, 2004) and the Fijian constitution established this position in law.  Instead, 
they could lease farm land from the NLTB under the Agricultural Landlord and 
Tenants Agreement [ALTA] which allows an initial 30 year lease (Ghosh, 2004).  
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Upon expiry the NLTB has the option of either renewing for another 30 years or 
rescinding the lease title.  
As the tenant, Indo-Fijian farmers and those from the other minority ethnic 
groups are disadvantaged.  In political terms they  perceive themselves as not 
being part of Fiji and as a society are and feel insecure.  These groups have to 
seek alternative means for financial and economic security.  To cope with the 
disadvantages of their social status  many  acquire tertiary qualifications to 
acquire a white-collar job or join the public service. 
The British Colonialist, ‘enshrined the indigenous Fijian land rights in the 
Native Land Ordinance 1945,’ (Derrick, 1968, p. 16) thus implying that the Indo-
Fijian community was landless and inferior in status to the Natives.  This created 
the potential for tension between the two ethnic groups as evidenced by the coups 
of 1987 and 2000.  
Under British rule the ANC was given the task of undertaking conciliatory 
functions amongst the warring native tribes.  This helped to keep the peace 
amongst the tribes, resolving their disputes and developing a system where the 
Indigenous warriors administered the affairs of the native population.  This is also 
a reflection of the dominant and powerful status of the Military Forces (as they 
were known after independence).  This Institution is still dominated by the 
indigenous population reflecting their sense of security and ownership of Fiji.  
During World War 11 in 1942, the members of the ANC were invited by 
the British and the Allied forces to join the New Zealand Military forces in the 
Solomon Islands and later in Malaya (Malaysia as known now).  Fiji’s Military 
contribution was recognised and the ANC became known as the Royal Fiji 
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Military Forces (http://www.rfmf.mil.fj/news/history) and was dominated by 
indigenous Fijians thus reaffirming their ownership of Fiji, their military heritage, 
and adding to their political strength.  
4.5  Independence and Coups: 1970-2000  
The evaluations here provide insights into Fiji’s socio-economical and political 
history over 1970-2000 period to illuminate how the indigenous tribal political 
structure was still dominant despite the existence of a Westminster system of 
governance.  The analysis will expose how accountability via public sector 
auditing was restricted. 
Fiji gained political independence from Britain on 10th October 1970 and 
the provisions of the 1970 and the post coup 1990 and 1997 constitutions, public 
sector laws, regulations and administrative processes bear a close resemblance to 
those which prevailed in Fiji prior to independence.  The 1970 Fijian Audit Act, 
the Native Land Trust Board Act are two such statutes. 
Fiji had her first democratic election under the 1970 Constitution (Kerr & 
Donnelly, 1972).  A Westminster system of Parliament, with a Senate (members 
nominated by the Prime Minister and the Leader of Opposition) and a House of 
Representatives (members elected via elections, having the power to vote on Bills 
and make policy decisions) was established.  The House of Representatives 
consisted of 52 members.  Of these 22 were indigenous Fijians, 22 were Indo-
Fijians and the remaining 8 were General Electors (minority groups such as 
Europeans, Chinese, other small Island immigrants) that reside in Fiji.  Such a 
composition of Parliament was perceived by the designers of the Constitution 
(Representatives of:  British Government Indigenous Fijian, Indo-Fijian and 
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General Electors) as representing the multiethnic population thus appearing to 
promote democracy.  Fiji also witnessed four coups during 1970-2000 and twelve 
different governments.  Table 4.1 summarises the timeline showing the four 
coups, the coup leader, the governments overthrown and the interim government 
after each of the coups. (Appendix 1 shows a timeline and the types of 
government).  
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Table 4-1: Timeline:  Coups and Government:  1987-2000 
 
Period  Coup –Leader  Government Overthrown  Interim Administrator  
 Civilian  Military   Name  Appointing Authority  
14 May, 
1987 
 Sitiveni Rabuka Democratically elected Fiji 
Labour Party (Liberal). Prime 
Minister Dr Bavadra   
Ratu Sir Mara  Nominated by  Rabuka 
appointed by the President-Ratu 
Sir Ganilau  
September 
1987   
 Sitiveni Rabuka Military appointed  Ratu Sir  Mara  President-Ratu Sir Ganilau  
14 May, 
2000 
George Speight 
– Failed 
Businessman  
Backed by the Counter 
Revolutionary Unit  
Democratically elected -Labour 
Party (Liberal). Prime Minister 
Chaudry  
Qarase  Appointed by Military and 
Navy Commander Brigadier 
Bainimarara  
5 December 
2006  
 Bainimarara- 
Lieutenant Highest 
Ranking Officer 
Democratically Elected 
Government  
Nationalist  
Prime Minister Qarase  
Vogere Bainimarara Self-elected with military 
backing. Made Official Prime 
Minister by President Iloilo   
(Source: Fiji Government websites, Literature References and Fiji Times articles)  
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The 1970 general elections were fought by three political parties, the 
Alliance the National Federation and the General Electors Party.  Table 4.2 
summaries the dominant ethnicity of and the type of party. 
A Fijian dominated government under the Alliance Party led by one of the 
Fijian high Chiefs, Ratu Sir Mara won the 1970 general elections and ruled Fiji 
for 17 years (Robertson, 1998) thus reflecting ongoing indigenous dominance. 
The Alliance win restored the tribal Fijian supremacy and their faith in Chiefs 
whom they considered to be their gods.  
During Ratu Sir Mara’s reign, the 1945 Native Land Ordinance was 
enacted and became the 1970 Native Land Trust Board Act [NLTB].  This 
conferred preferential status on the Fijians for land ownership and rights to, to 
conduct the administration of their affairs within community (Scarr, 1988, 1993).  
Such a provision  was fostered by the Colonial Administrators when they had set 
up NLTB (an arm of the Ministry of Fijian Affairs) to ensure that native Fijians 
retained ownership of the land and in doing this gained the support of the tribal 
chiefs probably to keep law and order and Fijian paramountcy. 
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Table 4-2: Political Parties who fought the 1970 General Elections 
  
Party Name  Leader’s Name   Dominant ethnicity 
of the Party  
Nature of Party  
Alliance  Ratu Sir Mara- Tribal 
Chief,  well educated 
Public Servant  – 
From the Highest 
Fijian Chiefly Clan   
Indigenous Fijians- 
mostly tribal chiefs 
and well educated  
members’ chiefs  
Conservative  
General Voters  Fred Caine – 
Businessman  
Part Europeans  Liberal  
National Federation  Siddiq Koya – Indo-
Fijian- Lawyer   
Indo-Fijians  Conservative  
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A significant outcome of the 1970 Constitution was the formulation of a 
communal based electoral system that segregated the population on ethnicity, 
which encouraged indigenous Fijian supremacy (Naidu, 2008).  Some researchers 
have interpreted this as an implicit presumption behind the colonial 
administration’s policy that the Fiji Islands belonged to the Fijian community 
because they were the original settlers and should have prior claims to the use of 
land (Lloyd, 1982; Lal 1992; Norton, 2002; Newbury, 2008).   As a result the 
Indo-Fijians and other minority ethnic groups were effectively alienated from 
owning land and hence are at the mercy and goodwill of the NLTB for leases in 
order to farm the land, undertake commercial activities and for the purposes of 
building and owning a dwelling.  
In 1978 the Fijian Military was invited by the United Nations for 
peacekeeping duties in Southern Lebanon (http://www.rfmf.mil.fj/news/histry. 
html).  The Fijian soldiers have been regularly deployed to other overseas 
countries for peacekeeping duties under the United Nations banner.  The Fijian 
Military recruits and trains soldiers for both combat and peacekeeping duties and 
for intelligence gathering.  The Military therefore is a powerful force in Fiji, is 
dominated by indigenous Fijians and is viewed by them as an institution for their 
benefit.  Such affiliation of the indigenous Fijians to the Military can be linked to 
Rabuka’s 1987 Coup, when the indigenous Fijian dominated Alliance Party, led 
by an indigenous high Chief, Ratu Sir Mara lost the general elections in the same 
year to the Labour Party.   
The Fiji Labour Party emerged in 1985, promoting itself as a liberal 
political party.  Its membership included both Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijians.  
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The latter were mostly educated and resided in the urban areas.  This Party 
attempted to promote the interest of the unemployed, the workers and the poor 
(Davies 2005; Robertson, 1998).  They formed a coalition with the Indian 
dominated Federation Party and fought the 1987 elections, which the coalition 
won. The Labour and Federation coalition came into power and chose Dr Bavarda 
(an indigenous Fijian, from the Medical profession) as their leader and Prime 
Minister of the country and Chaudry (an Indo-Fijian , a trade unionist and 
accountant) as the deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.  
This leadership was not accepted by the majority of the indigenous Fijian 
population.  They saw this as a loss of political control and erosion of the rights of 
Chiefs to rule (Lodhia, 2003; Norton, 2002; Tuimaleali’ifano, 2000) because 
Bavadra was not a chief but a commoner and his Labour-led government was 
dominated by Indo- Fijians.   Although democratically elected it had a short life of 
only 30days (elected on 14 April, 1987 and overthrown on 14 May, 1987) because 
it was overthrown by the Fiji military led by indigenous ‘commoner’ Rabuka on 
14 May, 1987 (who had a low military rank and was later promoted as major for 
political reasons).  The indigenous Fijian political supremacy was restored.  
Rabuka and his supporters justified this coup as returning the power to the 
indigenous Fijians thus fostering their political aspirations.   
Rabuka did not take control of the Parliament but elected an interim 
administrator, Ratu Sir Mara an indigenous high chief and a long time Prime 
Minister with a provision that no Indo-Fijian be allowed to act as an advisor 
(Robertson, 1998). The discussion that follows is an analysis of the politically 
influential 1987 military coup.  
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4.5.1 1987 Military coup 
The 14 May 1987 military coup executed by Rabuka, resulted in the abrogation of 
the 1970 Constitution.  A new Constitution was introduced in 1990.  This 
enshrined the political supremacy of the indigenous community and their right to 
landownership.  The 1990 Constitution also made provisions that only the native 
Fijians from the chiefly tribes are eligible to hold the positions of President and 
Vice President and further stipulated that nominations and selection of individuals 
to these positions be made by the Great Council of Chiefs (Gosh, 2004; Lal, 1999; 
Newbury, 2008; Tuimaleali’ifano, 2000).  Some commentators have claimed that 
the majority of the indigenous population also wanted the same principle to be 
applied for the position of the Prime Minister (Lal, 1999; Tuimaleali’ifano, 2000).  
Tribal and indigenous rights and rights to landownership had eroded in most 
Pacific island countries over the previous centuries and the Fijians were  intent on 
retaining their land and land rights. 
The Fiji Labour Party filed a case against the illegal overthrow of their 
government with the High Court of Fiji in June 1987 (Robertson, 1998).  The 
International community also demanded the return of democracy.  These 
pressures led to a meeting between Ratu Sir Mara, the caretaker Prime Minister, 
Ratu Ganilau, the President and selected members of the Labour Party (Bavadra, 
Leader, Chaudry, deputy and Dr Baba, senior member) in September 1987.  The 
meeting discussed the possibility of a power sharing government to diffuse the 
pressure for calls of a democratic election and to indicate to the Fijian judiciary 
that steps were being taken to rectify the illegal takeover (Robertson, 1998).  
Before a decision was made Rabuka overthrew Mara’s interim government and 
elected himself the Prime Minister on 12 September, 1987.  His action can be 
   
89 
 
related to his demand after the 14 May 1987 coup that Indo-Fijians be excluded as 
advisors to the interim government.  As a result of this second coup, sections of 
the Fiji Military force agitated against Rabuka because he was an indigenous 
commoner and had overthrown the caretaker government of the most highly 
ranked tribal Chief whom he had appointed.  Rabuka reappointed Ratu Sir Mara 
as the caretaker Prime Minister in December 1987.  
The 1990 Constitution introduced an electoral system that enhanced voting 
on ethnic lines by promulgating that ethnic Fijians only vote for ethnic Fijian 
candidates and Indo-Fijian only vote for Indo-Fijian candidates thus restricting 
racial integration (Robertson, 1998).  The Constitution allowed for 70 communal 
seats in the Parliament, which comprised 37 seats for Fijians, 27 for Indo-Fijians, 
5 for General Electors and 1 for Rotumans thus the electoral system ensured 
Fijian supremacy but relegated the Indo-Fijians to a second-class citizen 
(Robertson, 1998.  p.55).  In response to such relegation the Indo-Fijians sought 
supremacy in the fields of education, commerce, and other manufacturing and 
service based industries to reduce their fear of economic insecurity and to attain or 
possibly retain economic power.  
The Fijian economy suffered as a result of the coup and its performance 
was at an all time low, nearing financial collapse in 1988 (Lal, 1992; Prasad, 
1998).  Earnings from tourism industry declined by almost 80% (Robertson, 1998, 
p.67).  Unfortunately, sugar production (one of the main export earners) declined 
due to droughts, hurricanes and delayed harvesting.  The outflow of capital 
(driven by fear and lack of security) worsened the economic situation. 
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Collectively these contributed to a sharp decline in the foreign reserves 
and the Reserve Bank of Fiji devalued the Fijian dollar by 35% in 1987 and 
imposed stringent exchange controls (Prasad, 1998).  Ratu Sir Mara, nominated 
Kamicamica (an astute economist, a civil servant and indigenous Fijian) as his 
Minister for Finance ( Robertson, 1998 and proceeded to cut salaries in the public 
service and reduce the public sector grants (Lal, 1992, p.32).  
These initiatives did not appear to revitalise economic growth and 
therefore Tax Free Factory/Zone schemes, deregulation policies and 
corporatisation of the public sector was introduced by the Mara administration 
(Reddy, Prasad, Sharma, Vosikata, & Duncan, 2004; WTO Report, 1997).  These 
measures initiated economic recovery with a 10% growth in 1989 compared to a 
1% increase in 1988 (Reddy, Prasad, Sharma, Vosikata, & Duncan, 2004).  The 
period 1989 -1990 saw an economic growth expansion of almost 2.5% (Reserve 
Bank of Fiji, Annual Report, 1994).  
In 1992, the interim administration authorised the general elections.  By 
this time Rabuka had formed a nationalist political party known as the‘Soqosoqo 
ni Vakavulewa in Taukei’ which won the 1992 elections.  Rabuka, was elected the 
Prime Minster and this restored the indigenous Fijian political supremacy with 
Rabuka (a commoner) being heralded the hero of the common Fijians.  James Ah 
Koy, a businessman and a former Parliamentarian registered as an ethnic Fijian in 
the Native Land Register3 was appointed as the Minister of Finance.   
                                                 
3 Ethnic Fijians register in the Vola ni Kawa Bula as evidence. James Ah Koy is a descendent of  Chinese and Fijian 
heritage and was initially not classified as an indigenous Fijain but the Law was changed in 1982 to allow people having a 
Fijian ancestry to register as indigenous Fijians in the Vola ni Bula, and so Ah Koy registered as one in 1982 and was 
accepted as having indigenous rights (Robertson, 1998). 
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As the Prime Minister, Rabuka introduced the positive discrimination 
policy requiring that 50% of the civil service jobs be given to the native Fijians 
and that the natives be allowed to participate in commerce and retail and new 
investors accept Fijians as business partners.  This policy was introduced under 
the perception that Indo-Fijians were keeping the indigenous community out of 
commerce. 
The Great Council of Chiefs (GCC), an apex body of the tribal Fijian 
political structure appointed and accepted Rabuka as an honorary member in 
1992.  This action can be interpreted as compensation to the latter for the two 
coups thus reflecting the subjugation of democracy and the continuation of tribal 
warfare customs.  
The non-acceptance of the racially biased 1990 Constitution by the 
International community, and pressure to return to Parliamentary democracy 
together with Fiji’s continued suspension from the Commonwealth since 1987, 
signalled the drawbacks of the Constitution to the Rabuka led government during 
1993 and 1994 (Robertson, 1998).  For Fiji to re-enter the Commonwealth and for 
the international community to accept this government, Fiji had to come up with a 
constitution based on the principles of Western democracy.  Despite the 
supremacy of indigenous Fijians assured by the 1990 Constitution, a three 
member Constitutional Review Committee (the 1995 Review Committee) was set  
up in 1995 to promulgate a democratic constitution.    
The Review Committee recommended almost 654 changes to reform the 
Constitution (Parliamentary Paper 34/1996).  The acceptance and approval of the 
recommendations by the GCC and the Parliament led to the emergence of the 
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1997 Constitution, which gained the approval of the international community and 
saw Fiji’s re-entry into the Commonwealth.  Although the 1997 Constitution is 
perceived as being based on principles of Western style democracy and 
multiracial, it retained the clauses on Fijian landownership and political 
supremacy that existed in the 1990 Constitution hence it can be perceived as 
embracing only some elements of democracy.  Overall, the 1997 Constitution 
provided for cross voting across ethnic lines thus reducing some of the tensions 
created by race based voting enshrined in its predecessor.  
The democratic principles of the 1997 Constitution were put to test during 
the May 1999 general elections.  The Labour Party dominated by Indo-Fijians 
won the most seats and formed a multiparty, Peoples Coalition Government with 
other minority parties (Erwin, 1998).  This government was led by an Indo-Fijian, 
Chaudry and after being in Office for a year, it was overthrown by a civilian coup 
led by Speight, a failed businessman (Ewins, 2008).  Speight, an indigenous 
Fijian, like his predecessor Rabuka, used the rhetoric of protecting the indigenous 
sovereignty as an excuse for the coup and he had the backing of the Counter 
Revolutionary Warfare Unit, a section of the Fiji Military forces, and senior, long 
serving politicians who had lost their seats in the general elections, to execute the 
2000 coup.  The analysis presented in the next section provides insights into how 
the Speight led coup restored indigenous Fijian Supremacy.  
4.5.2 The 2000 civilian coup 
After executing the coup on 19 May 2000, Speight and his followers held the 
members of the Coalition government hostage in the Fijian Parliamentary 
complex at Veiuto in Suva for 56 days with the might of guns and terrorism (Lal 
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2008).  During this period, the people of Fiji were required to carry on with their 
daily lives and the various sections of the economy were expected to function as 
usual.  Amidst this expectation, Speight and his group of supporters set up road 
blocks in Central Suva area and terrorised the media, the Fiji Times and 
Television One station (http://www.fijilive.com May 23, 2000; Trnka, 2002).  
Certain sections of the indigenous population engaged in looting the commercial 
sector targeting those businesses owned by the Indo-Fijians and terrorising those 
based in urban and the rural areas (Trnka, 2002).  
These actions reflect the culture of tribal warfare where the indigenous 
population engaged in tribal war without regard to financial costs and 
consequences.  During the height of the coup, a group of native Fijians took over 
the Monosavu Hydro-Electricity Dam.  This disrupted the supply of electricity to 
all parts of Fiji and caused chaos in the retail and wholesale commercial sector.  
These acts of terrorism also disrupted the water supply to most segments of the 
population.  This group demanded compensation for the use of their land and 
water at a time when an illegal government was in power.  In this context, such 
actions can only be interpreted as opportunistic but caused fear and insecurity 
amongst the Indo-Fijian and other minority ethnic groups. 
After the release of the hostages on 12 July 2000, Laisenia Qarase was 
appointed as the caretaker Prime Minister by the Military, and the former 
appointed Ratu Kubuabola (a well-educated indigenous high chief, and a long 
standing Parliamentarian) as the interim Minister of Finance, an important 
position as this Ministry is responsible for the preparation of the government 
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budget.  These appointments reflect the continuation of the tribal political 
structure where the Chief leads and the tribe follows. 
   Qarase formed the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewanivanua Party (SDL) and 
called for general elections in August 2001 under the 1997 Constitution.  The 
SDL Party won 32 seats and formed the government with Qarase as the Prime 
Minister.  Ratu Jone Kubuabola, who won his South West Urban Fijian 
Communal seat, was appointed the Minister of Finance (presumably to continue 
with the government policies regarding public sector spending which were 
formulated when he served in the interim administration).  Once again indigenous 
supremacy was restored. 
In 2006, the Qarase-led government intended to introduce an Affirmative 
Action Plan with some controversial Bills, one of which would pardon the 
perpetrators of the 2000 coup.  This particular Bill caused friction between Qarase 
and Bainimarama as the latter had helped to bring Fiji back to normalcy after the 
hostage situation in the year 2000.  The tension between Qarase and Bainimarama 
led to the 2006 military coup. 
4.5.3 The 2006 coup  
On 5 December 2006, Fiji witnessed the fourth coup; led by Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama, the head of the Fiji Military and Navy.  The Qarase led government 
was considering introducing an ‘Affirmative Action’ Plan in 2006 to reduce the 
education and economic gaps that was perceived to exist between the indigenous 
Fijians and the Indo-Fijians (Durutalo, 2007).  This action was perhaps motivated 
by nationalistic sentiments under the veneer of democracy.   
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The other Bill under consideration was the ‘Qoliqoli Bill’ which when 
enacted would return the ownership of fishing areas to the indigenous Fijians 
instead of being under State ownership.  As such, the indigenous Fijians secure 
the rights to disallow others from using the fishing areas, or possibly confiscate 
others ‘catch’ or charge unreasonable fees for use of the area.  A Native Land 
amendment Bill was also under consideration, according to which all vacant land 
would be reverted to NLTB thus adding to the indigenous tribes’ landownership 
right.  The most controversial was the Bill to grant amnesty to the perpetrators of 
the 2000 coup, whom Bainimarama had helped to bring down.  
According to Durutalo (2007), Bainimarama demanded that Qarase 
withdraw the Affirmative Action Plan.  The latter refused so the former overthrew 
his government.  Once again, the Fiji Military Force was used to overthrow a 
government and because of the Institution’s well-established combat powers, 
Bainimarama was successful in the takeover and elected himself as the Prime 
Minister on 5 December 2006 (Durutalo, 2007).   
The four successive coups during 1987-2006 suggest that Fijian politics is 
still dominated by tribal and communal allegiance, irrespective of the existence of 
a Constitution based on principles of democracy.   
4.6 Social Problems 
The coups of 1987, 2000 and 2006 caused economic and political instability, 
which led to problems of increases in unemployment, violence and poverty, 
increased migration and non-renewal of ALTA leases upon expiry.  The 
discussion in this section focuses on the insecurities and fear fostered by these 
concerns and implications for the period of time under study (1987-2000). 
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According to the UNDP, 1990-2009 Report (p.3), ‘average economic 
growth in Fiji between 1987 and 2000 has ranged from 2-3 %’.  Such sluggish 
growth has been associated with a lack of private sector investment.  This can be 
associated with the outflow of capital from Fiji after the 1987 coup (Robertson, 
1998) and with Rabuka government’s 1990 positive discrimination policy which 
required that new investors accept indigenous Fijians as business partners (Reddy 
et.al 2004).  The concern here is ‘what security does the indigenous partner bring, 
how will he/she contribute in terms of administration and economic decision-
making’. Such policies will therefore deter a rational investor.   
The effect of slow economic growth was reflected in the increases in 
unemployment.  The rate of unemployment in Fiji increased from 2.5 % to 5% 
during the 1987-1992 period and the trend continued with an increase of 3.7% in 
1996 to 6.6 in 2000 and to around 8.6 % in 2007 (UNDP Report,1990-2009; 
Chung, 2008).  The increase in unemployment affected the low-income earners 
(Chung, 2008).  One possible effect of this was the increase in domestic violence 
(Narsey, 2008) the effect of which was felt by children and females who are 
usually the most vulnerable.  Another problem that stemmed from unemployment 
was the increase in squatter settlements during the 1990-2003 period (Yabaki, 
2009).  Living in the squatter settlements meant no rental expense, no council/city 
rates but an existence in an overcrowded or unhealthy environment, as most of 
settlements were on swampy land along the coast areas.  These situations also 
expose the individuals to threats from the sea and high winds and from looters.  
Such trends appeared not to catch the government’s attention as the trend of coups 
continued and the seemingly lack of accountability by the government to its 
citizens persisted. 
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The expiry of farmland leases in 1987, 1995 and 1998 under the ALTA 
system contributed to increases in unemployment particularly within the Indo-
Fijian community (Robertson, 1998).  The majority of the ALTA land leases 
administered by NLTB expired during the 1990 -2000 period and were not 
renewed (UNDP Report, 1990-2009).  As a consequence, the farmers were 
displaced without any compensation or any support from the Qarase led 
government.  Many of the displaced farmers lived either with extended families or 
in squatter settlements.  The dire state of these people is the outcome of the tribal 
land ownership structure enhanced by the Colonial administrators prior to 
independence and the entrenchment of tribal-ownership in the 1990 and even the 
so-called multiracial 1997 Constitution.  The successive governments in Fiji 
backed by the Fiji Military’s power have been promoting the rights of indigenous 
Fijians and protecting their land ownership rights, it is not surprising to find that 
these governments do not wish to be held to account to this end.  
Poverty in Fiji rose from ‘25% in the 1980’s to almost 30% in 2000 and to 
40% in 2008’ (UNDP Report, 1990-2009, p. 14).  Such increases meant that 
families were probably not having proper meals or meeting their daily dietary 
requirements.  Both Chung (2008) and the UNDP Report (1990-2009) indicate 
that the children and females were most vulnerable to poverty.  According to the 
UNDP Report ‘mothers at pregnancy stage were affected the most with some 
becoming diabetic and malnourished and a significant number died of breast or 
cervical cancer’ (UNDP Report 1990-2009, p. 45).  The Fiji Live (10 November 
2004) reported that poverty was the motivating factor for primary and secondary 
school dropouts.  In response to this, the Ministry of Education has introduced a 
compulsory education policy for children of ages 5 to 16 years for primary and 
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intermediate level studies.  The purpose seems useless however if poverty and 
instability continue to inhibit education.  Here again is a case of policy 
promulgated on democratic principles but failing to address the root cause of the 
(education) problem.  
Studies on migration of skilled and educated workers from Fiji to other 
overseas countries indicate a strong relationship between the coups (of 1987 and 
2000) and migration (Gani, 1998; Gani & Ward, 1995; Narayan & Smyth, 2003).  
These studies indicate that the feeling of job insecurity arising from political 
instability was the main factor.  Factors like lack of economic opportunities, 
higher income and better standards of living were not significantly related to 
migration after the coups.  
Narayan & Smyth’s (2003) study indicates that between the years 1987-
1999, teachers were the biggest group of professionals to migrate followed by 
architects, accountants and medical profession.  Such a massive brain drain 
indicates a loss to the development of the Fijian economy and it appears that the 
individuals and institutions involved in instigating and motivating the coup culture 
are not concerned about such losses.  This indicates the extent to which tribalism 
encourages a coup for Fijian political supremacy.  In this context the accountor-
accountee relationship, as interpreted in the accounting literature, has limited 
scope in terms of government accountability to its citizenry in the Fijian public 
sector.  This raises concerns about the existence of the 1970 Audit Act and the 
implementation of performance audits in the Fijian public sector by Auditor-
General Datt in 1995 and its subsequent discontinuation.  
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4.7 Summary   
Fiji is influenced by a multitude of social, economic and political structures such 
as Indigenous Fijian tribal and landownership, the British Colonial, the Indo-
Fijian and Fijian pressures, and the global economy.  There have been four coups 
within twenty years in which democratically elected governments have been 
overthrown by the military.  The coup makers have used the military’s strength to 
ensure indigenous Fijian dominance in Fiji’s domestic politics.  This practice is 
reminiscent of the tribal political structure to ensure landownership.  On each 
occasion, international pressures and local response to economic downturn 
ensured the return of Parliamentary democracy under the various Constitutions, 
which enshrined indigenous Fijian land ownership rights thus exposing the veneer 
of democracy that exists in Fiji.   
Political instability caused wide spread social problems such as 
unemployment, lack of land-use, poverty, fear of violence and an uncertain future.  
The effects of the instability contribute towards the accountee-accountor 
relationship in which the accountor  is  unwilling to be held to account.  
Understanding of the relationship between the Fijian public sector auditees and 
the Fijian Auditor-General is thus important to the Fijian society and all its 
members.  The study seeks to provide meaningful interpretation of this 
relationship within the context of a politically turbulent society driven by the 
interest of the indigenous Fijians underneath a veneer of democracy.  The next 
chapter provides an analysis of the developments of the role of the Fijian 
Auditors-General over the 1874-2003 period to illuminate the history and expose 
the unusual pattern that emerges from it.  
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Chapter 5 Public Sector Auditing in Fiji: Tracing its 
Development 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Governance in Fiji is still based on the Westminster system despite the unsettling 
effect of four coups since 1987.  In line with the Westminster system of 
governance, Fiji has provisions in the legislation for the office of an Auditor-
General, (Fiji Constitution, 1997, sections 148, 166, 168), who is given the 
mandate by the legislature to audit the executive on behalf of the legislature.  In 
the traditional sense the Auditor-General is expected to carry out public 
accountability obligations on behalf of Parliament by providing an independent 
and professional assurance that public sector resources have been managed 
properly, in accordance with the law, and that fraud has been prevented (De 
Martins, Clark, & Roberts, 1998; English, 2003; Pallot, 2003; Guthrie, 1991; 
Wilkins, 1995).   
This chapter outlines and analyses the processes and influences by which 
auditing developed and expanded in the Fijian public sector within the context of 
public sector auditing and accountability over the period 1874-2000.  An 
accountability perspective is adapted for the analysis.  The purpose here is to 
analyse the events which led to significant expansion in public sector auditing and 
reveal how performance audit was pursued by powerful actors and then 
abandoned even though it was serving a public good.  Publically available 
documents such as Parliamentary Papers, Legislation, and Annual Audit Reports 
by the Auditor-General and media sources were used to trace the development and 
observe the formal structures that created new accountability practices.  
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The chapter is structured in the following way: a historical explanation is 
provided to lay the foundation for an examination of the development of public 
sector auditing leading up to performance auditing.  The developments are 
organised according to the evolution in the role of the Fijian Auditor-General over 
the period 1874 to 2000.  This period predates and covers the timeframe in which 
performance audit emerged.  
Public sector auditing in Fiji can be traced back to 1874 (Fiji Audit Profile, 
1997).  Fiji was colonised by Britain in 1874 and remained a British colony until 
1970.  Being a British colony, Fiji was subjected to British laws and regulations.  
During the period 1874 to 1955, British audit acts and laws were applicable to 
public sector auditing in Fiji.  As a former British colony the laws, regulations and 
public sector acts in Fiji had initially originated from Britain; the Fiji Audit Act 
1970 is no exception.  Therefore, public sector audit developments in Fiji had a 
strong British influence during the colonial period and for most of the 1970s and 
1980s.  
It is only recently that New Zealand, Australian and Canadian public 
sector finance regulations have started having an impact on public sector auditing 
in Fiji.  For example, the Asian Development Bank Technical Assistance 
programme for improvements in the performance of the Fiji Audit Office from 
1995 to 1997 brought substantial Australian public sector auditing influence 
through the works of the Australian consultant firm of Staton Partners and the 
Victorian Audit Office (Annual Report- Audit Office, 1997).  Other examples 
include the Fiji Finance Management Bill of 1998 which was modelled after the 
Victorian Public Finance and Management Act of 1992 and the 2004 Public 
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Finance and Management Act, which is modelled after the New Zealand Public 
Finance Act of 2003 (Reddy, Singh & Chand 2004).  
The Auditor-General in a Westminster system acts on behalf of Parliament 
to ensure public sector accountability (Funnell & Cooper, 1998).  In the Fijian 
context the Auditor-General’s accountability role is associated with the 
functions/duties as prescribed in the 1970 Fijian Audit Act, section 8 (1-6).   
An analysis of the documentary evidence, legislation and media reports 
from 1874-2000 established three major developments associated with Auditor-
General’s functions within his accountability role.  These are as follows: (i) 
independence/authority of the auditor-general; (ii) scope of audit and (iii) 
reporting requirements.  To provide insights on how these functions changed 
overtime it was decided to tabulate the evidence pertaining to auditing from 1874 
to 2000.  This evidence was then used to trace the changes.  During the tracing 
process, it was noticed that there were significant developments in the functions 
of the auditor-general during certain periods of time (years). These time periods 
have been labelled as: (i) colonial compliance (1874-1955); (ii) verification of 
records (1956-1969); (iii) reporting irregularities’ (1970-1990) and (iv) focus on 
efficiency (1991-2000).  
Table 5-1 presents a summarised version of the major developments in 
each of the accountability functions of the Auditor-General during the four 
different time periods.  
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Table 5-1: Developments in the Functions of the Auditor-General (1874-2000) 
 
Time period Predominant 
type of audit 
Independence 
of the OAG 
Scope of OAG 
mandate 
Reporting requirements of OAG 
OAG’s right to investigate OAG’s right to 
report to whom, 
when and what 
inclusive 
OAG’s right to 
follow-up  
Choose 
information 
Access to information 
1874-1955 
Colonial 
Compliance
Budget 
compliance and 
cash flow.  
OAG not the end 
accountee, 
English reportee 
is. 
Compliance with 
English law. 
No Yes Compliance to cash 
flow. 
To British government  
No formal right to 
follow-up. 
1956-1969 
Verification of  
Accounting 
Records
Financial attest 
and irregularity  
Independence 
assured by Audit 
Ordinance 1956.  
Regularity audit only. 
Verification, Section 
8(2). 
Yes - allowed 
by law but not 
explicit.  
Yes to all documents 
and records, stipulated 
in Act. 
To Parliament on 
compliance with 
statutory rules.  
No.  
1970-1990 
Reporting 
Irregularities 
Fraud, 
mismanagement 
investigations. 
Financial 
statement.  
Assured by 1970 
Audit Act and 
reflected through 
reporting.  
 
Regularity, plus check 
for control, waste and 
extravagance. 
Section 6, (2a-e), 
Section 13(2) - other 
entities. 
Yes - reflected 
by reporting. 
Yes, but limited by 
what is available. 
Greater audience. 
 Level of reporting and 
change in focus of 
reporting. 
No.  
 
1991 to 2000 
Focus on 
Efficiency 
 
Financial 
statement and 
performance 
which  was 
discontinued in 
1997.  
Assured by 1970 
Audit Act -
Constraint - in 
some cases - 
clarification from 
Attorney–General. 
 
Efficiency reports plus 
regularity audit. 
Reporting at least once 
a year in most cases.  
Yes - but entity 
manager can 
object.  
Yes, entity manager 
can withhold records, 
case to date Military 
Trust Fund. 
Level of reporting, 
changes in format of 
reporting. 
No. 
 
 104 
 
5.2 Independence of the OAG 
Auditor independence forms the cornerstone of any auditing theory (Mautz & 
Sharaf, 1961) because the users of the audit reports view the preparers of these 
reports (auditors) as being neutral and unbiased in exercising their skills, expertise 
and professional judgments while forming an opinion on the audit findings.  In the 
Fijian public sector context, the various Fiji constitutions have provided the 
framework for auditor independence at all points in time during 1874 to the 
present day (including the Constitutions of 1970, 1990 and 1997, respectively). 
The Constitution,  
…provides for the independence of the Auditor-General in that the 
performance of his/her duties or functions or the exercise of his/her 
powers, the Auditor-General is not subject to direction or control by any 
person or authority (1997 Constitution, Section 166). 
 
This statement succinctly encompasses the concept of auditor- independence as 
described by Mautz and Sharaf (1961).  To date, the OAG reports and findings 
have been accepted by the Fijian Parliament, the Fijian Public Accounts 
Committee and the Fijian public.  The acceptance demonstrates that the members 
of these powerful groups have comfort in the performance of the Fijian Audit 
Office and also that the Auditor-General holds a position of power.  The question 
then arises whether he can use his powers to influence changes in public sector 
auditing.  
5.2.1 Colonial compliance years (1874-1955) 
During the period 1874-1914, specific sums of money were allocated in the public 
sector budget and appropriated by the Legislative Council for the purposes of 
public sector auditing (Colonial Annual Report, 1876-1878, 1902-1910; 
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Ordinance No. XX, 1875).  So the concept of auditing was recognised by the 
colonial rulers but there is no documentary evidence to suggest that the colonial 
Auditor-General was either independent or dependent on the controls of the 
executive government.  
Other evidence during this period indicates that the English reportee was 
the end accountee and not the Colonial auditor (Colonial Annual Report, 1876).  
The English accountee, being the colonial Governor, was based in Fiji but was an 
English representative and held the power for disbursement of budgetary 
allocation.  The accountee compiled the annual report and the colonial Auditor , 
Mr J.O. Forth based in Britain countersigned it (Colonial Annual Reports, 
1887,p.2; 1902-1910).  The colonial Auditor performed the compliance to cash 
flow audit. Accountability therefore was compliant with budgetary appropriations 
and not on the prudent use of public funds.  Although in 1914 an Audit 
Department was created in Suva for the purposes of undertaking public sector 
audits in Fiji (Journal of Legislative Council; CP, 107/1914), the colonial reportee 
was still under the reporting requirements of the colonial government.  
The authority of the colonial Auditor was limited to assuring that the 
annual accounts complied with the colonial government’s reporting requirements.  
It appears that the colonial auditor under the colonial reporting requirements was 
not expected to perform his/her duty independently of the influence of the colonial 
government.  Therefore, transparency was through accounting not auditing and 
reflected the expectations of the Colonial government.  Such expectations reflect 
the influence of the Colonial Government in shaping public sector auditing in Fiji.  
The Auditor-General (as known now) could  not influence audit changes, the role 
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was  one of providing assurance only.  It was perhaps the government, via the 
British representative, who had the political power to influence changes.   
5.2.2 Verification of accounting records (1956-1969) 
From 1956 to 1969, the authority and the independence of the Director of Audit 
was formally and legally established in Fiji through the enactment of the 
following laws: the 1956 Audit Ordinance, the 1965 Finance Ordinance, section 9, 
and the 1966 Fiji (Constitution) Order.  The respective sections in these 
constitutional documents form the framework for the independence of the Audit 
Office by stipulating that the ‘Director of Audit would not be the subject of 
control by any party or authority’.  This implies that the executive government 
and the government agencies would not be able to put undue pressure on the 
public sector auditor during the audit process because of the legal implications of 
the constitutional framework.  
Section 8 of the 1956 Ordinance specifies:  
…the Director of Audit acts on behalf of the Legislative Council while 
performing the duties of carrying out an examination of, inquiry into, and 
audit of the accounts of the Fiji public sector.  
 
In terms of auditor independence, the auditor-general has no formal 
relationship with the audited entity, therefore should not have an undue personal 
interest in the audited entity or allow a personal interest to cloud his/her 
professional judgment on the audit findings.  This perception of non-personal 
interest can be interpreted as an inspiration to the auditor-general for being 
morally responsible when disclosing irregularities found during attest financial 
audits.  
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Section 10 of the 1956 Audit Ordinance, provides the auditor with the 
authority to:  
cite and report to the Secretary of Finance any irregularities that may have 
occurred in the receipt, custody or expenditure of any public funds or 
public property of any type, or in the accounting of public funds and 
properties.  
 
These provisions contribute to auditor independence in terms of to whom 
they report to when irregularities are encountered during the compliance to budget 
and financial attest audits.  Legislative Council papers (Papers, 3/63; 14/1965; 
16/67) and media reports (“Department’s Accounts”, 1965; “Immigration Head”, 
1964; “Long Look”, 1966) indicate that the Director of Audits, Mr K.A.W. 
Johnson, reported and disclosed irregularities found during the annual attest 
audits.  Such disclosures create the perception that Director of Audit and the 
public sector auditors were able to compile their findings without apparent fear of 
reprisal.   
The media, by publicising the irregularities disclosed by the audit reports, 
conveyed the message that the Director of Audit was a powerful individual as 
he/she was holding the auditees to account without fear.  This interpretation is 
offered because there is no evidence that former Director of Audit was 
reprimanded or subjected to any external pressures either by the government or by 
the government agencies.  The concern is whether he/she has the power to 
influence changes in audit practice (Myers, 1994).  Simultaneously, the media is 
also seen as a powerful agent because of its ability to publicise the disclosures 
without reprisal. 
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The 1956-1969 audit were confined to checking the arithmetical 
verifications; an indication of how accounting was substituted for accountability 
even in these early stages of practice (Roberts, 1996).  
5.2.3 Reporting irregularities (1970-1990) 
The most significant development in auditor independence was during this period 
(1970-1990). The 1970 Audit Act allowed the Auditor-General to: 
(i) transmit special reports made on any matter incidental to his powers 
and duties under this Act (Audit Act 1970, section 12(3)), and (ii) citing 
serious irregularities in the disbursement and receipt of public funds 
arising through attest auditing (Audit Act 1970, section 10).  
 
These provisions allowed him to report on non-calculative accounting matters.  
Evidence from Parliamentary Papers (Parliamentary Paper 22/90; 
Parliamentary Paper 2/89; Parliamentary Paper 14/79) and the media coverage of 
the Auditor-General’s (AG) audit findings during this period indicate that AG 
Bhim had on some occasions either requested special audits or  transmitted special 
audit reports to the Parliament (Parliamentary Paper 2/89).  He also suggested that 
special inquiries be undertaken in financial operations of Public Works 
Department (“Account Query”, 1974; “Money Wasted”, 1975) and the Nausori 
Town Council (“Mayor, I Welcome”, 1980;).  AG Bhim was able to ‘freely’ 
transmit special audit reports to the Parliament exercising the constitutional 
independence of the Audit Office.  He was able to perform his accountability role4 
in a powerful way by ensuring that he could select what to audit and report the 
findings.  During the 1980’s AG Bhim was able to investigate non-accounting 
                                                 
4 AG accountability role refers to the audit and purpose of the audit of the public sector entities by the OAG to provide 
assurances to the public via parliament on the usage and management of the public sector entities, see 1970 Fiji Audit Act 
on Duties of the AG. 
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matters such as fraud and inefficiency, which is not covered by traditional 
financial attest audit.   
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) under the chairmanship of Shah 
(an Indo-Fijian) supported the Auditor-General’s request for special reports 
(Public Accounts Committee Report, 1983).  The PAC members also deliberated 
on the disclosures made in ‘Special Reports’ submitted by the Auditor-General 
and concurred with the contents of the Report (Public Accounts Committee 
Report 1980), thus implicitly supporting Auditor independence. 
The PAC is a select committee of Parliament and performs the role of an 
oversight body (Standing Orders 72/1992; 168/1995) overseeing the accounts of 
the government and the audited reports.  Table 5.2 summarises the existence and 
the authority of PAC over the 1970-2000 period.  
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Table 5-2: PAC Existence and Authority: 1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Derived from Audit Reports, Public Accounts Committee Reports, and media publications. 
 
Years and audit focus  Major Event Authority  Ruling Government  
1970-1986 Reporting irregularities 
Committee formed after Independence in 
1970.  
Oversee government expenditure and 
reports including audit reports.  
Mara led alliance.  
1987-April 1991 Reporting irregularities 
Military coup led by Rabuka Committee 
suspended. 
None.   Rabuka led military.  
Mara Led Interim, July-Sept 1987. 
Rabuka led Military Govt, Sept-Dec 1987. 
Mara led interim, Dec 1987-April 1991 
May 1991 Focus on efficiency  Committee reinstated continued. Oversee government expenditure and 
reports including audit reports.  
Rabuka led military government. 
1992-1996 Focus on efficiency Democratic elections.  Oversee government expenditure and 
reports including audit reports. 
Rabuka led (SVT) democratic - under  
undemocratic 1990 Constitution.  
May 1999-May 2000 Reporting 
irregularities and financial statements  
Democratic elections.  Oversee government expenditure and 
reports including audit reports. 
Chaudry-led Labour Party, democratically 
elected. Under 1997 democratic 
Constitution. 
May-August 2000 Civilian Coup led by George Speight.  Oversee government expenditure and 
reports including audit reports. 
Self-proclaimed leader, Speight.  
September 2000 Reporting irregularities 
and financial statements 
Military takeover and military elected 
government.  
Oversee government expenditure and 
reports including audit reports. 
Qarase-led and military nominated 
government.  
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The Committee members are the members of Parliament nominated by 
Parliament in consultation with the government leader of the day and the leader of 
the opposition party/ies.  The PAC is comprised of eight to twelve members, 50% 
of the members are from the government in power and 50% from the opposition 
party.  The Opposition party’s nominee is nominated as the Chairperson by the 
Parliament.  Table 5.3 lists the chairpersons of the PAC and the Ministers of 
Finance during the 1970-2000 period. 
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Table 5-3: Time frame: PAC Chairperson and Minister of Finance   
 
Time Period   
Minister of Finance  Chairperson of PAC and Opposition Party 
represented  
October 1970-May 1987 (Reporting irregularities) Peter Stinson (European) Shah (Indo-Fijian National Federation party) 
June 1987-September 1987 (Reporting 
irregularities) 
 Mahendra Chaudry(Indo-Fijian) Kahiyum (Indo-Fijian National Federation Party) 
June 1987-September 1987 (Reporting 
irregularities) 
Kamicamica- Financial Advisor 
(Indigenous Fijian-chiefly family)  
Appointment of PAC suspended  
September  1987-December  1987 (Reporting 
irregularities) 
James Ah Koy (Indigenous Fijian)  
December 1987-April 1992 (Focus on efficiency) James Ah Koy, Interim Minister 
(Indigenous Fijian) 
 
May 1992-March 1999 (Focus on efficiency) Ratu Kubuabola (Chief -Indigenous 
Fijian) 
Khaiyum (Indo-Fijian  National Federation Party) 
May 1999-May  2000 (Reporting irregularities)  Mahendra Chaudry (Indo-Fijian)  Pickering - General Electors (Part-European) 
Sources: Derived from Audit Reports, Public Accounts Committee Reports, and media publications. 
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The Committee gets its authority from the Standing Orders of the House of 
Representatives’ (Public Accounts Committee Report, 1992, p. 1).  As an 
oversight body the PAC shall:  
examine the Accounts of the Government of Fiji in respect of each 
financial year together with any report of the Auditor-General thereon, and 
such other accounts laid before the Parliament as the Committee may think 
fit and shall report thereon to the House. (Public Accounts Committee 
Report, 1992, p.1) 
 
The PAC Reports are derived from analyses raised in the Audit Report and 
therefore supplement the Audit Report.  During these deliberations the PAC 
members seek explanations from: 
(i) the Ministry of Finance on issues related to implementation and 
enforcement of financial regulations, (ii) the Audit Office on clarification 
of audit finding revelations, and (iii) the Ministry whose audit report is 
under discussion.  (Public Accounts Committee Report, 1992, p. 1). 
 
In Roberts’ terms (1996) the PAC was in a strong position to forward 
more arguments because a socialising form of accountability was taking place. 
This was through dialogue where the accountee (PAC) sought clarifications and 
explanations from the accountee (Ministry of Finance and the Ministry whose 
reports were under discussion) without threats.  After deliberations PAC 
members prepare a Report and this is published as a House Paper and laid on the 
Table in the Parliament for its consideration.  PAC therefore was in a position to 
influence changes in the way the auditees were held to account. 
The  PAC Reports during the 1970-1980 period tended to support the audit 
findings and disclosures of irregularities in record keeping.  The AG’s audit 
reports (“Accounts in Chaos”, 1978; “Cost of Groundings”, 1978; “Council 
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Accounts”, 1975; Money Wasted”, 1975) were validated by the PAC.  This was 
undertaken by the process of deliberation, seeking explanations from the 
government and government agencies on the disclosures and reports of 
irregularities contained in the audit reports.   
During this period the PAC was under the chairmanship of an Indo-Fijian 
and the government in power was dominated by and led by an indigenous tribal 
chief.  The latter was keen on protecting the native rights and the former was 
probably pushing for Indo-Fijian recognition.  In promoting the rights of their 
own ethnic groups there was a potential for conflict of supremacy.  The PAC’s 
support for and validation of the audit disclosures can be interpreted as an attempt 
to legitimise public sector auditing via  socialising form of accountability.  
After the second coup in September 1987 the Rabuka led military 
government suspended the PAC and reinstated it in May 1992 after the general 
election (Parliamentary Paper 29/1992).  This appears to have been done to create 
an illusion that the Rabuka government was keen to re-establish the bureaucratic 
structures to enable the accountee (PAC) to hold the accountors (bureaucrats, 
Ministers and government) to account.  This gesture was also for the benefit of the 
international community, which was pressuring the Rabuka government to restore 
democracy in Fiji.   
Prima facie, the PAC appeared to seek transparency via accounting.  As a 
powerful body, the PAC was not able to influence changes in public sector audit 
practice.    
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5.2.4 Efficiency period (1991-2000) 
The independence of the AG  (Table 5-1) appear to develop in two ways during 
the 1991-2000 period.  On the one hand, AG Datt, through the financial attest and 
statement audits, disclosed mismanagement of public sector funds, fraudulent 
practices by the public servants and the existence of poor accounting controls in 
most entities, as  evidenced by the following media reports5 and Parliamentary 
Papers  (“Abuse of Funds”, 1999; Ali, 2003; Deo, 2003; “Editorial Comment”, 
1997; Lewa & Buimajor, 2003; Manueli, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Lewa, 2002a, 
2002b, 2000a, 2000b, 1999; Parliamentary Papers 25/95, 26/95, 35/95, 36/95, 
37/95, 40/99; Rika, 2002; Wise, 1999).  These disclosures by the AG’s [Datt 
1987-1997, Jacobs 1997-2000 Vatuloka 2000-2009] covering the period 1995-
2000 can be interpreted to mean that these AG’s were  exposing the inadequacy of 
accounting to hold the auditees to account.  
AG Datt performed two efficiency and effectiveness audits in the Fijian 
public sector during 1996 and 1997 (“Auditor Finds”, 1997; “Auditor Slam”, 
1997; Chand, 1997; “Editorial Comment”, 1997; Jagmohan, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 
1996d, 1996e, 1996f, 1996g; Parliamentary Papers 8/97, 21/97; Ragogo, 1997; 
and media reports). No further performance audits were undertaken during the 
1997-2000 period.  
On the other hand, the documentary evidence indicates that the AG’s Datt 
and later Jacobs had concerns about the independence of the Audit Office [AO] 
(Annual Reports, 1998, 1999, 2000).  In the 2000 Annual Report of the AO, AG 
Jacobs’ states that the ‘AO is not totally independent of the executive control and 
                                                 
5 Media Reports of 2001, 2002 and 2003 cover the Auditor-General’s Audit reports of 1998, 1999 and 2000. 
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that the lack of resources seriously constrains its operations’ (p. 3).  The budget 
appropriation of the Fiji AO is determined by the Ministry of Finance.  It is 
possible that the Minister of Finance would not increase the budgetary allocation 
so as to enable the AO to undertake performance audits together with compliance 
audits.  Undertaking performance auditing would mean more expenses for the AO 
and via the budgetary constraint the executive would ensure that there is no 
surplus of funds to be spent on performance audits.  The Minister of Finance, Ratu 
Kubolala, an indigenous high chief and a member of Rabuka led-government 
which was in power could have placed undue pressure and controlled the 
operations of the AO by limiting the funds.  This interpretation is offered because 
during the 1992-1994, the Rabuka led government which was in power was 
elected under an undemocratic 1990 Constitution.  As such the government in 
power  is not keen to be held to account.  
The Fijian Public Service Commission also has the potential to affect the 
independence of the Audit Office.  Under the 1970 Public Service Act, this body  
‘is responsible for the appointment of civil servants’.  This rule applies to the 
employment of auditors at the AO.  Furthermore, any appointment of a civil 
servant can be challenged by the Public Service Commission’s Appeals Board 
(Public Service Act, 1970).  
 The involvement of the Public Service Appeals Board can also be 
influenced by the ‘rules’ of the traditional Fijian customary rights.  For example, 
if a particular decision on an appointment involves a Fijian Chief or a member of 
chiefly family and a member of the Board is swayed by the Fijian Customary 
rules, then the final decision is  not be arrived at through an objective Westminster 
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system.  In the Fijian customary system one never speaks or goes against the 
wishes of one’s chief or village elder (Torin, 1990).  Examples of such 
compromise can be found in the case of the Native Land Trust Board (which was 
set up by the Fiji government to protect the landownership rights of the 
indigenous Fijians) audit of 1994 and the National Bank of Fiji (set up and owned 
by the indigenous tribal high chiefs) audits reports from 1992-1995.  In these 
cases the AG (Datt - Indo-Fijian) had cited inappropriate practices and 
mismanagement of funds but had given the entities a clean audit report probably 
based on ‘true and fair accounts’ irrespective of the practices of mismanagement. 
Prima facie this indicated he was corrupt which may or may not have been 
the case.  However, AG Datt’s action may have been prompted by the political 
tension in Fiji during the 1990-1995 period.  During this time, the Rabuka led 
indigenous Fijian government was in power.  Within this broader political context 
there was potential tension of ethnic supremacy and to avoid this AG Datt (an 
Indo-Fijian) acted the way he did.   
These examples portray different dimensions of auditor independence in 
the Fijian public sector.  Although the AG is assured constitutional independence, 
he is not “free” from executive control thus Auditor independence is not achieved.  
It can be concluded that it was an illusion that the  Fijian AG was able to 
exercise his constitutional independence in carrying out his public accountability 
role by reporting and disclosing fraudulent practice and lack of compliance with 
financial regulations during 1991-2000 period.  Independence of the Fijian AO 
was suppressed by the executive.  The culture and traditional structure of the 
indigenous Fijian system of governance also has the ability to suppress auditor 
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independence in the Fijian public sector.  This is a motivation to explore why 
efficacy audits were implemented and then inexplicably discontinued.  
5.3 The Scope of the OAG Mandate 
The scope of the OAG mandate refers to the subject of audit which is usually 
determined by the audit act. Sections 8 and 9 of the 1956 Audit Ordinance 
specifies the entities to be audited by the Director of Audit, these include ‘all 
government Ministries, Departments, local government authorities, Provincial 
Councils, statutory bodies and overseas Missions’.  The focus of the OAG audit 
extends to the nature of assertions subject to investigation; that is the OAG has the 
responsibility to audit the accounting system of the entity.  This indicates that the 
auditor would determine the extent to which accounting information is used to 
‘lay bare’ the operations of the entities (Roberts, 1996).     
5.3.1 Colonial compliance years (1874-1955) 
The scope of the colonial Auditor’s mandate during 1874-1955 (refer to Table 5-
1) was limited by a small number (about five) of government departments 
(Journal of Legislative Council Papers, 14/1930; 16/1893).  The audit reports 
were prepared in Britain and the scope of the audit was a general cash flow audit 
for all government departments presented as a single account with lists of 
expenditure and revenues (Journal of Legislative Council Papers, 18/1892, 
16/1993, 18/1897).  The scope of the OAG mandate was thus limited to that 
precedent established in English law, which required the colonial Auditor to check 
for arithmetical accuracy of the records.  
The Fijian Legislative Council, whose members were appointed by the 
British representative (the Governor of Fiji), was responsible for providing the 
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public with the basic public goods and services like law and order, basic 
infrastructure and minimal health services.  This suited the public sector at that 
point in time because Fiji had a relatively small population.  It follows that the 
scope of the colonial Director of Audit’s mandate was suitable for the Fijian 
public sector at that time.  
5.3.2 Verification of records years (1956-1969) 
The 1956 Audit Ordinance, based on  British law expanded the scope of the 
Director of Audit’s mandate by providing him with authority to audit, the 
government, the government agencies and the accounts of any corporate body 
established by an Ordinance of the Legislative Council, (Section 8 and 9(1)).  The 
1956 Audit Ordinance and its subsections, provide the Director of the Audit with 
the authority to satisfy himself that: 
(i) reasonable precautions have been taken to safeguard the collections of 
public money and that the laws, directions or instructions relating to the 
collection of public money have been duly observed and ii) that all 
appropriations or disbursements had been expended and applied for the 
purpose/s for which the money was intended and authorized. (1956 Audit 
Ordinance, Section 8). 
 
This clause empowered the colonial Director of Audit to, investigate, 
report on and disclose if and how the auditees complied with financial rules.  He 
also had to verify and disclose that appropriations were used for their intended 
purposes.  
Analysis of the audit reports (Papers, 3/63; 14/1965; 16/67) and media 
reports (“Departments Accounts”, 1965; “Immigration Head”, 1964; “Long 
Look”, 1966) indicate that the Director of Audit was treating the government, the 
various government departments and government agencies as separate reporting 
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entities.  Each reporting entity was subjected to an individual cash flow and 
compliance to budget rules audit and issued a separate audit report.  By 
performing individual audits for every entity the Director of Audit was providing 
assurance to the public and the Parliament that the management of every 
government entity was complying with regulations.  At the same time each 
accounting audit was used as accountability to hold the management to account 
but without the power to impose consequences thus in Roberts (1991) terms real 
accountability was obstructed.  
During the verification of records period (1956-1969) the audit scope 
expanded from compliance with English reporting requirements to checking for 
arithmetical verification and compliance with budgetary procedures of disbursing 
expenses.  The Director of Audit was the accountee bringing to the Legislative 
Council’s attention the issues of record keeping, checking that the accounts were 
accurately kept, and that each public sector entity (the accountor) complied with 
financial rules and regulations.  The focus was on preparing accounts and 
therefore accounts prepared. Accounting, as such was substituted for 
accountability (Roberts, 1991, 1996).  
5.3.3 Reporting irregularities years (1970-1990) 
After gaining independence from Britain, Fiji adopted the 1970 Audit Act.  
Section 13, subsections 1 to 4, of this statute, ‘provide the AG with the authority 
to audit the accounts of government corporate bodies and other bodies established 
under the Fiji laws’.  The title ‘Director of Audit was repealed and changed to 
Auditor-General on 8th October, 1970’, (section 6 (1), 1970 Audit Act).  The 
corporate body includes the statutory bodies, government trading enterprises, 
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government owned companies and the National Bank of Fiji.  This expansion in 
the audit scope indicates that the AG was empowered to audit each and every 
public sector entity, funded by the government for compliance with financial 
regulations and also for financial statement audits.  As such, the AG was not 
empowered to audit for or assess fraud or efficacy.  He has the right to disclose 
irregularities and can possibly extend the disclosure to fraudulent practices.  Yet 
again accounting is used as accountability by substituting compliance for reports 
on financial accounts and irregular practices (Roberts, 1991).    
The 1970 Audit Act, section 12, stipulates ‘that within a period of eight 
months after the close of each financial year, the AG should transmit the annual 
audited accounts of the whole of the Fijian public sector entities and agencies.’  
The AG can seek an extension to the time from the Parliament if so desired, but 
this was not the practice.  The time lag between the close of the financial year and 
the annual audit reports ranges from two to three years (Audit Reports, 1980 & 
1983).  Delays in the submission of financial statements delayed the completion 
of audit reports (Annual Reports-Audit Office, 1980 & 1983).  This potentially 
diverted the attention from real accountabilities because financial reports were 
produced but audits were delayed hence were  not be used to provide 
consequences (Roberts, 2001a). 
5.3.4 Efficiency years (1991 -2000)  
There were significant developments in the scope of the OAG mandate during the 
1991-2000 period (Table 5-1) as a result of the Institutional Strengthening 
Programme jointly funded by the Asian Development Bank and the Fijian 
Government (Annual Report-Audit Office, 2000).  During 1995-1996 AG Datt 
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conducted  performance audit of two major public sector entities, the Fiji Customs 
Department and the Colonial War Memorial Hospital.  The scope of the OAG 
audit was expanded from financial attest auditing to performance auditing but 
without a mandate. 
AG Datt expanded the financial attest audit scope to include economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness.  The focus of the audits shifted, from examining and 
inquiring for compliance and control, to examining and inquiring for performance 
in terms of outputs and outcomes.  With a focus on performance, the AG was able 
to act in a much more powerful way to hold the auditees to account.  The concern 
here is whether AG Datt was able to continue with performance audits and report 
on non-accounting information to make visible the conduct of the public sector 
managers (Roberts, 1996).   
The 1990 Constitution, section 126, subsection 2, limits the scope of the 
OAG’s mandate to audit all public sector entities.  The section specifies: 
Provided, that if it is so prescribed in the case of any body corporate 
directly established by law, the accounts of that body corporate shall be 
audited and reported on by any such person as may be prescribed. 
 
Most public sector statutory bodies, local governments and the National Bank of 
Fiji used this provision and secured the services of private sector auditors for 
auditing purposes.  The power of the AG with respect to choosing the subject of 
his audits was thus highly limited.  In this context, the Rabuka led government 
used the undemocratic 1990 Constitution to weaken the AG’s powers by denying 
him   access to all public sector entities as per section 12 of the 1970 Audit Act.  
The Constitution in Fiji is the supreme law and therefore supersedes the latter 
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statute. The political supremacy of the indigenous Fijians was restored by this 
government and as such it did not deem it necessary that all government 
controlled and managed entities be held to account by an Indo-Fijian Auditor-
General (Datt).  The political power relationship between the Rabuka government 
and Auditor-General, Datt, exposes how the indigenous Fijian leadership 
protected their self-interests (Prasad & Mir, 2002).   
During the 1991-2000 period the Fiji public sector had the services of at 
least three dynamic auditors-general.  These were, Datt (1987-1997) a local Indo-
Fijian, Michael Jacobs (late 1997-late 2000), an Australian from the Victoria 
Audit Office in Australia, and an indigenous Fijian, Eroni Vatuloka (late 1997-
2009).  All three, during their tenure sought a mandate for performance audit by 
submitting proposals for changes to the 1970 Audit Act to the Ministry of Finance 
(Annual Report- Audit Office, 1995, 2000, 2003).  However, the latter did not 
progress with the proposal to do so.  Failure to secure a mandate for such audits in 
Roberts’ (1996) terms meant that the AG was not free to engage in a socialising 
form of accountability by explaining, debating and exchanging views on the 
benefits of performance auditing with the Ministry of Finance personnel and the 
auditees.  Similarly the latter appeared not be free to seek explanations and put 
forward their arguments on benefits of such audits.  
During the 1970-1990 and 1991-2000 periods, transparency occurred but 
was limited by compliance with regulations (Roberts, 1996) as demanded by the 
1970 Audit Act.  
During 1970- 1990, AGs (Bhim 1970-1984, Narain 1984-1987 and Datt 
1987-1997) strengthened their rights to report by extensively reporting for 
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compliance with budgetary appropriations procedures and record-keeping.  The 
audit reports during this period focussed on the methods of disbursements and 
receipts and the accounting and procedural controls in place for the financial 
operations of the entity.  During 1991-2000 the scope expended to auditing for 
performance.  AG Datt was one of the catalysts for this expansion.  He saw a need 
to start auditing for performance in 1995 because the prior years’ annual financial 
attest audit reports disclosed a high level of mismanagement of public funds due 
to improper record-keeping.  This was interpreted by him as a lack of control by 
the public sector managers in the management of public property and other 
resources.  During the 1990-2000 period accounting was substituted for 
accountability (Roberts, 1996) in the sense that performance (and corruption) was 
not under the AG’s gaze.  Hence accounting information was used by Datt to hold 
the ministries and departments to account on behalf of the Parliament.  
5.4 Reporting Requirements 
Reporting requirements set out the standards against which compliance is 
measured and the public sector managers are held to account.  For the purposes of 
this research, reporting requirements have been divided into three sub-categories 
(see Table 5-1).  These include the OAG’s right to: (i) investigate; (ii) report and 
(iii) follow up.  This was done on the basis that all three sub-categories  related to 
the OAG reporting requirements.  In order to report, the OAG has to investigate, 
and then report and disclose the findings of his investigation.  After the reporting 
there is usually a follow-up (i.e. consequences) to determine what actions can be 
taken for improving the deficiencies or to strengthen the strategies and techniques 
used by the managers to use the budgetary appropriations in order to achieve the 
objectives for which it was given.  
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The follow-up is undertaken by the PAC members (Standing Orders 
72/92) by seeking answers to concerns raised in the Audit Report from the 
respective entity’s heads and permanent secretaries, and even Ministers.  Seeking 
answers and getting responses does not constitute sanctioning the actions of the 
bureaucrats or the Minister; this is perceived to be the role of the government 
(Public Accounts Committee Report, 1983).  This process is perceived to be a 
socialising form of accountability (Roberts, 1996) as it engages dialogue and 
discussion.  With this form of communication the PAC as the accountee is in a 
better position than the AG to hold the accountor (auditees to account) and 
influence a change.   
The Fijian AG is not empowered by the 1970 Audit Act to undertake 
follow-up action and is not in a position to impose sanctions or rewards.  The 
concern here then is whether the AG will be able to influence changes in the 
public sector audit practice.  Will his influence be sustained?   
5.4.1 The OAG’s right to investigate  
The OAG’s right to investigate is derived from the Audit Act.  For example, the 
1970 Audit Act provides the OAG with authority to investigate both the financial 
and the cash flow statements of all accounting officers.  Accounting officers are 
defined as:  
every public officer who is charged with the duty of collecting, receiving 
or accounting for, or who is charged with the duty of disbursing , or who 
in fact disburse, any public money and every officer who is charged with 
the receipt, custody or disposal of, or the accounting for, public stores or 
other property in the possession of government or who in fact receives, 
holds, disposes of or accounts for public stores or other public property in 
the possession of government. (Audit Act, 1970, p. 1) 
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This section of the Audit Act (1970) provides the AG with powers to 
investigate any individual, entity or agency who uses or is given the responsibility 
to deal with public funds.  They include the public sector managers, accounting 
officers, permanent secretaries, the Ministers of the government, and some 
members of Parliament.  The right to investigate also includes the AG’s right to 
access information and right to determine the purpose of the audit.  The 
significance of the right to investigate would help determine the effectiveness 
with which the AG can perform the accountability role of an oversight body.  This 
is important because it gives the AG the opportunity to seek real accountability, at 
least with respect to financial attest audits.  Such rights changed over the periods 
of reporting irregularities (1970- 1990) and focus on efficiency (1991-2000) 
during the post independence, and the post coups periods.  
5.4.1.1   Colonial compliance years (1874-1955) 
The OAG’s right to investigate was not applicable during this period (Table 5-1) 
because it was the English reportee who reported on the public accounts and the 
colonial Auditor, based in Britain, vouched for the reports.  In order to do so, the 
colonial Auditor would have had access to the financial records or the financial 
accounts.  Since the colonial Auditor signed off the colony’s annual accounts, 
he/she would have probably cited the financial records before signing the reports.  
5.4.1.2   Verification of records years (1956-1969) 
During this period (1956-1969), the Director of Audit had the right to investigate 
cash flows (see Table 5.-1).  Section 8 subsection 2 of  the 1956 Audit Ordinance, 
‘specifies the objectives of the audit process’.  Evidence from the parliamentary 
reports (Parliamentary Papers, 3/63, 14/1965, 16/67) and media reports 
(“Department’s Accounts”, 1965; “Immigration Head”, 1964; “Long Look”, 
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1966) indicate that he/she did not have much choice in deciding which entities to 
audit but had the ability to decide the objective of his audit for particular entities.  
For example, a Fiji Times report (July 13, 1966) states that the Director of Audit 
carried out audit checks in the Department of Agriculture to establish if the 
expenses were properly authorised and if the revenues collected were properly 
recorded.  The cash flow audits do not evaluate fraud or misappropriation of cash 
it only discloses encounters of irregularities and thus limits the accountability for 
consequences of mismanagement (Roberts, 1991) as the individual responsible for 
such action is not taken to task.  
The Director of Audit’s right to access information is mandated in the 
1956 Audit Ordinance:  
 ----has  mandatory access to information on records, books, vouchers, 
documents, cash, stamps, securities, stores or other government property 
(1956 Audit Ordinance, Section 12, subsection 2) .  
The public sector managers, accounting officers and government Ministers 
therefore had to make the information available.  
5.4.1.3   Reporting irregularities years (1970-1990) 
Developments in the AG’s right to investigate (for both the right to choose the 
objective of audit and the right of access to information) was traced through the 
analysis of Parliamentary Papers, Auditor-General’s annual audit reports and 
media reports. The statutory rights remained the same as in the verification of 
records period (1955-1969), see Table 5-1.   
Parliamentary reports (Parliamentary Papers 28/70, 19/71, 11/73, 28/73, 
16/74, 2/75, 11/75, 13/76, 14/76, 19/77, 35/79, 4/81, 10/81, 56/86, 26/87, 2/89,  
22/90), and media reports (“Account System”, 1984; “Quiz on Accounting”, 
 128 
 
1984; “Racket Claim”, 1984; “Staff Sold”, 1978) state that the AG had used his 
rights to choose the audit objectives on almost all the government ministries, 
government agencies and statutory bodies.  During the 1970-1990 period 
Auditors-General (Bhim [1970-1984], Narain [1984-1987], Datt [1987-1997]) 
chose to investigate the internal accounting control systems of government 
Departments and Ministries to establish whether the internal accounting controls 
were appropriate or otherwise. 
In some cases the AG’s investigation focused on fraudulent practices and 
mismanagement of funds.  One such investigation was called for by the Ratu Sir 
Mara led democratically elected government in 1977 because of the claims by the 
public of corrupt practices in some government departments. (“Council Ignored 
Advice”, 1977).  Another such investigation was undertaken by the OAG in 1983 
when the Ratu Sir Mara government was in power.  A media report (Matai, 1983) 
notes that the Minister for Local Governments had called for the audit of the 
financial affairs of the Nausori Town Council for the years 1982 and 1983.  The 
objective of the audit investigation was decided by the Government in power 
which is allowed under section 13; subsection 2 of the 1970 Audit Act.  So while 
the Audit Act 1970 allows the AG to choose the objectives, the executive 
government can also direct the former to investigate for specific objectives.  The 
executive government of the day therefore subjugates the AG’s right and this can 
cause tension between the two as the former has the power to influence the latter’s 
right to decide the audit objective.   
The AG is given powers to have access to all records and information for 
financial attest audits.  Section 6, subsection 2 (a-d) of the 1970 Audit Act, 
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‘specify the records and information’ that should be made available for audits.  
These refer to accounting information and non-accounting information is not 
included.  In this context, accounting was used to make transparent the conduct of 
the auditees for record keeping and compliance to financial regulations (Roberts, 
1996).    
5.4.1.3.1 Efficiency years (1991-2000)  
From 1991-2000 there was significant expansion in the AG’s right to choose the 
objective of an audit and the right to access information.  The audit mandate did 
not change, but the AG (Datt, 1987-1997) expanded audit objectives by 
incorporating auditing for performance in 1996.   
Parliamentary Papers (No. 8/97 & 11/97) indicate that AG Datt chose the 
audit objectives for the Colonial Hospital and the Customs Department for the 
year 1996.  For both entities he chose to investigate for effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations and management of resources.  So performance audit was 
conducted to uncover new disclosures.  
In 1996, the Constitutional Review Committee’s Report (also known as 
Reeves Report) suggested that the Audit Act (1970) be reviewed and performance 
audit become a mandatory part of the revised Act.  This recommendation was 
based on various reports (media and audit reports) wherein allegations of corrupt 
practices were made and brought before the Ombudsman or the Judiciary (Annual 
Report-Audit Office, 1988, 1992; “Council accounts contain defect-AG”, 1975; 
“Accounts at FAB queried, 1983; Jagmohan, 1996; Matai, 1998).   
This recommendation if adopted by the government would have given the 
AG the rights to assess for efficiency and effectiveness.  The focus of such audits 
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would be on how and why the Ministers and the public sector managers used the 
resources the way they did thus making them take responsibility for the input and 
the outcome of their actions.  The AG would be able to hold the government, the 
Ministers and the auditees to account by using both financial and non-financial 
information.  
During the efficiency years (1991- 2000) the AG Datt exercised the  right 
to chose the audit object and extended this right to include audit for efficiency.  
He reported on the performance of the Fijian Customs Department and the 
Colonial war Memorial Hospital. The management of these two public sector 
entities provided the AG free access to information for financial attest and 
compliance to budget audits knowing that this was a legal requirement and also to 
non-financial information which was not legally required.  The OAG in its 
capacity as an overseeing body used both accounting and non-accounting 
information such as how and where management used the resources and why to 
hold the managers (auditees) to account.   
5.4.2 The OAG’s right to report  
The 1956 Audit Ordinance (section 8, sub-section 2) states that the Director of 
Audits ‘has the right to report on how the public sector entities keep their accounts 
and the controls maintained for proper authorisation of expenditures’.  During the 
cash flow audits, the right to report also includes checking if the public sector 
managers complied with appropriate rules and regulations while disbursing public 
funds, collecting revenue or while documenting financial transactions.  The 
auditors also audit to check whether the appropriated funds have been used for the 
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purpose for which they were intended, appropriated or otherwise (Annual Report-
Audit Office, 1965).  
Section 6 of the 1970 Audit Act empowers the AG with similar but 
extended rights on issues of what to report.  The extension included ‘checking for 
fraud or extravagant use of funds’.  The right to report empowers the AG to act in 
order to hold the government, the government agencies and other government 
bodies to account in the way the public funds and resources are used.  
The AG is required to: 
transmit the annual audited reports to the Minister of Finance and the 
Minister would then table the report in Parliament (1970 Audit Act, Section 
12 (1) ). 
 
The AG is not an officer of the Fijian Parliament so he has to transmit the 
Report to the Minister of Finance who can  delay the tabling of the audit report.  
Should this happen the disclosures in the reports will remain as ‘accounts being 
prepared’ and actions will  not be taken by the government in power on the 
disclosures.  As such, accounts prepared are  not  accompanied by action on the 
audit report findings and disclosures and this in Roberts’ (1991) terms remains an 
empty gesture.  
5.4.2.1   Colonial compliance years (1874-1955) 
The English reportee compiled the audit report during this period and hence the 
colonial Auditor’s right to report does not arise.    Since the financial reports were 
written for the British representative the colonial Auditor had no right to decide 
what to report on and to whom to present the report.      
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5.4.2.2  Verification of records years (1956-1969) 
Section 8, subsection 2, of the Audit Ordinance of 1956 provides the Director of 
Audit with ‘statutory rights to report on the records, documents, books and 
vouchers kept by the government ministries, departments and agencies’.  
An analysis of the Parliamentary Papers (3/63, 14/1965, 16/67) and media 
reports (“Department’s Accounts”, 1965; “Immigration Head”, 1964; “Long 
Look”, 1966) indicates that the Director of Audit used his rights to report on the 
record-keeping, the custody of government property and on the financial accounts 
of the entities.  Such audit reports indicated that the accounting officers were 
unable to properly document invoices, vouchers and receipts.  This raises a 
serious concern at the time on the accountors’ (accounting officers) 
responsibilities.   
It was perhaps difficult for the audit officers to verify the arithmetical 
accuracy of the records.  Such documentation also opened up room for 
mismanagement of cash and other corrupt practices, which are difficult to prove 
without good, quality records.  Since cash reporting formed the basis of 
accounting, the problem of establishing the amount of cash received or 
disbursement without proper evidence would have resulted in the audit officers 
not being able to establish the reasonableness of record keeping as a form of 
accountability by the entity under audit.  Reporting during the 1956-1969 period 
was based on accounting numbers but not evidence. As such accounting made 
visible the conduct of the accountors (Roberts, 1996, 2003).  
5.4.2.3  Reporting irregularities years (1970-1990) 
The 1970 Audit Act established the OAG’s right to report. He could report on: 
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the records, documents, books and vouchers, stamps and properties in the 
custody of or kept by the government ministries, departments and agencies 
(Section 12, (1)).  
 
An analysis of Parliamentary Papers6 revealed that the AG’s (Bhim, Narain and 
Datt) reported on compliance with rules and procedures related to the budgetary 
allocations and on accounting controls.  This expanded their reports by disclosing 
audit findings on irregular practices of account keeping and misappropriation of 
funds, a result of the level of reporting undertaken by the Audit Office.  For 
example, Parliamentary Papers (4/81, 35/79, 14/79, 19/77) and media reports 
(“Bank searches”, 1979; Matai, 1983; “Money Wasted”, 1975; “Racket Claimed”, 
1984) state that the audit reports highlighted: (i) discrepancies between the 
appropriated amounts and the amounts disbursed by certain public sector entities; 
(ii) discrepancies between the cash collections receipted and the cash collections 
deposited; (iii) non-compliance with banking regulation in giving loans to clients 
in the National Bank of Fiji and (iv) a high rate of government vehicles involved 
in accidents.  This indicates that the AG was seeking for accountability through 
investigating and the entities’ accounting systems.  
5.4.2.4   Efficiency years (1991-2000)  
AG Datt used the statutory rights provided by section 12, subsection 3, of the 
1970 Audit Act, and the requirements of the relatively new 1996 Public Enterprise 
Act, to audit for performance in two public sector entities (Chand, 1997; 
Parliamentary Papers 8/97; Ragogo, 1997).  The 1996 Public Enterprise Act was 
introduced as a part of New Public Management (Appana, 2003) by the Rabuka 
led government in an effort to improve the performance of the public sector 
                                                 
6 Parliamentary Papers 24/70, 28/70, 7/71, 19/71, 11/73, 13/73, 28/73, 16/74, 2/75, 11/75, 13/76, 14/76, 5/77, 19/77, 35/79, 
4/81, 9/81, 10/81, 56/86, 26/87, 2/89, 22/90. 
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entities.  It required all the public sector entities to publish their outputs in 
quantifiable auditable terms and submit these with the financial statements to the 
AG for annual audits.  The statute was an enabler of performance audit regardless 
of the fact that the 1970 Audit Act did not mandate such audits.  
AG Datt transmitted the performance audit reports to the Parliament via 
the Minister of Finance in 1996.  These audit reports disclosed how and if the 
auditees (public sector managers) achieved the required levels of outputs and 
services they were expected to provide to the public (Parliamentary Papers 60/97, 
61/97).  Both financial and non-financial information was used by Datt to hold the 
auditees to account.  
Although Datt used the 1996 Public Enterprise Act to audit for 
performance, the 1970 Audit Act did not provide him with the rights to do so.  
The lack of mandate and the broader socio-political context that prevailed in Fiji 
during the 1970-1990 created a potential for conflict between the AG and the 
auditees.  Media reports (Hildebrand, 2003; Jagmohan, 1996; Manueli, 2003; 
McGowan, 2002; “PM Agrees”, 2001; Wise, 1997) have highlighted instances 
whereby the OAG was out rightly denied the right to access and report on 
financial information.  
 The economy, efficiency and effectiveness audits were performed during 
the 1995-1996, a period when the Rabuka led government elected under the 
undemocratic 1990 Constitution, was in power.  James Ah Koy, an indigenous 
Fijian was the Minister of Finance.  The executive government was also military 
backed.  Given the political history of Fijian supremacy, the indigenous Fijian led 
government would not be keen to be held to account; at least in this case by an 
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Indo-Fijian AG (Datt).  An exploration of the tensions between these powerful 
political individuals will reveal how they influenced changes in public sector 
(Myers, 1994; Prasad & Mir, 2002).   
The OAG’s duties and responsibilities expanded from reporting on 
budgetary compliance with statutory laws and financial attest audit to reporting on 
performance efficiency.  The AG has been the major catalyst for these changes.  
The support from the PAC members and the media’s publicity of the disclosures 
of these  reports inspired  the AG Datt  to expand his  reporting rights.  Reactions 
to the OAG audit reports by various user groups such as the PAC members and 
the media imply that the reports were useful in informing them about public sector 
accountability or lack of it thereof.  Most of these reports used accounting to hold 
the auditees to account for and it appears that accounting was accepted as 
accountability (Roberts, 1991) by the users.  
5.4.3 The OAG’s right to follow-up  
The OAG’s right to follow-up refers to the actions the OAG is empowered to take 
under the Audit Act (1970) or any such law to ensure that the audit findings are 
acted upon.  During the 1874- 2000 period neither the Audit Act nor any other law 
empowered the OAG to take actions on its audit findings (see Table 5-1).  The 
OAG is empowered to report its audit findings and provide an opinion on the 
findings.  In Fiji the general law has empowered the PAC members to examine 
the AG’s report, and form suggestions based on these.  This means that holding 
others to account for problems found is limited.  
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5.4.3.1  Colonial compliance years (1874-1955) 
The colonial Auditor had no right to follow-up on his reports during the 1874-
1955 period.  An analysis of the Annual Reports of the Colony (1875, 1876, 1900, 
1910) indicated that the decision to follow-up on the audit reports would not have 
been desirable because the financial reports indicated amounts spent compared 
with appropriated amounts.  
5.4.3.2  Verification of records years (1956-1969) 
The 1956 Audit Ordinance does not provide the Director of Audits the right to 
follow-up on audit reports.  Legislative Council papers (Papers, 14/1965; 16/67) 
and media reports (“Department’s Accounts”, 1965; “Immigration Head”, 1964; 
“Long Look”, 1966) were analyzed to trace any developments.    
From these reports it appeared that PAC members deliberated on the audit 
findings and disclosures of inappropriate record keeping and sought explanations 
from the auditees.  There was no follow-up action to address the concerns.  In 
Roberts’ (1991) terms, real accountability did not take place because 
consequences did not follow.   
5.4.3.3  Reporting irregularities years (1970-1990) 
The 1970 Audit Act does not empower the AG to take follow-up actions on the 
financial attest audit and compliance to rules audits.  Instead, Section 12, 
subsection 2 ‘empowers the OAG to transmit special reports to the Minister of 
Finance to be tabled before Parliament’.  The AG used these provisions to 
perform investigations audits in some government departments (media reports: 
“Mayor, I Welcome”, 1980; ‘Shipyard Report”, 1972).  These audits were enabled 
by the financial attest audits performed at the Government Shipyard and at the 
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Nausori Town Council.  These departments had on a continuous basis received 
audit reports indicating a failure to comply with procedures.  So although the 
OAG did not have explicit rights to undertake follow-up exercises, special 
investigations allowed him to do so.  
An analysis of the Parliamentary Papers (2/75, 14/76, 9/81) indicates PAC 
members support special investigations.  This support suggests that problems of 
holding the accountor to account by accounting based audit reports were not 
effective because these disclosures were not accompanied by follow-up actions 
(consequences).   Therefore there was a need for follow-up actions.  
5.4.3.4  Efficiency years (1991-2000)  
The AG did not have the rights to undertake follow-up on audit reports from 1991 
to 2000.  Instead he used the financial attest audits and financial statement audits 
during this period to suggest that  other agencies undertake follow-up actions.    
 An analysis of media reports (“Abuse of Funds,” 1999; Lewa, 2000; 
Manueli, 2003; Rika, 2001) indicates that the OAG’s reports have instigated 
several special investigations.  Some of these investigations were handled by the 
police as the audit reports had implicated fraudulent and corrupt practices.  The 
media (Lewa 2000 a & b) reported that in 1999 AG Jacobs disclosed in his audit 
report that there were instances of fraudulent and corrupt practices regarding the 
use of public money by one of the local town councils.  The Minister for Housing 
and Local Governments reported the audit findings to the Fiji police requesting a 
police investigation.  This incident indicates that there are other institutions which 
undertake follow-up actions instigated by the OAG reports and requests.  
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The PAC members are another agent who have served similar purposes on 
some occasions.  The PAC, when deliberating on the audit reports and disclosures 
seeks explanations for these from the management of the audited entities, and 
recommends corrective actions based on the OAG report.  However, it lacks the 
authority to take action.  On some occasions, the Parliament has asked for special 
investigations based on the financial audit findings, indicating the need for follow-
up exercises.  The media is another pressure group, who by publicising the 
financial statements audit findings and disclosures of fraudulent and corrupt 
practices forces the government to instigate special inquires.  These groups 
therefore can influence changes in the scope of public sector auditing.  
 If the OAG had been given the authority (through legislation) to 
undertake a follow-up role then the OAG’s (accountee) ability to hold the 
accountor to account will be strengthened because the latter will be answerable to 
the former.  The AG could impose sanctions on the party/ies to change their 
behaviour.  A follow-up exercise by the OAG would send a strong signal to the 
bureaucrats that they will be ultimately held responsible for their actions.  During 
1970-1990  transparency occurred  through financial accounting compliance, but 
it was  not accompanied by consequence.  In this context accountability without 
sanctions or reprieve from the accountee (the OAG, or the Parliament) is an empty 
gesture (Roberts 1996).  
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5.5 Summary  
The role of the OAG is important for the Fijian public sector because it has the 
power to audit the institutions that use and control publicly owned resources and 
finances (Constitution 1997).  The AG therefore is responsible for holding the 
public sector auditees to account thus making the latter take responsibility for 
their actions.  
Table 5-1 illustrates how the functions of the Auditors-General developed 
over the 1874-2000 period.  The historical analysis of audit findings, reports and 
disclosures reveal that Auditors-General Bhim (1970-1984) Narian (1984-1987) 
and Datt (1987-1997) were the catalysts for changes in the functions of the Fijian 
Audit Office.  These three used the 1970 Audit Act and the Constitution to expand 
on their statutory duties and powers.  
During 1970-1984 AG Bhim while reporting the findings of budgetary 
compliance and financial attest audits disclosed encounters with irregular record 
keeping by the public sector managers and accounting officers.  The Ratu Sir 
Mara led Alliance government appeared to overlook the audit findings and 
avoided being held to account because no follow-up or penalty was imposed.  The 
media publicised the audit findings highlighting the lack of accountability.  
Auditing in Fiji continued under the 1970 Audit Act despite the 1987 
Military coups and the overthrow of the democratically elected government.  AG 
Datt used the OAG’s independent status to disclose mismanagement of funds and 
corrupt practices during his tenure (1987-1997).  Although these disclosures were 
based on accounting, it was a signal that calculative accounting was not sufficient 
to hold the public sector managers and Ministers to account.    
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During 1995-1996, AG Datt undertook performance audits, at the Customs 
Department and the Colonial War Memorial Hospital.  He used the 1996 Public 
Enterprise Act and stretched the financial attest and compliance to budget audit to 
perform such audits.  These audits included both accounting and non-accounting 
information to assess auditees’ performance  
After these two performance audits were completed the practice was 
discontinued in 1997.  One must therefore ask why such audits were discontinued, 
when they served such a useful public service.  This chapter has laid out the 
background of public sector auditing in Fiji. The next chapter sets out the 
methodology employed in this thesis and explains how the critical hermeneutic 
methodology serves the purpose of this study. 
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Chapter 6 Methodology 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The chapter will discuss why hermeneutic theory has been chosen as the 
appropriate theoretical framework to explicate the research findings.   
Research in accounting has been greatly influenced by the theoretical 
perspectives advanced by the social science (Dey, 2001; Laughlin, 1995; 
Humphrey & Scapens, 1996; Chua, 1985).  The social science literature provides 
a variety of philosophical lenses for the study of accounting phenomenon ranging 
from an objectified view of accounting to a view where accounting is seen to be 
socially constructed (Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Broadbent & Laughlin, 1997; 
Morgan & Willmot; 1993; Preston, 1992; Hines, 1987; Chua, 1986a; Chua & 
Baxter, 2003).  Theoretical assumptions are important because they seek to 
explain the existence of some form of reality and truth and explain how one seeks 
and accepts knowledge (Chua, 1986a).  
Methodology describes the core assumptions regarding the nature of 
knowledge and the methods through which that knowledge can be obtained, as 
well as a set of root assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon to be 
investigated; it forms a link between theory and method (Llewellyn 1993; Morgan 
& Smircich, 1980).  Once a researcher decides his/her position concerning how to 
seek knowledge and explain the existence of some form of truth and reality from 
the researcher’s perspective, the researcher is  in a better position to explore the 
possible techniques of data collection (Llewellyn, 1993; Chua, 1986a; Tomkins & 
Groves, 1983).  For example Chua (1986a) states:  
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Methodological assumptions indicate the research methods deemed 
appropriate for the gathering of research data (p. 604).   
Llewellyn (1993) suggests:    
Methodology adopted will shape the research process and the research 
findings to a far greater extent than will the research method (p.232). 
 
The methodology is the vehicle used by the researcher to explain the 
meaning of the phenomenon under study and provide justifications of how it 
‘came into being’, that is accepted as reality and not the research methods.  A 
researcher’s perception of reality as such depends on the methodological 
framework accepted and applied.  In social sciences, there exists the possibilities 
of several realities, which are interpreted as being socially constructed (Chua, 
1986a; Llewellyn, 1993; Tomkins & Grooves, 1993).  Therefore once a 
methodology is adopted the researcher then proceeds to identify methods by 
which data will be collected.   
To achieve the aims of this chapter, it is organised in the following way: a 
general explanation of methodology is offered, followed by an analysis of the 
positivist and the interpretative approaches in accounting research.  Next, the 
arguments are made for the use of critical hermeneutics as a methodology for this 
research.  Finally, an explanation of the philosophical underpinnings of the 
hermeneutic framework and the application to this study is offered.  
6.2 Methodological Selection  
According to Llewellyn (1993) in the social sciences: 
methodology reflects the ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
the researcher (particularly those concerning the relationship between the 
subject and the object (p.232).   
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  Ontology concerns the nature of reality (Hopper & Powell, 1985) and 
focuses the researcher’s assumed view of the existence of physical and social 
reality (Chua, 1985).  Ontological assumptions form two extreme parts of a 
continuum:  
on one extreme the social world and its structures can be regarded as 
having an empirical, concrete existence external to and independent of and 
prior to the cognition of any individual, on the other extreme reality is 
depicted as existing only as a product of individual consciousness- the 
external world consists simply of concepts and labels created by people to 
help them understand reality and negotiate a shared conception of its 
nature with others, (Hopper & Powell, 1985, p.431). 
 
Ontological assumptions as such bring to the fore the question of whether 
the researcher views the existence of reality as something concrete and 
independent or as socially constructed and therefore value laden.  Such views on 
reality will influence how the researcher comes to realise and understand the 
existence of the phenomenon under study. 
Accounting researchers may adopt a view that reality exists independent of 
the researcher and is something ‘out there’ (Chua, 1986a, p. 606) which can be 
discovered.  This view of reality encourages the researcher to undertake research 
where the phenomenon under study ‘comes into being’ by using the scientific 
methods (Chua, 1986a & b; Willmot, 1983).  These methods include, hypothesis 
testing using a structured set of predetermined variables, and experiments in a 
controlled environment where the researcher is a passive participant and follows a 
predetermined structured set of rules (Hooper & Powell, 1985; Willmot, 1983).  
According to Willmot (1983), an objective view of reality can be used in 
accounting research only if the variables of a phenomenon being studied have 
stable meanings.  
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Adopting the view that reality is socially constructed implies that reality is 
multifaceted because it is shaped by both human and non-human interactions 
(Hines, 1979).  This view of reality encourages the researcher to seek to capture 
and reflect on the distinctive form and process of the actual research setting 
(Willmot, 1983).  The researcher therefore is not a passive participant but is 
actively engaged in the research activities bringing with her/him their own 
interpretation of the social setting in which the research takes place.  In trying to 
understand a socially constructed view of reality the researcher is encouraged to 
undertake research where the phenomenon under study ‘comes into being’ 
through interpretation of human actions, concepts, symbols, observations and in-
depth interviews.  A socially constructed reality is:   
created and sustained by ceaseless reflexive use of accounts, by social 
actors in constant interaction with each other (Mehan & Wood, 1975 cited 
by Hines, 1979 p.53). 
 
Epistemological considerations address the question of how we know a 
phenomenon and how we verify what we know as truth, also known as ‘theory of 
knowledge’ (Carter & Little, 2007, p. 1317).  According to Chua, 
‘epistemological assumptions decide what is to count as acceptable truth by 
specifying the criteria and the process of assessing truth claims’ (Chua, 1985, p. 
604).  The researcher therefore relies on the methods and processes of data 
collection and analysis as a means to justify the data used to construct knowledge. 
The epistemological beliefs of a researcher will be contingent upon the 
researcher’s ontological beliefs (Chua, 1985).  If the researcher views reality as an 
object to be discovered then the researcher will use scientific methods to ‘prove or 
falsify’ the phenomenon under study.  On the other hand if the researcher views 
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reality as a social construct then the researcher will engage in using subjective and 
interpretative methods to provide insights so that the phenomenon studied is 
accepted as knowledge that has been socially constructed.  Ontological and 
epistemological assumptions are important as they provide implications of and 
meanings to the research phenomenon being studied.  It can be conclusively stated 
that methodological considerations provide a ‘theory and justification of how 
research should proceed’ (Harding, 1987, cited by Carter & Little, 2007, p. 1316).  
Research methodologies adopted by most accounting researchers have 
been inspired by the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework (Laughlin, 1995; 
Chua, 1986b; Hopper & Powell, 1985).  The Burrell and Morgan framework has 
been constructed from two independent dimensions based on assumptions 
regarding the nature of social science and the nature of society (Chua, 1986b; 
Hopper & Powell, 1985; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  According to the Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) framework theoretical assumptions on epistemology, 
ontology, human nature and methodology form four paradigms.  The four 
paradigms are classified as functionalist, interpretative, radical humanist and 
radical structuralist and are viewed as being mutually exclusive.  Research within 
the functionalist paradigm assumes the existence of an external reality that can be 
researched and hence truth established and identified.  Accounting research based 
within the functionalist paradigm is labeled as positivist or mainstream accounting 
research.   
The positivist accounting research is perceived as providing a worldview, 
which claims the existence of a world with an objective reality, a determinable 
nature that is knowable and exists independent of human beings (Chua, 1986b). 
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Accounting as such is seen as a technical discipline and the accountant is viewed 
as a neutral contributor of the accounting information in positivist accounting 
research.  
The positivist accounting research views ‘accounting as an object’ and 
distinct from the contextual environment in which accounting is practiced.  Such 
methods of investigation expect the ‘research design to be structured in such a 
way that the impact of all extraneous factors that might bias and thus invalidate 
the results are minimised’ (Willmot, 1983, p. 390).  This aspect is important 
because, ‘to the believers in the scientific method, these elements are crucial for 
the use of theory construction and verification in prediction’ (Abdel-Khalik & 
Ajinka, 1979, cited by Willmot, 1983, p. 390).  Knowledge constructed by using 
scientific methods is perceived to be objective and neutral, free from researcher 
bias and social prejudice.  Chua (1986a) recognises the role of knowledge 
constructed using the scientific methods and suggests that for most people such 
knowledge is easily acceptable because it helps them to use the knowledge to 
make informed decisions for improvements.  
Accounting researchers using the positivist approach have been criticised 
for isolating the practice of accounting from the contextual environment (Chua & 
Baxter, 2003; Humphrey & Scapens, 1996; Llewellyn, 1996; Hines, 1989; Hopper 
& Powell, 1985; Tomkins & Groove, 1983).  The common theme of contention is 
that accounting as a practice does not exist independently of the accounting 
practitioner, the purpose of the practice and the user of the accounting 
information.  Research in accounting therefore should incorporate the 
contributions of the practitioner, the users of accounting information, and the 
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impact of accounting information on the wider society.  Humphrey and Scapens 
(1996, p. 87) quote Hopper and Powell (1985):  
Accounting should no longer be studied in a mode which is divorced from 
its social context and which ignores the influence of “wider social and 
political collectives” (p. 450). 
 
The critics of the positivist approach hold the view that knowledge 
constructed using the assumptions of this approach does not provide a ‘holistic’ 
meaning of the accounting phenomenon studied.  This is because the effects of the 
interactions amongst the accounting practitioners, the users of accounting 
information and the environment on the accounting phenomenon studied do not 
form a part of the research process and their influences are not considered in the 
construction of knowledge.  
The interpretative, radical humanist and radical structuralist paradigms are 
labelled as alternatives to positivist accounting research (Chua, 1986b).  The 
alternative research approaches suggested are used mainly in management 
accounting research (Baxter & Chua, 2003; Llewelyn, 2003).  These alternatives 
provide different worldviews based on assumptions of a reality that is either 
socially constructed through human interactions or is characterised by objective, 
real relations which are transformed and reproduced through subjective 
interpretations (interpretative and critical worldviews) (Chua, 1986b).   
Chua (1986b) states: 
All human knowledge is a social arti-fact__ it is a product of the 
constituting labour of people as they seek to produce and reproduce their 
existence and welfare (quoted from Habermas, 1978). Knowledge is 
produced by people for people and is about people and their social and 
physical environment. Accounting is no different (Chua, 1986b, p. 603). 
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Baxter and Chua (2003) also advance a similar argument and state:  
accounting is a discipline of the social and it seemed important to us to 
understand it in the context of a broader set of discourses from the social 
science’ (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 98).  
 
The interpretive methodology is one possible way to undertake accounting 
research since it allows the researcher to study accounting within its social context 
and incorporate the wider social and political influences in explaining the 
construction of knowledge (Humphrey & Scapens, 1996).  
According to Chua (1986) interpretive methodology is derived from 
German philosophical interests which emphasise the role of language, 
interpretation, and understanding in social sciences.  Chua (1986b) uses Schutz  
(1967, 1966, 1964, 1962) to explain that social science is concerned with human 
behaviour which is future oriented and directed towards the achievement of a 
determinate goal.  
because actions are intrinsically endowed with subjective meanings by an 
actor and always intentional, actions cannot be understood without 
reference to their meanings (Chua, 1986b, p. 613). 
   
The implication is that the human actors create their own social reality.  
The social world therefore is a product of human effort.  According to Hopper and 
Powell (1985), ‘the external social world consists simply of concepts and labels 
created by the people to help them understand reality and negotiate a shared 
conception of its nature with others’ (Hopper & Powell, 1985, p. 431). 
In creating their reality the human actors continually interact with one 
another and this  process of continuous social interaction allows for modifications 
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to human actions and some of the human actions assume a ‘stable nature’.  Once 
these actions become stable and are ‘internalised by the humans’ the stable actions 
are accepted as social norms and form part of the status quo.  The stable actions 
‘become objectively (inter-subjectively) real and are institutionalised, taken for 
granted structures and become an essential part of the social frameworks within 
which actions are made intelligible’ (Chua, 1986b, p. 614).  
Knowledge in the interpretive methodology is constructed by interpreting 
the meaning of human action within its social setting.  The interpretive researcher 
therefore engages in interpreting ‘lived experiences’ (Sandberg, 2005; Prasad & 
Prasad, 2002; Llewellyn, 1993) of the human actors.  In order to interpret the 
‘lived experiences’ the researcher has to first deconstruct the ‘lived experiences’ 
and then interpret the actions seeking to explain the intentions within the context 
the action took place.   
The interpretive methodology enables a researcher to construct knowledge 
of the phenomenon studied by using naturalistic research methods of data 
collection (Sandberg, 2005; Chua, 1986b; Hopper & Powell, 1985).  The use of 
naturalistic method is important because the researcher is seeking to understand 
socially constructed knowledge.  Some of these methods include ethnographic 
work, case study, participant observation, and in-depth interviews.  Hopper and 
Powell (1986) claim that the naturalistic methods of data collection allow the 
researcher to gain insights into an individual’s inner world.  
Some writers have outlined the limitations of using interpretive 
methodology in accounting research (Sandberg, 2005; Llewellyn, 1993; Hopper & 
Powell, 1986; Chua, 1985).  These writers claim that interpretive researchers have 
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mismatched the meanings and roles associated with methodology and methods; 
‘interpretive empirical work should be explicitly grounded in a methodology 
rather than a method’ (Llewellyn, 1992, cited in Llewellyn, 1993, p. 233).  This 
implies interpretive researchers have focused more on the methods of data 
collection and analysis to inform their research rather than focusing on how their 
assumptions of ontology and epistemology shapes the research process.   
Llewellyn (1993) suggests that the interpretive researcher might have 
focused more on methods to inform their research because of the researchers 
‘take’ on the objective-subjective dualism.  The objective-subjective dualism 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979) is concerned with how perceptions of reality are 
constructed.  For a thorough discussion of the objective - subjective dualism refer 
to Morgan and Smircich’s (1980) paper.  For example, in the interpretive 
methodology the researcher studies phenomenon which is a social object.  The 
researcher proceeds to explain how the social object is construed as reality, and 
then objectified by human interactions. 
One of the limitations of the interpretive methodology is that the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions are limited to providing a contextual 
understanding.  The way the wider social and political collectives’ impact on the 
processes of common sense understanding is not considered (Hopper & Powell, 
1985).  This limitation is reflected in the assumption that the actors’ agreement on 
a ‘shared meaning of an action’ is accepted as an explanation that reality exists 
(Chua, 1986b).  The actors and situations outside of the environment (context) in 
which the action takes place are excluded from attributing meanings to the action. 
An accounting researcher using the interpretive methodology will only focus on 
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the micro-level (research site) meanings attributed to the practice of accounting; 
accounting practice then is perceived to exist in isolation and its impact on the 
wider community is neglected.  
Interpretive methodology limits the researcher’s ability to critically 
evaluate the forms of life the researcher observes (Chua, 1986b).  This happens 
because the researcher’s observation is limited by the actors’ actions and the 
meanings the actors attribute to their action.  In such situations the researcher is  
not be able to evaluate the self-seeking interests of the individual actors.  
The social reality built on micro-social interaction suggests that the 
researcher neglects the conflicts of interest between classes in society (Chua, 
1986b).  Since conflicts of interests between classes are neglected, power 
dimensions that exist within the society are also neglected.  Such situations arise 
in the interpretive study because the study does not consider the wider society and 
concentrates only on a specified situation.  
The ontological and epistemological assumptions in critical theory provide 
a different set of lenses to understand the construction of reality and knowledge. 
According to Chua (1986b), a critical researcher has to understand the 
contributions and the potential contributions of human actions to understand the 
construction of reality.  The human actions can be observed as they have taken 
place but the potential human actions have not taken place and the researcher has 
to seek to understand what would have been the potential action and why the 
action did not take place.  To fully comprehend why the action did not take place 
or what stopped the action from taking place the researcher has to analyse the 
answers to these issues within the prevailing socio-economic and political setting. 
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Only after having done this can the researcher come to understand how humans 
create social reality.  
A critical researcher in seeking to understand why the potential human 
action did not take place observes the ‘prevailing systems of domination which 
alienate people from self-realisation’ (Chua, 1986b, p. 619).  This implies an 
evaluation of acceptable social practices and structure to understand how the 
society functions.  Acceptable social practices can also be enforced by the rules 
and the legal systems that operate to hold the society together.  The critical 
researcher analyses and evaluates the existing practices to understand the 
asymmetrical power relationships that prevail in the society. 
Critical researchers hold the belief that to understand social reality and 
societal dynamics the researcher has to understand the relationships that exist 
between the parts of the society consisting of individuals, groups, organisations 
and the whole society.  This implies reality is a set of relationships and if a 
phenomenon is studied using this assumption then its existence is only possible 
through its relationships with the other parts of the society and with the society as 
a whole.  
In understanding reality, the issues of domination, conflict and change are 
important for the critical researcher.  An understanding of these issues helps the 
researcher to understand how the society functions and brings into the open why 
humans perform certain actions.  
Knowledge in the critical methodology is socially constructed and is 
believed to be grounded in social and historical practices (Chua, 1986b); ‘there 
are no theory independent facts that can conclusively prove or disprove a theory’ 
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(Chua, 1986b, p. 620).  This implies knowledge is not a set of pre-existing objects 
to be discovered.  It is socially constructed and is not restricted by contextual 
interpretations.  Instead the wider socio-economic and political environment 
impacts on the interpretation of social actions.  According to Chua (1986b), 
critical philosophers disagree as to the precise criteria to be used to assess truth 
claims.   
Chua (1986b) cites Foucault (1977) ‘truth is a thing of the world: it is 
produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint and it induces regular 
effects of power’ (Chua, 1986b, p. 626).  This implies knowledge is an outcome 
of human efforts in overcoming their limitations in performing certain actions.  
Once humans acquire the skills or methods to overcome the limitations faced they 
would use the knowledge to dominate others by exerting the power of their 
knowledge.  
Some critical researchers assume that knowledge is an outcome of 
discussion; this is drawn from Habermas’s theory of communication (Habermas, 
1987; Laughlin, 1995; Van Peursem, 2005), which implies that the role of 
language is one important consideration when a researcher seeks to attribute 
meanings to social actions. From a Habermasian perspective language alone does 
not contribute to meaning, instead meanings to actions are conjointly constructed 
by language, labour and domination.    
In some research situations the researchers adopt critical methodology 
assumptions to complement an interpretive study (Myers, 1994; Prasad, 2005).  
Researchers opt for this combination in situations where the research is concerned 
with interpreting social phenomenon whose existence was impacted by the wider 
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social collectives, and the effect of the wider social collectives led to domination 
in society and changes in the existence of the phenomenon being studied.  To 
successfully undertake a study where the phenomenon being studied is affected by 
the dominant groups in the society the researcher can  decide to use an 
interpretive-critical methodology. In adopting the interpretive-critical 
methodology the researcher is able to develop understandings of the phenomenon 
studied by seeking the contextual everyday interpretations and understandings that 
make-up the life world.  In seeking the life world meanings the researcher 
interprets the meaning of power and power relations that affect the existence of 
the phenomenon so that the change dimensions within the life world can be 
explained.   
For the purposes of this study, an interpretive-critical methodology is 
adopted so that an understanding is gained into the meaning of why the practice of 
performance auditing was introduced and then discontinued in the Fijian public 
sector.  In understanding the meanings to why the project was introduced an 
attempt is made to seek which actors initiated the project and why, which actors 
and groups in the public sector were affected and how did the effects of their 
interaction lead to the discontinuation of the project.  In interpreting the 
relationships amongst actors and groups of actors involved in the project the 
researcher will try to attribute meanings to their actions by seeking to understand 
the power relations that existed amongst the actors, groups of actors, institutions 
and the society and how these relations implicate accountability practices.  
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6.3 Hermeneutic and Its Application to this Study  
Hermeneutics is known as the general theory of interpretation and understanding 
(Gummeson, 2003; Geanellos, 1999; Kidder, 1997; Thompson, 1980; 
McLaughlin, 1981; Bleicher, 1980; Riceour, 1974).  It is a ‘discipline that has 
been primarily concerned with the elucidation of the rules for the interpretation of 
text’ (Thompson, 1980, p. 36).  There are rules, procedures and principles which 
underlay the interpretation of the text (Hathway, 2002).  
Interpretation is the work of thought which consists in deciphering the 
hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of 
meaning implied in the literal meaning (Don Ihde, 1974, p. xiv).  
 
Interpretation in hermeneutics encompasses both explanation and 
comprehension.  It is a process of ‘coming to understand’ the symbols and the 
projections of the social realities objectified by the human minds which includes, 
written texts, works of arts, social actions of individuals, groups, institutions, 
organisations and communities (Gummeson, 2003; Ricoeur, 1981; Bleicher, 1980; 
Thompson, 1980).   
The word hermeneutics is derived from the name of the Greek god 
Hermes, and among one of several of his responsibilities was the guardianship of 
language and texts.  The developments of hermeneutics can be traced ‘from the 
Homeric disputes of the Greek Enlightenment to the biblical controversies of the 
Reformation’ (Thompson, 1980, p. 30).  Although hermeneutics emerged from a 
religious background its focus has expanded from religious ‘parochial concerns to 
an effort to formulate a general account of all human interpretive understanding’ 
(Hathaway, 2002, p. 207).   
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During the eighteenth century, developments in hermeneutics were 
influenced by Schleiermacher who was inspired by the Kantian philosophy of 
interpretation.  In order to interpret an activity, Schleiermacher’s approach was to 
interpret the activity on its own, followed by an interpretation of the process of 
how it came into being.  Therefore one had go behind the processes to understand 
what made the activity possible (Sud, 2008; Thompson, 1980).   
Further developments in the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
of   hermeneutics have been influenced by several notable philosophers like 
Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamar, Riceour and Habermas. 
The influences and efforts of these philosophers have been classified under three 
categories; classical hermeneutic theory, philosophical hermeneutics and critical 
hermeneutics (Prasad, 2002; Thompson, 1980).  The categories are expanded on 
below so as to clarify the positioning of this project.  
6.4 Classical Hermeneutics  
Classical hermeneutics is associated with the works of Scheiermacher and 
Dilthey.  Under the tradition of Scheiermacher and Dilthey, hermeneutics is 
understood in epistemological terms (Prasad, 2002) and is concerned with 
recovering the individuality and originality of the speaker or writer to recreate the 
creative act (Thompson, 1980).  This implies classical hermeneutics is concerned 
with retrieving the original meaning of the text as intended by the author and 
therefore to understand what the text meant from the original author’s perspective.  
The researcher has to re-experience the mental processes of the original author in 
order to retrieve the intended original meaning within the historical context in 
which the text was written or spoken.  Rules of grammar are also applied during 
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the interpretation process so that the retrieved meanings are comprehended ‘in the 
context of the language with its possibilities’ (Prasad, 2002, p. 15).  The purpose 
of classical hermeneutics is to guide the practice of correct interpretation and 
understanding. This concept is drawn up only to interpret the first reading of the 
text in this study.  
6.5 Philosophical Hermeneutics  
Philosophical hermeneutics is concerned with what is constitutively involved in 
each and every act of interpretation (Prasad, 2002; Bleicher, 1980).  The 
development of philosophical hermeneutics is attributed to the efforts of 
Heidegger and Gadamer. Heidegger, while accepting the Kantain impressions in 
the classical hermeneutics, challenged the concepts of an objective interpretation 
and objective mind based on grammatical and psychological dimensions offered 
by classical hermeneutics.  To Heidegger, attributing meanings to concepts based 
on grammatical and psychological dimension was ‘logical inquiry rather than an 
ontological interpretation’ (Thompson, 1980, p. 99). 
Heidegger proposed that ‘existential-ontological interpretation is 
concerned with the constitution of ‘Being’ rather than its theoretical-critical 
generalisation’ (Thompson, 1980, p. 99).  In proposing the ontological 
interpretation, (‘being there’) Heidegger raises the concept of ‘understanding’ to 
the status of a fundamental category of human existence and suggests that an 
understanding of reality or existence can only be arrived at through an interpretive 
effort.  This interpretive effort is the interpreter’s own understanding of ‘being’ 
which comes from within the interpreter, known as pre-understanding and 
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projection of the interpreter’s understanding.  This is also known as transcendental 
inquiry.   
Gadamer expanded Heidegger’s ontological interpretation by building on 
the concepts of pre-understanding and widening the interpretation to include 
prejudice and linguisticality of understanding (Hathaway, 2002; Bleicher, 1980).  
According to Gadamer when a text is interpreted the text and the interpreter are no 
longer separated as an object (text) and the subject (interpreter) (Prasad, 2002).  
The interpreter while interpreting the text brings with him/her their own horizon 
of experiences and preconceived ideas, which have become part of the interpreter.  
The interpreter is perceived to have some pre-understanding of concepts and 
phenomenon through his cultural and traditional experiences.  These pre-
conceived ideas are called prejudice.  Therefore, the interpreter’s prejudices such 
as my life experiences in Fiji during the 1970-2002 form a part of the 
interpretation process and the meaning of the text goes beyond the intended 
meaning of the original writer of the text.  
Languages and words are prerequisites for all social life (Gummesson, 
2003).  The centrality of language is also emphasised in constructing the meaning 
of the social world in philosophical hermeneutics (Prasad, 2002; Bleicher, 1980).  
According to Gadamer (Prasad, 2002) the interpretation is a dialogue between the 
text and the interpreter.  Language is the means by which a text is interpreted and 
the interpreter proceeds to read with the intention that the language in the text will 
inform the interpreter enabling an understanding of the text.  The interpreter while 
reading the text experiences the text and seeks to understand the language of the 
text in light of the prejudices the interpreter has brought with him/her.  So for 
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example, I seek to interpret published and spoken claims of the actors in 
conjunction with my personal experiences. The interpreter gains new 
understanding of the text by experiencing the language used in the text and by 
interpreting the text from his/her prejudiced pre-understanding.  The social reality 
the interpreter creates therefore is no longer what the original author intended.  
6.6 Critical Hermeneutics  
Critical theorists have extended the hermeneutic enquiry to include a critique of 
the ideological aspects of the text being interpreted (Prasad, 2002).  The need for 
the inclusion of a critique is based on the language and power dimensions 
associated with the processes of interpretation.  In the view of the critical theorist, 
philosophical hermeneutics neglected the presence of the impact of power and 
domination issues, which would have impacted on the processes of interpretation.  
Critical hermeneutics is associated with the works of critical theorists like 
Habermas and Apel (Bleicher, 1980). 
Philosophical hermeneutics has been criticised by philosophers like 
Habermas and Apel who have questioned Gadamer’s view of language as 
ontological interpretation (Bleicher, 1980).  ‘Gadamer conflates the unavoidability 
of prejudices with an acceptance of the legitimacy of all such prejudices’ (Prasad, 
2002, p. 22).  This implies that interpreter prejudice is not considered as one of the 
means by which interpretation of the text can be  suppressed and tradition is 
something out there which the interpreter can reach out and claim as his own.   
Instead, Prasad (2002) cites Habermas:  
tradition is something which we actively construct through self-reflection 
and in this process some prejudices are accepted and others rejected and 
new prejudices are created therefore the role of prejudice during the 
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process of interpretation needs to be critiqued’ (Prasad, 2002, pp. 22 & 23; 
see also Bleicher, 1980). 
 
Both Habermas and Apel accept the centrality of language as a means to 
create reality but argue that language itself is dependent upon social processes, 
which are not wholly linguistic in nature.  This implies language is not value free 
and that there are elements such as the interpreter’s tradition and language, social 
labour practices and power relations within the society which would hinder the 
ideal speech situation (Prasad, 2002).  Thompson (1980) cites Habermas (from 
Thompson, 1970) as insisting: 
Language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to 
legitimatise relations of organised power. Insofar as the legitimations of 
power relations, whose institutionalism they make possible, are not 
articulated, insofar as these only express themselves in the legitimations, 
language is also ideological (Thompson, 1980, p. 82).  
 
This implies that social elements such as power relations and organised 
labour can distort communication by suppressing free speech.  Free speech will be 
suppressed by the individual or groups who hold power and can influence the less 
powerful whereby the less powerful of the society ‘give in’ to the demands of the 
powerful groups.  Under these conditions when an activity or action is interpreted 
and attributed a meaning, the meaning cannot be said to have arisen out of a 
shared consensus.  The meaning is in fact distorted by the influence of a dominant 
individual or group.  To offset this distortion in communication Habermas has 
called for an ideal speech situation in which human beings arrive at a genuine 
consensus with respect to the interpretation and meaning of an activity by 
engaging in rational discourse totally free of coercion and domination (Van 
Peursem, 2005; Prasad, 2002).  From a critical hermeneutic perspective the 
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purpose of interpretation is to offer a critique of the ideological elements of 
tradition and language that hinder ideal speech situations (Prasad, 2002).  
Hermeneutics therefore involves rational interpretation of communication and not 
domination (Small & Mannion, 2005). 
6.6.1 Critical hermeneutics and application to this research project  
In this research project a critical hermeneutics philosophy of enquiry is adopted to 
develop an understanding of events and attribute meanings to the processes by 
which the practice of public sector auditing was introduced then discontinued in 
Fiji.  It is believed that the use of critical hermeneutics, emphasising 
interpretation, and a critique of the ideological elements of tradition and language 
will unveil and reveal the hidden meanings attributed to the practice and the 
events that led to the discontinuation of performance auditing which served the 
interests of the socially and politically powerful.  
There are five fundamental concepts that guide the critical hermeneutic 
research.  These key concepts are derived from the hermeneutic circle which 
concerns the ontological and epistemological debates surrounding theory.  The 
hermeneutic circle can be  defined as an ‘ontological condition of understanding; 
[that] proceeds from a commonality that binds us to tradition in general and that 
of our object of interpretation in particular; [and] provides a link between theory 
and praxis’,  (Bleicher, 1980, p. 267).  The researcher, therefore, has to draw upon 
the five key concepts to explain the existence of reality and knowledge that is 
gained through the processes of interpretation.  
The five concepts are: hermeneutical circle, hermeneutic horizon; fusion of 
horizons; rejection of author-intentionality; and critique (Prasad & Mir, 2002; 
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Bleicher, 1980).  This section will describe each of these concepts and will 
analyse how each element contributes an understanding of the social reality and 
knowledge in the context of public sector performance auditing in Fiji.  
6.6.2 Hermeneutical circle  
‘Hermeneutical circle’ is defined as ‘a methodological device in interpretation 
which considers a whole in relation to its parts and vice versa’ (Bleicher, 1980, p. 
267).  This implies meaningful understanding is only feasible when ‘the part’ can 
only be understood from the ‘whole’ and the ‘whole’ can only be understood from 
the ‘parts’.  In a research context the meaning of taking a part would be taking a 
word, a concept, a sentence, or a paragraph in a text; the beliefs and values of an 
individual in the community.  The parts can be understood with reference to the 
whole where examples of whole include the whole text, author of the text, the 
historical and socio-economic background of the author, the community and its 
values and the socio-economic status of the community.  On the other hand, 
meaning of the whole can be understood on the basis of its parts. Thompson 
(1980, citing Dilthey, 1976) states that the social world cannot be understood 
independently of its parts and vice - versa.  Bleicher (1980) extends this relational 
understanding by adding that the relationship between the whole and its parts is 
contextual, historical (happened at a particular point in time) and is for a given 
combination of parts.  The definitions of the whole and parts is left to be decided 
by the individual researcher since the research phenomenon for each research is 
different and each researcher has a particular problem he/she intends to interpret 
and attribute a meaning.  
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From a critical hermeneutic perspective, the text in this study refers to 
documents such as the Annual reports of the Fijian Audit Office Auditor, 
individual interview transcripts, Asian Development Bank Technical Assistance 
Report and the 1970 Audit Act.  These consist of several parts, which refer to the 
micro-elements of what is going on.  The parts can be words, phrases, paragraphs, 
sections and sub-sections that refer to principles of public accountability, purpose 
of public sector auditing, roles of auditor-general, roles of audit office, principles 
of audit act, purpose of performance auditing, auditees, responsibilities of auditees 
and purpose of technical assistance project.  The whole refers to the macro- 
picture, the entire story, the context in which the micro-elements are situated.  The 
whole is the entire document , including the period (when the events took place). 
While reading these texts the researcher will move between the whole and the 
parts of the text in order to understand specific phrases and statements within the 
context of the whole text.   
In reading and interpreting the parts of the texts in the context of the whole 
and vice - versa the researcher is seeking to understand the meaning of the text as 
it is and will endeavour to reveal the hidden meaning of the text by analysing the 
text in its socio-historical context.  In this research the researcher will reveal the 
hidden meaning associated with the introduction and discontinuation of the 
performance auditing project, firstly by reading the parts of the texts mentioned 
above and interpreting the meanings in conjunction with the whole of the text; 
secondly by evaluating the interpretations from the first reading in the context of 
the socio-historical environment faced by the Fijian public sector during the 
period in which the project was introduced and then discontinued; thirdly by 
analysing how the socio-historically derived meaning would have impacted upon 
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the interests of the socially and politically powerful.  The processes of 
interpretation described above would enable the researcher to inform the 
meanings attributed to the introduction and discontinuation of the performance 
auditing project.  
The hermeneutic circle has been conceptualised by some scholars as a 
process driven by the concepts of pre-understanding and understanding (Bleicher, 
1980).  The meaning of the parts is dependent on the interpreter’s understandings 
and the meaning of the whole is determined by the interpreter and not the original 
author.  The understanding of the text therefore is based on the lived experience of 
the interpreter.  The interpreter starts from a pre-understanding acquired through 
the interpreter’s culture and tradition and through the processes of moving from 
the parts to a whole and having a dialogue with the text to gain a better 
understanding of the text in a given situation.  Therefore, knowledge on the 
phenomenon studied using the critical hermeneutic philosophy is socially 
constructed knowledge, subjective in nature and can  have only a temporal 
existence.   
6.6.3 Pre-Understanding  
Pre-understanding is defined as ‘a living relationship with the subject-matter of a 
text as the pre-condition of any interpretation; all observations constitute 
themselves through the prior organisation of our experience’ (in natural science 
experiences are channeled by existing theories; in the human sciences by the 
knowledge of things we bring with us from our everyday life); ‘the constituting 
intentionality of the horizon’ (Bleicher, 1980, p. 271).  This means, pre-
understanding is the prior knowledge the interpreter has of concepts and ideas 
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regarding the text under study.  The researcher gains pre-understanding of 
concepts and ideas from the social, historical and cultural contexts and discipline 
to which the researcher belongs; the experiences of the researcher, and the 
knowledge the researcher has regarding the object of study (Sud, 2008; Prasad, 
2002; Llewellyn, 1993).  These attributes which the researcher brings to the 
research form a frame of reference, influencing the hermeneutic processes of 
interpretation and outcome.  Pre-understanding defines the horizons (depth) of the 
researcher’s understanding and therefore is a necessary condition for 
understanding a text. 
The researcher’s pre-understanding, for this research, arises from the 
personal experiences of growing up and having lived in a Fiji within a 
multicultural society until 2001.  The researcher also has an understanding of 
broader socio-economical and political history and brings this with her to the 
research.  
The researchers pre-understanding will also be derived from the 
accountability concepts prevalent in the Westminster system of auditing, the 
accountability roles of the auditor-general as prescribed in the 1970 Fijian Audit 
Act.  An evaluation of the extant literature review on performance auditing in five 
Anglo-American countries have also contributed towards the pre-understanding 
on factors which have influenced the emergence of such audits these countries.  
The frame of reference for this study will be developed from the 
researcher’s personal experiences of having lived and having experienced Fiji’s 
cultural and political structures.  As do the contributions from the historical and 
critical literature on performance auditing and on Fiji.  This frame of reference 
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represents a set of pre-understanding or a priori which is considered crucial for 
unfolding the meanings of accountability in the public sector; the roles and 
responsibilities of the auditor-general and the auditees, and the ADB funded 
technical assistance associated with the emergence and discontinuation of the 
performance auditing practice.   
6.6.4 Hermeneutic horizon  
The concept of hermeneutic horizon alerts us to the fact that, any piece of 
communication is embedded in a specific cultural context, and in seeking to 
interpret that communication a person brings in his or her own interpretation 
which is embedded in his /her own historic-cultural context.  The two contexts are 
never precisely the same (Prasad & Mir, 2002; Thompson 1980).  This implies a 
critical hermeneutic researcher will come into the research having developed a set 
of contexts at the institutional (micro) level as well as the broader historical and 
cultural level to understand the purpose of the phenomenon studied and the 
problems associated with the phenomenon.  
In developing the contexts at the institutional level, the researcher seeks to 
understand the text from the cultural perspective of the institution in which the 
phenomenon studied is situated.  The meaning of the text as understood by the 
institution for whom the text is written, this is termed ‘the text context’.  In 
seeking the meaning from the text context (meaning as accepted by the institution) 
the researcher also tries to capture the problems associated with text meaning 
from the institutional perspective (Sud, 2008).  The institutional context, in this 
case, is broadly defined as the Fiji (audit) public sector concerned with 
accountability.  
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The researcher herself has preconceived meanings of the text being 
interpreted.  These preconceived meanings originate from the researchers own 
cultural and historical background.  Therefore, the researcher ends up having two 
sets of contexts for interpreting a text.  The two contexts provide the researcher 
with two divergent sets of views to interpreting the text.  As such the critical 
researcher will mostly argue only a certain view of the text and the context 
(Prasad & Mir, 2002) until the two horizons are fused for a comprehensive 
understanding.  To achieve this, the two text views will be compared and 
integrated.  
Setting the hermeneutic horizon for this research will be guided by the 
researcher setting up a set of contexts associated with public sector auditing in 
Fiji.  This means the researcher will be making contact with individuals and 
groups associated with public sector auditing and performance auditing for 
interviews.  These include the Fijian Auditor- General, the Fijian Audit Staff and 
the auditees involved with performance auditing.  The Ministry of Finance staff, 
members of the Public Accounts Committee and the media reporters associated 
with reporting on performance auditing will also be contacted.  Request will be 
made to Asian Development Bank for Report and documents on its technical 
assistance project to the Fiji Audit Office.  The researcher will then proceed to 
read the documents and interpret the interviews to understand the views these 
individuals and organisations have and have expressed on performance auditing.  
Reading the texts produced by these groups will enable the researcher to 
understand the traditional meaning of performance auditing and will provide 
insights into the processes that led to the maintenance of the asymmetrical 
relationship within the public (audit) sector.  
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Furthermore, the researcher’s own cultural and historic experiences will 
enable the researcher to have her own views on the textual information contained 
in the interviews and reports the researcher has solicited from the Audit Office, 
and the national archives.  The onus is on the researcher to decide which views of 
the text and from which context (researcher’s or industry’s) the researcher will 
argue on issues associated with the introduction and discontinuation of the 
practice of performance auditing.  The researcher engages in a deliberate and 
conscious act of deciding which particular aspects of the text and context to argue 
about.  By deliberately focusing on particular aspects only the researcher ends up 
selecting to interpret only certain events associated with the text and context at the 
expense of other events.  This is guided by the focus of the study and partly by the 
inexplicability of certain events.   
Since the researcher is trying to interpret meanings and understand the 
reasons for the emergence and discontinuation of public sector performance 
auditing in Fiji, the researcher will only pick on those views expressed in the text 
that deal with issues associated with performance auditing and accountability.  
Therefore, events surrounding the emergence and discontinuation will be 
interpreted at the expense of the outcomes of the practice or the discontinuation of 
the practice.  This will be a conscious decision.  
The interpretation of events would enable the researcher to explicate how 
the various groups and institutions within the Fijian public sector perceived the 
introduction of performance auditing and, based on their perceptions, how the 
various groups and institutions reacted to the introduction of the practice.  From 
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interpreting their reactions the researcher will be able to fathom the meanings 
these groups and individuals attributed to performance auditing.  
6.6.5 Fusion of horizon 
In critical hermeneutics, a ‘fusion of horizon’ becomes necessary to overcome the 
lack of common understandings that are likely to occur due to  the outcome of  the 
process of hermeneutic horizon (Sud, 2008; Kinsella, 2006; Prasad & Mir, 2002).  
Hermeneutic horizon creates a ‘slippage between the respective contexts of the 
text and the interpreter’ (Prasad & Mir, 2002, p. 96) this slippage or gap is closed 
by the process of fusion of horizon.  Fusion of horizon seeks to integrate the 
horizon of the text with that of the interpreter (Sud, 2008; Prasad & Mir, 2002).  
In setting the hermeneutic horizon, the researcher has to deal with two horizons, 
one from the context of the text drawn from the institutional setting and one from 
the researcher’s context.  The researcher therefore will interpret the text and 
proceed to interpret the context.  Having two sets of interpretations on hand the 
researcher has to seek the mutual relationship between the text and the context 
interpretations.  
The comparison would result in a fresh perspective which would not have 
been possible otherwise.  The fresh perspective would bring a deeper 
understanding of the interpretations.  Fusion of horizons in critical hermeneutics 
is, ‘directed at the future and at changing reality rather than merely interpreting it’ 
(Bleicher, 1980, p. 233).  This implies the outcome of the fresh perspective from 
the fusion of horizon seeks to direct the researcher towards the future meanings of 
the text based on the past.  It also directs the researcher’s attention to the changes 
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which have taken place since the text was written, therefore the reality that is 
constructed is the changed reality from what was originally written in the text.  
The concept of the fusion of horizon will be realised within this study 
when the researcher integrates the hermeneutic horizons which were constructed 
from the text’s interpretation and the horizon which was constructed from the 
researcher’s interpretation.  For example, the researcher will first read the text 
which will comprise of interviews from selected individuals and groups of 
individuals associated with performance auditing in the Fijian public sector, 
annual reports of the Audit Office and the ADB technical Assistance Document.  
These documents represent the text context.  The researcher will interpret the 
same texts based on the researchers pre-understanding of the concepts of 
accountability, public sector auditing, performance auditing and the expansion of 
the scope of the auditor-general’s role.  
The researcher will then proceed to integrate the text’s intended meaning 
with the researcher’s interpretation of the text based on the researcher’s pre-
understanding.  This integration will be the fusion of horizons since it will enable 
the researcher to form a fresh perspective on the reasons for introduction and 
discontinuation of the performance auditing project.  This fresh perspective will 
enable the researcher to analyse the actions of the groups and individuals 
associated with the project and will illuminate the social and political interests of 
the group and individuals associated with the project.  The hermeneutic horizon 
contributes to the construction of knowledge by emancipating the interpretation of 
the text from the socially and politically powerful. 
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6.6.6 Rejection of author intentionality  
‘The meaning of a text always goes beyond its author’ (Gadamaer, 1975, p. 264 
cited by Prasad and Mir, 2002, p. 97).  ‘The text at all times represent(s) more 
than the author(s) intended’ (Bleicher, 1980, p. 111).  Therefore, in the critical 
hermeneutics the objective of interpreting the text is not to attribute or recover the 
original meaning of the text as intended by the author but to interpret the text as a 
subjective object.  ‘All aspects of the text become subjects of analysis, including 
critique of authenticity, of all possible bias, and of the ideological elements of the 
text’ (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2002, p. 79 cited in Prasad & Mir, 2002, p. 97).  
The specific motive of the author in writing the text becomes insignificant and 
instead the text is interpreted with a motive to understand both the apparent and 
the hidden meaning of the text.  Readings of hidden meanings provide insights 
into how the socially and politically powerful manage to maintain their interests 
and retain the status quo, thus the text reveals new meanings and produces fresh 
relevance for the text (Llewellyn, 1993).  The process of interpreting the hidden 
meaning is the final moment or critique in understanding interpretations from the 
critical hermeneutics philosophy.  
In the context of this research, the researcher will seek to reject the 
intentional meaning of the author(s) of the text firstly by interpreting the text 
using  the frame of reference the researcher established in the processes of  ‘fusion 
of horizon’.  Meaning, in the moment of ‘fusion of horizon’ the researcher has 
already integrated the contexts of the text and of the interpreter (researcher) 
whereby the original authors intended meaning of the text has lost relevance.  
Using this fresh perspective, which has emerged from the fusion of horizon the 
researcher will be interpreting the text for its apparent meaning and will seek to 
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capture the meanings in the text which have implications and signify the actions 
of the various actors associated with introduction and discontinuation of the 
performance auditing project.  In seeking to decipher the implied meanings, the 
researcher will be illuminating the types of relationships the various actors had 
with the project.   
For example, when the researcher interprets the interview documents from 
various actors involved in the introduction and discontinuation of performance 
auditing, the researcher will not only seek to interpret the meanings of the 
documents as intended by the respective interviewees.  Instead, the researcher will 
seek to interpret the documents based on the perspective the researcher has 
acquired via the fusion of horizon.  The text will be interpreted based on the pre-
understanding acquired of the concepts through the literature reviews.  Thus the 
themes associated with the introduction and discontinuation of the public sector 
performance auditing in Fiji will be interpreted in a larger or macro-environment. 
Rejecting the authors’ intentional meaning and interpreting the text from 
fusion of horizons contributes to the construction of knowledge from the contexts 
of text and interpreter.  Such knowledge is based on the apparent meanings of the 
text.  The deeper meanings are yet to be construed.  In the context of this study, 
the researcher would be able to understand the apparent reasons attributed to 
introducing and discontinuing performance auditing.  This apparent reason  does 
not provide an insight into why the actors reacted the way they did, so for a 
deeper understanding the researcher will embed the text in its socio-political and 
historical setting to critique the text.  The critique will be informed by Roberts’ 
critical interpretations of accountability.  
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6.6.7 Moment of critique  
Moment of critique takes place when the interpreter seeks to illuminate the hidden 
meanings in the text.  The interpreter seeks to illuminate the hidden meanings by 
linking the text to the context.  The purpose of ‘linking the text to the context is 
not merely an act of bland theorising, but involves and facilitates a critical-
creative unveiling’ (Philips & Brown, 1993, cited by Prasad & Mir, 2002, p. 97).  
This unveils the ‘ideological meanings of the text and the manner in which certain 
groups try to position their sectional interests as broader social goals’ (Prasad & 
Mir, 2002, p. 97).  The interpretation of the text reaches a higher plane when the 
researcher understands the text through, 
textual interpretation and through the mutually constituting relationship  
between  what the researcher considers the abstracted meaning of the text 
and what he/she has fore-grounded as the anchored context in which the 
text was produced (Prasad & Mir, 2002, p. 98).  
 
The text will be interpreted by situating it within its socio-economic and 
political setting and within the ambit of the researcher’s pre-understanding of the 
text.  An interpretation of the text within these contexts enables the researcher to 
identify the relationships of the various actors associated with the phenomenon 
under study.  In identifying the relationships the researcher will unveil the impact 
of these on the various actors and will reveal the dominant groups who attempt to 
maintain the interests within which the phenomenon being researched is situated.  
In unveiling the relationships amongst the various actors and interpreting 
the text the researcher tries to explicate how the socially and politically powerful 
hinder ideal speech and manage to serve their own interest.  By bringing to light 
the dominant groups and their relationships the researcher finally manages to 
emancipate the hidden meanings of the text.  In providing an emancipatory 
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understanding of the text the researcher provides insight into the way human 
interests shape and guide the communicative process, helping to understand how 
collective sense making is produced by different characters.  
In the context of this research, the moment of critique will happen when 
the researcher rejects the author’s intentional meaning by embedding the text 
within its contextual setting.  In doing so the hidden meanings conveyed in the 
text will be interpreted to reveal how accountability was implicated by the actors 
associated with the performance auditing project (introduction and 
discontinuation).  For example, the researcher’s interpretation of the interview 
documents and other archival documents like the Asian Development Bank 
funded-technical assistance report will be interpreted from the contextual setting 
that is its socio-economic and political environment.  In interpreting the text from 
the contextual setting the researcher will be able to illuminate the relationships 
amongst the actors like the Fijian Auditor-General, the performance auditing 
team, the auditees, and the funding agency, the public accounts committee 
members and others.  Once the relationships are illuminated further interpretations 
of the text will take place to reveal their interest in order to determine how each of 
these individuals and entities shaped the processes of introduction and 
discontinuation and implicated accountability.   
Once the interest of each individual or group is determined the text will be 
interpreted to explicate how the interests of each were maintained or rejected.  
This process will give the researcher an inter-subjective understanding of the 
processes of introduction and discontinuation of the public sector performance 
auditing in Fiji.  The researcher will also come to know how a collective sense 
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making regarding the performance auditing project is produced by different 
characters like the Auditor-General, the auditees, the performance auditor, 
members of public accounts committee and others associated with the project.    
6.7 Summary     
Critical hermeneutics contributes to an understanding of knowledge by denying 
the subject-object dichotomy.  It emphasizes that understanding is only possible 
when the researcher interprets the part in relation to the whole and the whole in 
relation to the part.  In doing so, the text is grounded into its contextual setting for 
possible interpretations.  These reveal power relationships between and amongst 
the powerful and the influential elements of a society.  Knowledge therefore is 
constructed by social interactions and by the meanings attributed to it by the 
dominant groups who shape the communicative process and whose interest dictate 
the collective sense making of the phenomenon  being researched.  The 
methodological discussion in this chapter has laid the foundation for grounding 
the research evidence and the researcher’s intent to explore how reality is socially 
and contextually constructed. The focus of the following chapter is to explain how 
the critical methodology guides the research methods.  
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Chapter 7 Research Methods 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws upon the critical hermeneutics exposition in the previous 
chapter to justify the research methods.  According to Prasad (2005), research 
methods are only insightful when the methods are ‘linked to larger paradigmatic 
issues’ (Prasad, 2005, p. 8) and are consistent with the researcher’s 
methodological assumptions because ‘knowledge is created from data and 
analyses’ (Carter & Little, 2007, p. 1317).  Methods used in this research are 
consistent with the central theme of acquiring hermeneutical understanding 
through textual interpretation (Prasad & Mir, 2002); the researcher will rely on 
techniques of collecting and reading the text to identify dominant themes and 
phrases which have a symbolic meaning for the research participants (Prasad & 
Mir, 2002).  
7.2 Sources of Text Data  
For a hermeneutical understanding, the interpretation of meaning is the central 
theme, as such archival documents and interviews are the best possible sources to 
obtain text data.  In order to seek specific kinds of meaning the ‘researcher poses 
questions to the text and vice versa’, (Kvale, 1999, p. 38) thus engaging in a 
conversation with the text. 
For this study, the primary source of text collection is interviews and the 
secondary source is archival documents.  These sources provide text evidence  for 
interpretation to gain insights into  ‘what’ shaped the participants understanding 
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of  ‘why’ the performance auditing project was introduced and then discontinued 
in the Fijian public sector.  
The next section presents a discussion on the choice of documents and 
how these serve the purpose of the research.  This is followed by an explanation 
of the processes of interviewee selection and the nature of questions asked to 
capture their responses.  The final section describes data recording and analysis.  
7.3 Archival Documents  
Archival documents such as Annual Reports, and other such business documents 
have been objects of study (Prasad & Mir, 2002; Jameson, 2000) where 
researchers focus on the roles of these documents in outlining and communicating 
business priorities (Prasad & Mir, 2002) and their importance as representational 
devices (Benschop & Meihuzen, 2001).  David (2001) advocates the view that the 
Annual Reports serve as a tool for managing public perceptions of the entity’s 
behaviour, for crafting and constituting the entity’s own identity and for 
safeguarding the entity’s legitimacy.  A number of archival documents were used 
to collect text evidence.  Table 7.1 summaries the documents and reasons for 
choosing them.  
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Table 7-1: Documents used for Data Collection 
Document  Source of documents  Authority on Document  Content of interest to this study  
Annual Report : Fiji Audit Office 1970-2003 National archives of 
Fiji 
Audit Act 1970 
Signed by Auditor-
General  
 Developments in the Audit Office, 
Implementation of the Institutional 
Strengthening program.  
 Issues of funding and staffing. 
 Restructure of the Audit office- Setting up a 
Performance Audit Section.   
Technical Assistance Report – Fiji Audit 
Office1996 
Asian Development 
Bank- Library  
Asian Development Bank   Type of Assistance and Resources made 
available.  
 Identification of who sought the assistance and 
why.  
Minutes  of Select Committee Meetings  Asian Development 
Bank-Library 
Chairperson and Secretary  Identification of members and ‘roles’. 
 Members’ feedback on their ‘roles’. 
Annual Performance Audit Reports 1996, 
1997 
National Archives  Auditor-General   Reasons for implementing performance auditing.  
 Auditor-General’s performance audit opinion 
and basis of opinion.  
Public Account Committee Reports 1996, 
1997  
National Archives  Chairperson of PAC  Issues relating to restructure of Audit Office and 
Funding. 
 Comments of performance audit report and 
practice of performance auditing.   
Legislation:   
 Public Finance and Management Act 
1990,1992 
 Public Finance management Bill 1998 
 Audit Act 1970 
 Constitution of Fiji -1990, 1992,1997 
National Archives  President of Fiji  Regulations on compliance of disbursement of 
funds. 
 Regulations on management of resources.  
 Powers and roles of Auditor-General.  
 Scope of Audit.   
 Establishment of Audit Office and appointment 
of AG. 
Selected Newspaper articles  National Archives  Journalist; Chief Editor    How performance audit findings are portrayed.  
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7.4 Annual Reports – 
7.4.1  Fiji Audit Office (1970-2003)  
The publication and the format of the Annual Reports of the Audit Office are 
authorised by the 1970 Audit Act and the content is the responsibility of the 
Auditor-General who is the constitutional head of the Audit Office.  The Auditor-
General signs the Annual Reports, assuming responsibility for the content and 
indicating that he knows and agrees with the content.  The information from the 
Annual Reports provides descriptions of the events and issues that involve the 
Audit Office and its staff.  The descriptions of the events concerning the Audit 
Office provide insight into why these events took place and who was responsible 
for their occurrence.  The Annual Reports outline the objectives of the Audit 
Office, describe the operations and future plans and ‘how’ these are achieved 
,‘who’ or ‘what’ is responsible for the achievements of the objectives and future 
plans, and these descriptions provide evidence to establish the social, economic 
and political elements that shape the operations and practices of the Audit Office.  
Annual Reports of institutions and corporations are authorised by CEOs 
and the Heads of the institutions in Fiji (Public Enterprise Act, 1996) to 
communicate to the stakeholders the performance of the entity and create 
perceptions of the institutions (Prasad & Mir, 2002; Benschop & Meihizen, 2002).  
In this case the Annual Report of the Fijian Audit Office is intended for 
stakeholders such as the government, the auditees, Asian Development Bank 
(funding agency) and the public, and communicates how the Auditor-General held 
the auditees to account.  The Report also provides information on the roles of the 
Audit office and how these are discharged.  It also reveals the resources in terms 
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of staff numbers, training and funding needs and other activities undertaken by the 
Audit office.  The purpose of this communication is to affirm the intended 
recipients’ beliefs and the ideals (Prasad & Mir, 2000) of the Audit Office.   
7.4.2 The Technical Assistance Report (TAR) 
The Technical Assistance Report (TAR) is authorised by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB).  The Bank provided the funds and technical assistance for the 
Institutional Strengthening program of the Fijian Audit Office (Asian 
Development Bank Technical Assistance Report, 1996).  The TAR provides 
information on the ADB’s worldview of performance auditing and brings to light 
how this was shaped. 
Information on the historical reasons of how and why funding was 
provided for performance auditing in  Fiji is found in the TAR thus identifying 
‘who’ requested the funds and the purpose of the request for funds. It also 
provides information on the ADB’s ‘expectations’ of how the funds are to be 
used, and the expected outcomes (Asian Development Bank Report, 1995). 
7.4.3 Minutes of Technical Assistance Select Committee meeting  
The Minutes of the Select Committee meetings contain evidence regarding who 
the members of the Committee are and their affiliation to the respective 
government departments or private sector institutions (Staton & Partners, 1997).  
This  provides evidence of the ‘roles’ of each of the members with respect to 
public sector audit reforms and audit policies.  It reveals how the members 
fulfilled their roles and the difficulties (if any) encountered (Staton & Partners, 
1997).  Evidence of ‘who’ and which institutions the members associated and 
liaised with to undertake their roles will also be found in the Minutes.  
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7.4.3.1  The Performance Audit Reports (1996-1997) 
The Fijian Auditor-General decides and chooses the government department for 
performance auditing and authorises the audit to take place.  The auditee gives 
consents for a performance audit to take place (Parliamentary Paper 60/1997).  
The performance auditors carry out the auditing on behalf of the Auditor-General.  
The performance audit reports on how the resources of the entity were managed in 
terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Guthrie & Parker, 1999) and 
provides recommendations for improvements in managing the resources.  The 
Report is signed off by the Auditor-General and presented to the Fijian Parliament 
(Parliamentary Papers 60/1997 and 61/1997). These observations have been made 
independently of the fact that the 1970 Audit Act is silent on performance 
auditing. 
Since the Auditor-General authorises the performance audit and signs off 
the performance auditing report, the indication is the Auditor-General 
understands, forms a view and provides an opinion on the findings of the 
performance audit contained in the report.  The Performance Audit Reports 
provide information on issues such as the purpose of the audit, the findings on 
management of resources and recommendations (Parliamentary Papers 60/1997 
and 61/1997).  It also establishes how the audit subject and object of the audit 
were determined.  
7.4.4 Public Accounts Committee reports  
The PAC Reports will have information on the members’ recommendations on 
the restructure of the Audit Office and funding implications of the restructure.  
The Reports reveal the reasons for the recommendations or otherwise and the 
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members views on the activities of the Audit Office.  It also provides information 
regarding the members’ perceptions of the performance audit findings. 
7.5 Legislation  
The Legislation cited for the purpose of this research includes, Audit Act 1970, 
the Constitution of Fiji (1990, 1998, sections 148 and sections 166-168), the 
Public Finance and Management Act (1990, section 106) and Standing Order, 
section 106 (B).  These Statutes outline how the public sector entities, the 
Ministers and the Auditor-General should discharge their respective 
accountability roles.  These provide text evidence on the authority the Auditor-
General has to hold the government and the auditees to account.  
The 1970 Audit Act outlines the roles, scope and the rights of the Auditor-
General providing evidence on ‘the types of audit the Auditor-General can engage 
in  and the authority the Auditor-General can exercise to access records of public 
sector entity’, in short ‘what the Auditor-General can audit’ and the scope of the 
audit. 
The 1990 Public Finance and Management Act (PFM) Part 7, outlines how 
the government departments should discharge their accountability roles and the 
regularity with which the departments should prepare and present their 
‘Appropriation Statements’ to the Parliament. Part 7, Section 43 to 52, details ‘the 
content’ of the Appropriation Statements and the Annual Financial Statements.  
The information in Part 7 of the 1990 PFM Act is important to this study because 
Part 7 sets out the rules of compliance which the public sector entities need to 
follow and the Audit Officers have to ensure that the entities have complied with 
the financial regulations.  
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The Constitution of Fiji (1990, 1997, section 148) sets out the appointment 
of the Auditor-General and sections 166 - 168 set out the establishment of the 
Audit Office and the functions of the Auditor-General.  These sections provide 
evidence that the Auditor-General has a constitutional accountability role and has 
powers to undertake public sector audits.  
7.6 Selected newspaper articles  
Fiji’s premier newspaper, ‘The Fiji Times’, was selected as the source for media 
reports.  This ‘Paper’ is Fiji’s longest running news publication and has the 
highest circulation rate.  It covers a wide range of business, political, government 
related and overseas news.  The coverage also includes historical documentaries 
on Fiji. Newspaper articles covering public sector audit news during the period 
1970-1999 in the form of editorial comments, excerpts from interviews with the 
Auditor-General, members of Parliament and letters to the editor are reviewed to 
collect text information.  The year 1970 was selected because that is when Fiji 
gained independence and the 1970 Audit Act was enacted.  In the same year, 
Tamesar Bhim, a local Indo-Fijian was appointed as the Auditor-General.  
Therefore 1970 became the starting point of tracing how the media publicised the 
developments in public sector audit and media perception of Bhim’s influence.  
Particular attention was paid to media coverage of audit reports in the 1970s 
because the Fiji Audit Office became a member of the South Pacific Association 
of the Supreme Audit Institution in 1973 (Annual Report- Audit Office, 1974).  
The articles selected during 1970-1983 provide evidence of the expansion and 
changes in audit reporting and Bhim’s, PAC members’ and others influence in the 
emergence phase. 
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Auditor-General Narain took Office in 1984, so this period was also 
important to gauge media perception of Narain’s contribution to audit 
developments.  Datt was appointed as the Auditor-General in 1987 and Fiji 
experienced the two military coups, both led by Rabuka in the same year.  The 
media reports during 1987-1996 will reveal the focus of the Audit Reports.  These 
reveal how the Auditor-General held the auditees to account before and after the 
coup.  It will also expose the government (Ratu Sir Mara led interim government 
1987-1992) reaction to these and will cover the Rabuka led government’s (1992-
1999, under undemocratic 1990 Constitution) reaction to Datt’s audit findings and 
disclosures.  
  The media coverage from 1995 to 1999 was also important because these 
reports would reveal how the technical assistance funded by the Asian 
Development Bank affected the audits.  This will expose the types of disclosures 
that were made in the audit reports.  It will illuminate the changes in audit 
reporting.  
  The editorial comments, on the ‘audit findings’ presented to the 
Parliament, provide information on the newspaper editors’ views of how the 
public sector managers have used the public funds.  Letters to the editor and 
excerpts of interviews provide information on what individuals (public) think of 
the way the public sector money has been spent.  The reports cover individuals 
views on government accountability and how the Auditor-General holds the 
government accountable.  
Documents such as Fiji Economic and Statistical Analysis Reports for the 
years 1995, 1996, 1997, 2007 and 2008 and the Annual Reports of the Ministry of 
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Finance were also reviewed.  These reports did not cover public sector audits but 
they provided statistical evidence on employment, gross domestic product and 
poverty.  
7.7 Interviews  
This section describes the period during which the interviews were conducted, the 
type of interview used to collect text data and explains how the interviews serve 
the purpose of this research project.  
The 29 interviews (initial and return) for this project were conducted over 
a two and a half month period in late 2005 and early 2006.  During this period Fiji 
was preparing for the General Elections in the year 2006 as mandated by the 
Qarase government elected by the Military after the 2000 coup7.  The interviews 
took place at the scheduled time with each interview lasting between sixty to 
ninety-five minutes.  The interviewees shared their thoughts and expressed their 
views on issues relating to the different phases of the performance auditing 
project.  They also suggested names of other individuals who they thought would 
be able to provide me with information regarding efficiency audits.  The inclusion 
of these additional interviewees’ responses will add strength to the research 
evidence.  Table 7.2 summarizes the list of interviewees with reasons and details 
for the choice. 
                                                 
7 Most of the interviewees participating in the research project were civil servants and despite being engaged in the 
preparations for the 2006 general elections, agreed to continue with the interviews. 
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Table 7-2: Summary of the interviewees  
Interviewee 
Category  
No. of 
interviews  
Experience/ 
Years  
 
Gender  Ethnicity  No. of 
interviewees  
Reasons for selection  
  0-3 3-10 10+ M F F I G   
Auditor-General  2 1   1  1   1  AG- Responsible for writing policy documents on performance auditing and making submissions to Ministry of Finance for changes to 1970 Audit Act. 
 Deputy  Auditor General 1997-2000. 
 Auditor General  2000 – 2009. 
 
Senior Audit Staff  
 
9 
  
2 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2
 
4 
 
3
  
7 
 Have been with the Audit Office in various capacities between 1990-2003. 
 Involved with various stages of the performance auditing project. 
 Sent overseas on performance auditing training.  
 Provided training to other staff. 
 Provided guidance to PAC members on Public Sector Audit Reports. 
 Three of the interviewees had more than 8 years of experience before being transferred to 
another public sector entity. 
Members of Public 
Accounts 
Committee  
 
4 
  
1 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
 
1 
 
3
 
1
 
4 
 Individuals were members of the PAC when performance audit reports were presented to the 
Parliament. 
 Two interviewees belong to National Federation Party, 1 to General Electors party, 1 to Labor 
party. 
 As PAC members they have discussed and deliberated and formed opinions on the PA reports. 
 PAC Reports on PA reports have been presented to the Parliament.    
Ministry of 
Finance –Senior 
Staff 
 
4 
 
 
  
3 
 
3 
  
2 
 
1
  
3 
 Liaise with the Audit Office for budgetary allocation and funding. 
 Senior Finance Officer provides guidance to PAC members on matters of compliance with 
Public Finance Regulations and Act. 
Auditees  2   2 2  1 1  2  The auditees interviewed were from the two different  institutions which participated in the PA 
project. One from Customs and one from Colonial war Memorial Hospital.  
Members of 
Parliament  
5  2 3 4 1 2 1 1 5  Served in the Fijian Parliament when the PA reports were presented and deliberated  upon.  
Media- Senior 
Reporters  
3   3 2 1 1 1 1 3  Reported on the PA reports and the Audit Reports presented by the AG. 
Total  Interviews 29  1 5 19 21 4 12 10 3 25  
Key: Ethnicity - F-Indigenous Fijian; I-Indo-Fijian, (Born in Fiji of Indian Origin); G-General Elector –Born in Fiji of European, Part European Chinese of other small island migrants. 
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Interpretation of texts in critical hermeneutics requires that the ‘dialogic 
process of doing research focuses on the conditions through which meaning is 
constructed’, (Kvale, 1996, p. 8) so that those elements that unconsciously shape 
the understanding of the interviewees and interviewer are revealed or made visible 
(Herda, 1999, p. 32, also see Kogler, 1999).  This requirement predetermines that 
neither a purely conversational style of interview nor a purely structured 
interrogative interview will facilitate the data collection for this research.  Neither 
will it allow the interviewees to express their worldviews in a historical - cultural 
context (Kvale, 1996, p. 8) because both will restrict open conversation.  To 
overcome this limitation semi-structured interviews are used in this project.  
The purpose of a semi-structured interview ‘is to obtain descriptions of the 
life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the 
described phenomenon,’ (Kvale, 1996, p. 6).  The interview takes the form of a 
professional conversation and is structured with a purpose to seek the 
interviewee’s understanding of the phenomenon studied.  In a semi-structured 
interview reflexive interviewing techniques can be used (Mouritsen & Thrane, 
2006, p. 243; also see Alvesson, 2003).  Reflexive interviewing focuses on the 
development of a dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee.  Once the 
interview assumes the form of dialogue the interviewee opens up and feels free to 
tell his/her story (Alvesson, 2003, p. 245) with explanations providing the 
researcher with an opportunity to probe for information (Alvesson, 2003).  
The semi-structured interview is a facilitated conversation between the 
interviewee and the researcher.  During this process the interviewees describe the 
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events that shaped their understanding and provide insights into their worldview. 
Table 7.3 provides a list of the key areas8 of focus during the interview.  The 
details of the questions asked in the semi-structured questionnaire are found in 
Appendix 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The key areas formed the major part of interview questions. The key areas were informed by the researchers pre-
understanding of the Fijian socio-political history, and chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis. Chapter 3, (pp. 35-71), Literature 
on Performance Auditing in the Public Sector and chapter 4, (pp. 72-98), detail the broader socio-political history of Fiji, 
and chapter 5 details the History of Audit Development in Fiji (pp. 99-138).  
 189 
 
Table 7-3: Interview Focus during Enquiry 
 
Section and questions  
in the questionnaire  
Areas of Focus  
Section  Questions  
1 1&2  Descriptions of the interviewee’s background: institution 
associated with, experiences  and roles.  
1 3&4 Descriptions of the interviewee’s roles during emergence 
implementation and discontinuation of performance auditing.  
Descriptions of other groups/individuals and their roles and 
contributions. 
2 1&2  The interviewee’s understanding of who and what was involved 
with the project during the different phases. 
2 3 What caused the changes during emergence, implementation and 
discontinuation.  
2 4 Benefits or costs of, implementation and discontinuation. 
2 5 Legislation and performance auditing.  
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7.8 Interview Questions and Focus  
Questions on interviewees’ background were asked to establish which public 
sector entity they work for, their roles and experiences.  This exposes their interest 
and motivation in the claims they make on how their institution contributed to 
each phase of performance auditing.  Their experiences will illuminate how they 
perceive their roles and why.  The interviewees represent the two dominant ethnic 
communities in Fiji.  The differences in their opinions and claims on what 
motivates them will be illuminated via their responses.  Their claims of who and 
what influenced the changes in the Fijian public sector audit will be reflective of 
their experiences in their roles and with other individuals and groups with whom 
they associate.   
  The interviewees’ roles during the emergence, implementation and 
discontinuation of performance auditing is asked so that information on how the 
interviewee’s contributed to each phase can be gathered.  The interviewees are 
also asked about other groups/individuals they worked with.  Questions are also 
asked about the latter’s contribution.  As such the interviewees will reveal what 
motivated their contribution and why, who influenced them and also provide 
insights into how they view others contribution to the project.  Questions on the 
institution the interviewee is employed by and its role are asked to gain insight 
into how the institutions contributed to the project and why.  This will provide 
information regarding who the interviewees see as the agents of change and why. 
 The major focus in section two of the questionnaire is the changes in 
performance auditing.  Interviewees are asked to describe what they 
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believe/perceive caused the changes in performance auditing.  The interviewees 
response to this will expose who the change agents are and what they did to bring 
changes or otherwise.  Their responses will reveal who they thought were the 
most influential agents and what gave the agent that power.  The question on costs 
and benefits of performance auditing will reveal whether they favor the 
implementation or the discontinuation and why.  These will illuminate their 
interest in and motivation for changes or otherwise.  
Questions on legislation are asked to ascertain how the interviewees 
perceive these as change agents and why. They can  also lead to questions of 
policy and regulation and their interpretations.   
Neither the prior identification of the key areas nor the semi-structured 
interview questionnaire sent to the interviewees prior to the interview will deter 
the interviewees and the interviewer from raising other issues during the 
interview.  The partially structured nature of the questions will allow for open 
discussion.  This is because the interview questions were not rigidly structured 
(Kvale, 1996, p. 8).  The next section provides a discussion on the interviewees.  
7.9 The Interviewees 
The choice of interviewees was made by looking at the methods associated with 
purposive sampling (Creswell 2007, p.23 also see Kvale, 1996).  The researcher 
used her network within the Fijian Audit Office, the Fijian Public Service and her 
knowledge of audit development in the Fijian public sector to identify the sections 
and departments of the Fijian Public Service who were closely involved with the 
performance auditing project.  These individuals can best inform the researcher 
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about the emergence, implementation and discontinuation of public sector 
performance auditing.  
The interviewee sample (Table 7.2) comprised six categories of 
participants representing the Fijian Audit Office (AO), the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Members of Parliament (MP), the 
Media and the auditees.  During the research a total of twenty-nine interviews9 
were conducted (Appendix 2).  Seventeen participants were initially selected for 
interview; the number increased to twenty-five because at the end of each of the 
interviews interviewees were requested to suggest names of individuals who they 
knew were associated with the performance auditing project and who they thought 
could contribute towards providing an understanding of the introduction and 
discontinuation of the project.  Four follow-up interviews were also undertaken to 
seek further clarification on the concerns raised by the interviewees, increasing 
the total number of interviews to twenty- nine.  A discussion of the interviewees 
selection follows. 
                                                 
9  The interview process began with seventeen interviewees and upon the suggestion of the current interviewees eight 
additional participants were included. The twenty-nine interviews comprised of four follow-up interviews and twenty-five 
initial interviews.   
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7.10 Selection of Interviewees  
This section expands on Table 7.2 and explains the choice of interviewees and 
how they served the purpose of this study.  
7.10.1 Auditor-General  
The Auditor-General in the Fijian public sector is the constitutional custodian of 
the public purse and has a constitutional obligation to perform public sector 
accountability roles (Fiji Constitution, 1970, 1990, 1997).  Despite the military 
coups of 1987, 2006 and the civilian coup of 2000, the Fijian public sector has 
maintained the Westminster system of auditing and the accountability role of the 
Fijian Auditor-General is similar to those found in countries that also follow the 
Westminster system of accountability.  
The Auditor-General (Vatuloka) interviewed for this research project was 
with the Ministry of Finance before being transferred to the Fijian Audit Office in 
1997 as Deputy Auditor-General.  He was appointed as the Auditor-General in 
1999 (Annual Report-Audit Office, 2000).  He had experienced the ‘goings on’ in 
the Audit Office during the discontinuation of performance auditing.  Auditor-
General, Vatuloka therefore was in a position to provide insights into who and 
what was instrumental for the changes in the Fijian public sector auditing.  
The Audit Office staff will have information on the roles each played and 
how the roles were discharged at different phases of the performance audit 
project.  Table 7.4 summarises information on interviewees from the Audit Office. 
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Table 7-4: Interviewee Summary-Audit Office 
Position  Years of 
Experience  
Gender Ethnicity  No. of Interviews Total 
Interviews 
Initial  Return 
Senior 
Auditor  
16 Male Indigenous 
Fijian 
1  1 
Senior 
Auditor  
10 Female  Indigenous 
Fijian 
1 1 2 
Senior 
Auditor  
10 Female  Indigenous 
Fijian 
1  1 
Senior 
Auditor  
18 Male Indigenous 
Fijian  
1  1 
Senior 
Auditor  
12 Male  Indo-Fijian 1 1 2 
Senior 
Auditor  
13 Male  Indo-Fijian  1  1 
Senior  
Auditor  
18 Male  Indo-Fijian 1  1 
Total 
Interviews  
   7  2 9 
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Claims about changes in public sector audits by these seven interviewees 
will be based on their experiences and backgrounds.  Their claims on their roles, 
how and who decided what their roles are, will expose what or who influences 
them and how.  It will illuminate why they make certain claims and what their 
aspirations are.  These interviewees will provide insights as to how they 
discharged their duties and what the consequences were.  Their close association 
with the project will provide quality evidence on their understanding of their roles 
and the auditee’s reactions towards to them.  
Information regarding staff sent on training to the Victorian Audit Office 
in Australia, those sent to the Accounting General’s Office in the USA and those 
trained within the Fijian Audit Office will be revealed by these auditors.  They 
will provide insights into why they were sent for the training and how their 
training and skills benefitted the Audit Office.  These interviewees have 
information on how the Fijian public sector would benefit from the practice of 
performance auditing because of their outside experiences.   
The audit staff will also have information on the other groups with whom 
they associated during the different phases of the project.  Their descriptions of 
the interactions will identify the other groups and will bring to light the type and 
the duration of interaction.  These details will provide insights into ‘the influence’ 
the audit staff had on the other groups and how the other groups in turn 
‘influenced’ the audit staff’s understanding of the different stages of the 
performance audit project. 
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7.10.2 Members of Public Accounts Committee  
The Public Accounts Committee members are selected from elected members of 
the Parliament, from both the Government and the Opposition. Table 7.5 
summarises information on interviewees from PAC. 
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Table 7-5: Interviewee Summary-PAC  
Position: Members 
During: 1970-1999  
Years of 
Experience 
 
Gender* Ethnicity  No. of Interviews Total 
Interviews 
Initial Return 
Chairperson (National 
Federation Party) 
12 Male Indo-
Fijian 
1  1 
Senior member (Labour 
Party) 
8 Male  Indo -
Fijian  
1  1 
Senior member (General 
Elector Party) 
15 Male  General 
Electors 
1  1 
Senior member (Rabuka led 
govt- 1995) 
12 Male  Indigenou
s Fijian  
1  1 
Total Interviews     4  4 
*The interviewees were all males because none of the females served on the PAC committee during 1970-1999.  
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Four members of the Public Accounts Committee are selected.  These 
members have served under various governments over the 1970-1997 period. 
They represent the three major political parties as well as the three ethnic 
communities.  Their responses to the interview questions will be based on their 
cultural experiences, the expectations of their political parties and their own 
motivations regarding public sector audit and the Auditor-General’s ability to hold 
auditees to account.    
These members will draw upon their experiences to reveal how they 
contributed towards the economy, efficiency and effectiveness audits.  Their 
claims on changes in audit practices are based on their interactions with the 
auditees, the Auditor-General and the Ministry of Finance officials.  The 
Committee Members will expose which group or individuals contributed towards 
the acceptance of the practice of performance audit, how and why.  This implies 
that the Public Accounts Committee members brought a broader worldview to the 
interview that was shaped by a collective of people.  
7.10.3 Ministry of Finance personnel  
Senior Officials from the Ministry of Finance are interviewed for this research 
because the latter is responsible for the budgetary allocation to the Audit Office. 
Table 7.6 provides a summary of the interviewees.  
 
 
 
 199 
 
Table 7-6: Interviewee Summary – Ministry of Finance    
Position  
 
Years of 
Experience 
 
Gender* Ethnicity  No. of Interviews Total 
Interviews 
Initial Return 
Senior-Officer   15 Male Indigenous 
Fijian 
1  1 
Senior-Officer   15 Male  Indo -Fijian  1  1 
Senior- Officer  12 Male   Indigenous 
Fijian 
1 1 2 
Total Interviews     3  4 
*The interviewees were all males because none of the females served on the PAC committee during 1970-1999  
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  Three interviewees with more than ten years of experience with the 
Ministry are selected for the interview.  They were with the Ministry before, 
during and after performance audit was discontinued.  This includes the period 
prior to Rabuka led military coups in 1987 and during Rabuka’s regime (1992-
1997).  These interviewees provide information about the funding of the 
implementation of the performance audit project and possibly on implications on 
future funding.  Their claims regarding changes in public sector auditing will 
illuminate the government policy on Audit Office funding.  
At least one senior Ministry Official is always present at the Public 
Accounts Committee meeting to clarify concerns regarding the accounting system 
followed by, internal controls maintained by and financial rules and regulations 
followed by the public sector entities during their record keeping.  These 
interviewees will provide details on how the Ministry officials maintain, revise 
and evaluate the accounting systems followed by the public sector entities, the 
types of records kept and the use of accounting principles and rules to contribute 
towards the implementation of performance audits.  The interviewees will also 
reveal the Ministry’s support and contribution or resistance to such audits.  
7.10.4 Auditees  
The two auditees selected for interview represent institutions which participated in 
the performance auditing project during the 1995-1997 period and they bring with 
them a view influenced by their participation and experience of such audits. Table 
7.7 provides a summary of the interviewees. 
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Table 7-7: Interviewee Summary –Auditees  
Position and 
Institution  
 
Years of 
Experience 
 
Gender Ethnicity  No. of Interviews Total 
Interviews 
Initial Return 
Senior Manager: 
Customs Department  
15 Male Indigenous 
Fijian 
1  1 
Senior-Accounting  
Officer: Colonial War 
Memorial  Hospital 
12 Male   Indo-Fijian  1  1 
Total     2  2 
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The senior manager from the Customs Departments has information on 
what motivated them to participate in performance auditing and why.  His claims 
on this will reveal how the Customs employees contributed to the implementation 
of performance audits.  It will also provide insights into how the auditees’ 
understanding is either similar to or different from the auditor’s understanding of 
such audits.  Caution is taken to ensure that the auditees do not express their 
delayed beliefs (their perception of performance auditing after 1999) on the 
performance auditing project by making constant references that this project is 
seeking their beliefs and opinions on the issues related to performance auditing 
during the 1995-1997 period.  
 The senior accounting officer from the Colonial War Memorial Hospital 
will illuminate how he perceived the implementation of efficiency audits.  He will 
reveal what motivated the Hospital’s management to participate.  The accounting 
officers claims will be based on his experiences at the Hospital and will reveal 
what motivated him to be a part of the project.   
7.10.5 Members of Parliament  
The Five Members of Parliament selected for the interview have information that 
will reveal their roles either as members of the Opposition party, or members of 
the Government.  Table 7.8 summarises the interviewees representing this group. 
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Table 7-8: Interviewee Summary –Members of Parliament   
Position  
 
Years of 
Experience 
 
Gender Ethnicity  No. of Interviews Total 
Interviews 
Initial Return  
Senior-Parliamentarian 
–  Alliance Party   
12 Male Indigenous 
Fijian 
1  1 
Senior-Parliamentarian 
National Federation 
Party 
12 Male  Indo -Fijian  1  1 
Senior-Parliamentarian- 
Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei- 
Party  
8 Female  Indigenous 
Fijian 
1  1 
Senior-Parliamentarian- 
Fiji Labour Party  
8 Male  Indo-Fijian  1  1 
Senior-Parliamentarian 
-General Electors Party 
15 Male  General 
Electors 
1  1 
Total Interviews     5  5 
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These interviewees will have information on how they, as representatives 
of the people (Funnell & Cooper, 1998), perceived the introduction and 
implementation of performance auditing by Auditor-General Datt in 1996-1997.  
In describing their roles and their associations with other groups involved in the 
project (Staton & Partners, 1997), the Parliamentarians will be able to bring to 
light the events which enabled the emergence of the performance auditing project 
and will reveal the factors which influenced their beliefs, attitudes and 
understanding of the project.  The Members of Parliament are in a position to 
reveal what the project meant to them as elected representatives of the Fijian 
people and their perceptions of how the Auditor-General holds the auditees to 
account.  
7.10.6 Media  
The three members of media interviewed for this project are those who actively 
publicised the  Auditor-General’s audit reports and findings during the 1995-1997 
period by publishing certain excerpts of the audit reports, by writing editorial 
features and by publishing the interviews they had with the Auditor-General and 
Members of  Parliament.  Table 7.9 lists the interviewees from this group. 
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Table 7-9: Interviewee Summary – Print Media   
Position  
 
Years of 
Experience 
 
Gender Ethnicity  No. of Interviews Total 
Interviews 
Initial  Return 
Senior-
Reporter    
20 Male Indigenous 
Fijian 
1  1 
Senior-
Reporter    
20 Female  Indo -Fijian 1  1 
Senior- 
Reporter-
Editor  
25 Male   European 1  1 
Total 
Interviews  
   3  3 
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  The interviewees include a well-respected senior current affairs 
commentator employed by Fiji’s premier newspaper, the Fiji Times.  This person 
wrote editorial comments for events like government budgets, audit reports and on 
significant political events in Fiji and overseas.  A senior reporter and editor of the 
Island Business Magazine was also interviewed.  This individual was responsible 
for editing and reporting political news which covered Parliamentary debates, 
government budgets, audit reports, interviews with politicians and the Fijian 
Auditor-General.  A senior well-respected Radio Fiji reporter who hosted 
primetime news, and was a political commentator, who conducted live interviews, 
was also interviewed.  These journalists were interviewed so that they could 
provide explanations on how they managed to get the audit reports and why they 
published ‘certain excerpts’ of the audit reports.  In describing how they acquired 
the reports and narrating how they chose what to report on, the journalists will 
provide insights into what and who influenced their choice on selection of the 
materials they publicized and their interpretations.   
7.11 Contacting the Interviewees  
The initial set of selected interviewees was contacted through emails in October 
2004.  The interviewees were sent a synopsis of my research project, a copy of the 
request for an interview written by my supervisor and the interview questionnaire 
(Appendix 1).  Most of the interviews were conducted from mid-July to mid 
October, 2005; a few were conducted in January, 2006. The fourth coup in 2006 
made it difficult to return but all parties were available  via email if I wished to 
contact them.  
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According to Kvale (1996, p. 42), it is important that interviewees are 
provided with a brief before the interview so that the intention of the interview is 
made known and with a debrief after the interview to ensure their responses were 
accurately captured.  For this project the briefing session set the scene for the 
interview and helped put both the interviewee and myself at ease.  During the 
briefing session I also informed the interviewees that they were free to raise issues 
on the key areas of exploration or on other issues concerning the performance 
auditing project if they thought my questions did not address the issues.  
After the interviews I provided the interviewees with a debriefing of each 
of their interviews for them to decide whether I had summarised their views as 
expressed by them.  I did this so that the interviewees were aware of the notes I 
made during the interview and if they disagreed with the notes, they could correct 
me.  This also provided them with an opportunity to elaborate on issues they 
decided I missed when recording and summarising their interviews.  After 
debriefing, the interviewees were asked to sign the consent form which was given 
to them prior to the interview.  A copy of the consent form is attached as appendix 
2.  
7.12 Data Recording and Analysis  
This section outlines the processes of recording and analysing the data informed 
by the critical hermeneutics tradition.  Data are recorded and stored using the 
N’vivo software and analysed for a critical interpretation.  
7.12.1 Recording  
Before undertaking the interviews, permission was sought from the interviewees 
for the interviews to be tape-recorded.  After completing the interviews, these 
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were transcribed and given to the respective interviewees to read.  This is done to 
ensure that the interview is captured in its entirety and that the ‘correct essence’ of 
what the interviewees said is recorded.  The interviewees provided feedback on 
the transcriptions. 
  The transcribed interviews are stored using the N’vivo software program. 
This is done to organise the interview data so that the data are easily accessible for 
reading at different stages of the analysis process.  All the interview data are 
stored in one folder allowing the coding of interview data by themes and actions 
which appear to have a symbolic meaning to the interviewees.  
7.12.1.1  Data analysis  
Critical hermeneutics require that the researcher ‘fuses text and context to argue 
for a certain critical interpretation, thereby closing the hermeneutic cycle of 
meaning’ (Prasad & Mir, 2002, p. 93).  This section describes the processes of 
data analysis for a critical interpretation.  
7.12.1.2  The first level of analysis – (text and context)  
The first level of analysis involves two readings of the interview transcripts and 
the archival documents.  In the first reading an immediate impression of the 
contents of interviews and the documents is obtained to begin the cycles of 
hermeneutic understanding.  During this first reading of the text, the actors who 
are influential at the different phases of the performance auditing project are 
identified.  The actors’ roles are identified and coded.  
In the second reading the actors’ background, type and length of 
association with the project is identified and coded using the axial and open 
coding techniques suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998).  This is followed by 
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identifying and listing the actors’ roles and who selected them.  The list 
containing the actors’ details on roles and how their roles were assigned to them is 
mapped against the codes identifying the historical background of the actors.  This 
mapping fuses the text and the context.  
7.12.1.3  The second level of analysis (closing the 
Hermeneutic cycle) 
In the second level of analysis, the text is reread ‘to discover possible 
relationships of the text to the contextual story’, (Prasad & Mir, 2002, p. 103).            
In this process the recurring themes associated with different phases of the 
performance auditing project are identified and coded using the Miles and 
Huberman (1994) technique of exploring and describing information.  The text is 
read several times for multiple interpretations.  For the interview transcript, each 
response to each of the questions is linked to a particular theme and coded.  A 
similar process is undertaken for the archival documents.  
7.12.1.4  The third level - (critical understanding)  
At this level of analysis the themes and phrases reflecting a ‘consensus of 
meaning’ will be identified and coded.  To achieve this, commonly and 
metaphorically used words, phrases and passages in the text, which convey a 
common consensual message or idea regarding the different phases of the 
performance audit project will be identified, coded and mapped against each 
other.  Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2001b, 2010) interpretation of accountability is used 
to inform the meanings conveyed by the commonly used words and phrases by 
the various actors at each phase of the project.  
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7.13 Summary  
The chapter describes the nature of interviews, the selection of interviewees and 
the key areas of interview focus.  Descriptions and arguments are provided on 
choice of archival documents.  Finally the data analysis processes for a critical 
interpretation is outlined.  The descriptions of the processes used for data 
collection and analysis illuminate how the principles of critical hermeneutics 
guided the research methods.  The next chapter presents the empirical findings 
and analyses of the text and contextual interpretations to expose how the practice 
of performance auditing emerged in the Fijian public sector during the 1970-1995 
periods.  
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Chapter 8 Results and Analysis: 
 The Emergence of Performance Auditing (1970-1995) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This and the following two chapters present the empirical analysis and theorise 
the research findings.  The narratives are presented in a roughly sequential order 
to reveal the events surrounding the emergence, implementation and 
discontinuation of the practice of performance auditing in the Fijian public sector 
from 1970-1999.  The discussions draw upon the hermeneutics to present two 
levels of interpretation which are informed by Roberts’ critical expositions on 
‘accountability’.  The first level, concerned with making sense of the research 
evidence is the presentation and explanation of selected quotes from the primary 
and secondary sources which provide evidence on what, how and why certain 
events happened during the different phases of the performance auditing project.  
The second, concerned with drawing informed interpretation from the quotes, is 
achieved by situating the quotes within the broader socio-economic and political 
context of the Fijian public sector during the different phases of the performance 
auditing project.  These interpretations are informed by ‘critical accountability’ 
(Roberts, 1996, 2001a &b, 2010) to reveal the messages conveyed by the text thus 
closing the hermeneutical circle.  
Using hermeneutics the text explorations are presented as themes and sub-
themes to elucidate what happened, and how and why it happened.  These 
discussions bring to light the major actors and reveal how their understanding of 
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the practice of performance auditing was shaped during the emergence, 
implementation and discontinuation phases.  The analyses drawn from the 
discussions are informed by Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2001a, 2000b, 2010) critical 
interpretation of accountability to reveal power regimes and structures of 
domination constructed by actors such as the Auditor-General (AG), Audit Office 
Staff, auditees, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Members, Members of the 
Parliament, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and media in their attempt to 
either change or to hold to the status quo with respect to the Auditor-General’s 
public sector accountability role thus closing the hermeneutics cycle and allowing 
for critical reflection.  
This chapter is formatted as follows: the problems faced by the Auditors-
General during the 1970-1995 period are evaluated; the influences of exogenous 
factors in audit developments are analysed; followed by discussions on revelations 
of mismanagement and its consequences.  The lack of action on audit findings and 
disclosures is analysed and the calls for changes to the audit practices are 
evaluated.  The final section of the chapter provides a summary of the findings in 
the chapter.     
8.2 Discussion and Analysis  
The entry points of the hermeneutic circle describe various constraints faced by 
the Auditors-General in discharging accountability during the 1970-1995 periods.  
These are embedded in their contextual setting and fused with the researchers pre-
understanding of the socio-economic and political history of Fiji (19970-1995). 
The purpose is to discuss and explain the constraints and evaluate how, despite the 
constraints, the Auditors-General incorporated performance audits as part of 
public sector auditing.   
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8.2.1 Theme 1: Problems faced by the Auditor-General 
The Fijian Auditor-General holds a Constitutional Office (Constitution of Fiji, 
Section 148 of 1993, Section 167 of 1997) with an ‘overseeing role’ holding the 
Government accountable for the use of public sector resources.  The Auditor-
General and his team undertake public sector audits and the Auditor-General 
presents the audit reports to the Fijian Parliament (Audit Act, Section 6 of 1970) 
who approves the appropriations.  This is essentially a compliance audit of 
Parliamentary approved budgetary appropriations.   
The public sector entities audited comprise the whole of government, 
Ministries, Departments, Statutory Bodies, Local Government Authorities, 
Provincial Councils, and Overseas Trade Missions (Annual Report - Audit Office, 
1993, 1980).  The Auditors-General who served under different governments were 
Fiji citizens with the exception of Jacobs who was an Australian.  As to be 
revealed they encountered a number of similar problems in holding the auditees to 
account during the 1970-1995 periods.   
Table 8.1 provides a list of the Auditors-General, who appointed them, 
when they served, and under which government.  Table 8.2 summarises the major 
contributions of each of the four Auditors-Generals (Bhim, Narain, Datt and 
Jacobs) towards emergence of performance auditing during the 1970-1997 period.  
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Table 8-1: List of Auditors-General during 1970-1999 
Name  Served as Deputy 
AG before 
appointed as AG 
Yes/No 
Period Served  Appointed  as AG or Promoted from 
Deputy AG to AG  
Government: Name of Prime Minister and Governor-General/President after 1987 
Coup  
    Government Prime Minister         President
Tamesar 
Bhim 
Yes.  Fiji October 1970 – 
October 1984 
Appointed by Constitutional 
Services Commission  under 
Chairman Cruishank - (European- 
Fiji born)  
  
Alliance Party (democratically 
appointed).  
Ratu Sir Mara Ratu Ganilau  
Rupendra 
Narain 
Yes.  Fiji November 1984 - 
October 1987 
Promoted from Deputy AG to AG  
Under Constitutional Commission 
Chairman Cruishank (European-Fiji 
born) 
Alliance Party (democratically 
elected) continued after Rabuka led-
military coup in May 1987.  
  
Ratu Sir Mara  Ratu Ganilau 
Ramesh 
Chandra 
Datt  
Yes.  Fiji November 1987- 
October 1997 
Promoted from Deputy AG to AG 
under Constitutional Commission 
Chairman Tonganivalu (Indigenous 
Fijian) 
i) Nov-Dec 1987 Military Govt  
ii)  Dec 1987-April 1992 Interim 
Govt Military appointed 
iii)  May 1992-Nov 1997- SVT 
Govt  led by Rabuka.and 
elected under 1990 
undemocratic constitution   
i)   Rabuka 
 
ii)  Ratu Sir Mara  
 
iii) Rabuka 
Ratu Ganilau 
 
Ratu Ganilau 
 
Ratu Sir Mara  
Michael 
Jacobs  
Yes. Australian 
National Audit 
Office.   
November 1997- 
October 2000 
Appointed as AG by Constitutional 
Services Commission – Chairperson 
Walker (Indigenous Fijian) 
i) Nov 1997-April,1999 SVT led 
by Rabuka.  
ii)  May  1999-May 2000 Fiji 
Labour. 
iii)  June 2000-August 2000 - 
Terrorist Govt  
iv)  Sept 2000-Nov 2000 - 
 Military appointed  
i)   Rabuka 
 
ii)  Chaudry  
 
iii) Speight  
 
iv)  Qarase 
Ratu Sir Mara 
 
Ratu Sir Mara  
 
Ratu Seniloli  
 
Ratu seniloli 
Eroni 
Vatuloka  
Yes. Fiji.    
Transferred from 
Ministry of 
Finance  
November 2000- 
December 2009 
Promoted from Deputy AG to AG 
under Constitutional Services 
Commission Chairperson 
Waqavavanilagi (Indigenous Fijian) 
i)  Nov 2000-Sept 2001- Military 
appointed interim govt.  
ii)  Sept 2001-2006 – SDL 
i)   Qarase  
 
ii)  Qarase  
Ratu Seniloli 
 
Ratu Seniloli 
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Table 8-2: AG Contributions towards Emergence of Performance Audit  
 
Auditors-General and  
years of service  
 
Contributions/influences on Emergence of Performance Audit  
 
Bhim - 15 Years  
 
 Expanded the reporting requirements of audits by incorporating 
details on how resources were managed in his financial audit 
reports.   
 Revealed flaws in accounting systems and internal controls 
used in the public sector.   
 Revealed lack of support from Ministry of  Finance  and PSC 
 Suggested that Fiji adopt performance auditing in 1981. 
 Proposed changes to 1970 Audit Act.  
 
 
Narain - 3 years  
 
 Continued with detailed reporting.  
 
 
Datt - 10 years  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Highlighted reasons for delays in completion of audit reports 
and submission of financial statements for compliance audits 
by some of the public sector entities. 
 Requested adequate funding and staffing for Audit Office from 
Ministry of Finance and Public Service Commission. Revealed 
lack of support from government agencies.  
 Gained Public Accounts Committees support for funding, 
staffing and for expansion of compliance audits to incorporate 
value for money audits.  
 Called for introduction of performance audits to arrest lack of 
transparencies in the public sector, revealed via financial 
statement audits. 
 Called for changes to 1970 Audit Act to mandate performance 
audit. 
 Secured Asian Development Bank funding for Audit Office in 
1995, with an objective to introduce performance audits.   
 Implemented performance audits  
 Discontinued performance audits.  
   
 
Jacobs - 3 years  
 
 Submitted proposal for changes to 1970 Audit Act.  
 Encouraged staff training and development.  
 
Sources:  Annual Reports - Audit Office, ADB Report 1995, Staton & Partners’ Report 1997, 
media articles and interviews.  
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‘Mr Tamessar Bhim, an Indo-Fijian  was appointed the first Auditor-
General after Fiji gained independence from Britain in 1970’ (Fiji Times, 1970, p. 
1, August 1).  His appointment was approved by the Constitutional Select 
Committee under the Chairmanship of Cruishank (Fiji citizen with European 
origin) in consultation with the Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Mara and the Governor-
General Ratu Sir Ganilu.   
 Cruishank was a government appointee who held a powerful position and 
could influence appointments in the public service.  His decision to appoint Bhim 
as the AG was  influenced by the fact that Bhim had the audit (accounting) 
knowledge and auditing experience for the position.  Bhim had served in the Fiji 
Audit Office during the Colonial rule (prior to 10th October, 1970). The 
Constitution (1970) requires that the Prime Minister (Ratu Sir Mara) and the 
Governor-General (Ganilau) approve the appointment, which was done.   
The Ratu Sir Mara led Alliance government was a democratically elected 
one and dominated by indigenous Fijians of chiefly rank.  Bhim’s appointment 
can be interpreted as a token gesture of goodwill to the Indo-Fijian community 
given that the native Fijians wanted kindred-based political power. Given that Fiji 
had only gained independence (in 1970) from the British rule, this was  motivated 
by a desire to create a public perception of democracy.  
 Bhim resigned in 1984 on the completion of his tenure without any 
apparent controversy and Mr Rupendra Narain, the deputy, was promoted to AG 
in November 1984 while the Alliance government led by Ratu Sir Mara was in 
power.  Such promotions are a common practice in the Fijian civil service.  The 
Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Mara and the Governor-General, Ganilau, both powerful 
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indigenous Fijian chiefs, endorsed his appointment.  This signaled to the 
indigenous community that having an Indo-Fijian as the AG was acceptable and it 
possibly did not erode Fijian political paramountacy.  Narain remained in his post 
even after the 1987 Military coup led by Rabuka.  Upon completion of his tenure 
in November 1987 Narain resigned from the civil service.  His resignation was not 
accompanied by controversy or known threats.  His deputy, Ramesh Datt also an 
Indo-Fijian was promoted to the post of AG in November 1987 (Annual Report, 
Audit Office, 1996. p.6).   
Datt’s promotion was approved by Ratu Sir Mara, the interim caretaker 
Prime Minister appointed by Rabuka.  The latter had overthrown the 
democratically elected Labour government on May 14, 1987.  In accepting Datt as 
the AG, Ratu Sir Mara was creating an impression of Parliamentary democracy 
while his government backed by the powerful military was promoting ethnic 
Fijian political supremacy.  Datt’s resignation in November 1997 was without 
known controversy.   
Upon Datt’s resignation in 1997 Mr Michael Jacobs, an Australian was 
appointed the Auditor-General on a two- year contract (Annual Report - Audit 
Office, 1996).  The Australian consultants who were involved with the Asian 
Development Bank funded institutional strengthening programme of the Fiji 
Audit Office supported his appointment.  Rabuka, the Prime Minister during 
1997-March 2000 approved the appointment.  As indicated by the timing, this was 
probably done for the benefit of the ADB (the donor agency) and the international 
and local Fiji community who were pressuring Rabuka to return Fiji to 
Parliamentary democracy.   
 218 
 
   The Auditors-General, Bhim, Narain and Datt each influenced the 
emergence of performance auditing in their own way (Table 8-2) and encountered 
a number of common problems while undertaking compliance audits during the 
1970-1995 period.  The first of these involved delayed audit completions.  
8.2.1.1 Delayed audit completion 
According to the 1970 Audit Act (1970 Act), the Auditor-General is expected to:  
prepare and transmit to the Minister responsible for Finance within a 
period of eight months after the close of each financial year or such longer 
period thereafter as Parliament may, by resolution, appoint, a report upon 
his examination and audit of all accounts relating to public moneys … 
together with certified copies of the statements and accounts referred to in 
section 11 (1970 Audit Act, Section 12 (1)).  
 
The 1970 Act has provisions for allowing a longer period than eight months for 
the presentation of the audit report by the Auditor-General but only by a 
resolution of the Parliament.  The Auditors-General never used this provision 
during the 1970-1999 period (Annual Reports, Audit Office, 1983, 1985, 1995, 
1997, 2000).  
Section 11 of the 1970 Act states: 
Within a period of six months after the close of each financial year or such 
longer period thereafter as Parliament may, by resolution, appoint, the 
Minster responsible for Finance shall transmit to the Auditor-General the 
accounts and statements referred to in section 23 of the Finance (Control 
and Management) Act together with such other statements as Parliament 
may from time to time require (1970 Audit Act, Section 11). 
 
A comparison of the timeframes (Sections 11 and 12 of the 1970 Act) 
indicates that the Auditor-General and his team have two months to audit the 
annual accounts from the time they receive the accounts from the Ministry of 
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Finance.  Given that the Auditor-General is the Auditor for all the government 
ministries and departments, statutory bodies, local governments and provincial 
councils, the two month period could constrain the Audit Office’s ability to meet 
this deadline.  
It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that during the years 1970 to 1974 
when AG Bhim was in Office only four out of nineteen Statutory Bodies, which 
fell under the audit scope of the Auditor-General, were audited in time 
(Parliamentary Paper 16/74).  The audit for the other fifteen was delayed for at 
least three to four years (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1978).  The delay was said 
to be due to the ‘inadequacy of staff in the Audit office’ (Parliamentary Paper 
35/79 p.23) and the Office faced ‘increasing difficulty in giving proper attention 
to the accounts subjected to audit’ (Parliamentary Paper 35/79 p.23).  Despite 
these delays nothing was done to improve and increase the number and quality of 
audit staff at the Audit Office or to change the deadline for completing the audits.  
It is probable that only AG Bhim saw this as a concern, because no further funds 
or support for the Audit Office was forthcoming.   
Auditor-General Bhim’s (Indo-Fijian) concern to hold the auditees to 
account was not shared by the Ratu Sir Mara led government.  The indigenous 
Fijian dominated government at that time (1970-April 1987) was keen to promote 
Fijian political paramountcy.  As such, using Roberts (2003) interpretation of 
accountability, attention from real accountability was eluded by the Ratu Sir Mara 
government by withholding resources from the Audit Office and hence failing to 
provide reasonable support for timely audits.   
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Audit Reports for some Provincial Councils,10 for which an audit was 
required by the 1970 Audit Act, were also not issued in a timely manner for the 
1988-1992 period.  ‘The annual financial reports of at least four of the seven 
Provincial Councils for the years 1988-1992 were yet to be audited in 1993’ 
(Annual Report, Audit Office, 1993, p. 8) during AG Datt’s tenure.  The delay 
occurred because these authorities failed to provide the Audit Office with their 
annual financial accounts and statements in a timely manner (Parliamentary Paper 
1/93).  The Auditor-General (Datt - Indo-Fijian) has no authority to demand their 
financial accounts and statements.  Instead, section 11 of the 1970 Audit Act 
specifies that the ‘Minister of Finance is responsible for transmitting the annual 
financial accounts and statements on time’.  The Provincial Councils therefore are 
accountable to the Minister of Finance for timely submission and not the AG.  
Fiji experienced two military coups in 1987 (May and September) and the 
military appointed government probably did not prioritise audit.   As such, the 
then (September 1987-October 1991) Minister of Finance, Ah Koy (indigenous 
Fijian) elected by the interim caretaker government and backed by the military, 
saw no consequence to not forwarding the annual financial statements for audit 
(Annual Report, Audit Office, 1993).  
Considering this, and the two-month window to audit the accounts, timely 
audit completion by the AG appears to be an unreasonable expectation.  Auditor-
General Datt has no power in meeting these deadlines.  The non-delivery of 
timely financial reports for audit by the Provincial Councils is probably a 
demonstration of Fijian political supremacy.  The political instability caused by 
                                                 
10  Provincial Council - Fiji has seven Provincial Councils. These are statutory bodies whose members represent Fijian 
Villages and districts within a specified boundary in terms of ownership of land and water resources. 
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the 1987 coups and the colonial practice of annual financial attest audits and 
accountability were in conflict.  Datt an Indo-Fijian AG was in a weak position to 
hold the auditees to account when compared to the indigenous Fijian Finance 
Ministers (Ah Koy and Ratu Kubuabola) who sought to promote indigenous 
Fijian supremacy. The latter were probably not concerned with being held to 
account for budgetary compliance.  
In his 1993 Audit Report Auditor-General Datt expressed the following 
concern:  
----with the exception of one or two, most authorities’ accounts up to 1988 
have been audited and others are from one to four years behind (Annual 
Report- Audit Office. Parliamentary Paper 1/1993 p.6). 
 
Some of the audit reports are at least five years late and the issues raised in 
these audits are outdated by the time they are disclosed (Parliamentary Paper 
28/98, p. 3).  According to the 1985 Finance Act (Part 111 Section 8) and the 
1970 Audit Act Section 12, the Minister of Finance has the power to impose a 
reporting timeframe on the bureaucrats to submit their annual financial reports for 
audits.  Despite having such powers, the Minister of Finance, Ratu Kubuabola an 
indigenous Fijian chief, under the Rabuka government (1992-1997) did not 
impose the deadline (Parliamentary Paper 28/98. p. 4).  Based on this  researcher’s 
pre-understanding and the Fijian socio-economic and political history, the 
Minister of Finance was  not at all concerned with being  held to account.  Instead 
of imposing the timeframe, he was using the time frame and the delays in 
submission as a shield to avoid being held to account.   
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The Auditor-General Jacobs (1997-1999) raised concerns about reporting 
timeliness prior to his 1997 appointment.  
In previous years, it was found that issues raised in the Annual Report- 
Auditor-Generals were often somewhat ‘out of date’ so (as) to speak, as 
the reports dealt with issues that were not recent. (Parliamentary Paper 
28/98) 
 
The Asian Development Bank expressed related concerns in its 1995 
Report.   
The Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) at present is unable to complete 
audits within a satisfactory time period after the end of the respective 
fiscal year, particularly where there is no statutory imposed deadline. 
(Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance Report [TAR], 1995a, p. 
1) 
 
The Audit Office’s inability to complete the audits on a timely basis was 
seen to be a problem to those who relied on the Auditor-General’s opinions with 
the exception of the successive Fijian governments headed by indigenous Fijian 
chiefs for whom delays served non-accountability.   
A senior media reporter raised concerns about the delay of the audit 
reports presented to the Parliament:   
The Auditor-General presents outdated audit reports and the findings are 
useless as no action can be taken. It is a waste. (Senior Media Reporter, 
July, 2005)  
 
A similar comment was made by a senior Audit Office staff member:  
We lagged behind with the preparation and presentation of Audit Reports 
for some years in late 1980 and the 1990s because of shortage of staff and 
other resources. (Senior Audit Office Staff, July, 2005) 
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Given the length of the delays between the year-ends and financial attest 
audits, ‘individuals’ responsible for account keeping and management could not 
be contacted by the audit officers to answer their queries regarding the poor 
documentation and mismanagement of resources discovered during the audit 
process.  As such, attention from real ‘accountability’ was diverted (Roberts, 
2010) because the miscreants probably were not present to provide answers to the 
questions raised by the auditors.   
8.2.1.2 Weak support  
Another problem was that the Auditor-General did not manage to obtain sufficient 
co-operation from government agencies responsible for the funding and staffing 
of the Office.   
Despite the 1970 Act and the various Constitutions (sections 168 of 1970, 
1990 and 1997) giving the Audit Office independence in performing its functions, 
the latter is dependent on the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) for operational resources.  The PSC failed to recruit suitably 
qualified staff for employment at the Audit Office on a timely basis (Annual 
Report- Audit Office 1993, 1985).  The Ministry of Finance failed to increase the 
Audit Office’s budget despite the Auditors-General Bhim’s (1970-1984) and 
Narain’s (1984-1987) repeated requests (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1993, 
1985).  Irrespective of the Constitution and laws based on a Parliamentary system, 
weak support from these two agencies constrained the Auditor-General in several 
ways during the 1970-1995 period.   
Auditor General Bhim published his concerns in his Audit Reports:   
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As reported in 1994, limited resources prevent this Office from auditing all 
Government ministries/departments and offices.  
The main areas of constraints are as follows: 
(i) inadequate staff in terms of numbers and quality; 
(ii) inadequate funds to meet additional equipment needs, 
particularly computers ; and  
(iii) constraints imposed by the Public Service Commission and 
the Ministry of Finance despite the mandate given to this 
Office under the existing law.  
                          (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1995; Parliamentary Paper 37/96). 
These constraints were visible only to AG Bhim and not the Rabuka led 
government (1992-1997) possibly because the former believed in holding the 
auditees to account.  The latter was interested in promoting native Fijian 
supremacy and hence eluded being held to account.  The AG had little or no 
authority to demand additional resources and the Rabuka government had the 
power to deny it.  The Office of the Auditor-General thus retained its Westminster 
symbolic status.  Staffing and funding constraints also hindered the operations of 
the Audit Office in various ways. 
8.2.3 Staffing 
The following highlights staffing concerns which prevailed at the Audit Office 
during the late 1980s and 1990s and which have played a role in the delays:  
The Audit Office lacked qualified staff to provide quality and timely audit 
reports. (Interviewee, Senior Audit Officer, July, 2005)  
The lack of qualified staff as well as lack of staff generally have led to 
situations where audit completions took longer than the normally expected time.  
Being understaffed resulted in some audit jobs taking priority over others.  The 
end result was delayed completion of audits.  
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The Audit Office faced staffing constraints during 1987-1995 because the 
PSC neither recruited sufficient nor suitably qualified auditors.  The Permanent 
Secretary of the PSC (Thompson 1991-1994 and Waqanivavalagi 1995-2005) was 
motivated to promote the Rabuka government’s agenda of indigenous Fijian 
political supremacy rather than addressing AG Datt’s concern.  AG Datt on the 
other hand was concerned with the problems associated with delayed audits and 
appeared to believe that recruiting additional staff was the solution. 
A senior auditor from the Audit Office claimed:  
Staff have resigned and moved to other departments, this affects our audit 
completion. Being understaffed most of the time(s), we cannot complete 
audits on time. (Senior Audit Office Staff, August, 2005) 
 
Audit staff left for reasons related to the political coups of 1987 and also 
because of an undemocratic election in 1992.  An experienced senior government 
Officer pointed out the effects on staffing of an unstable government: 
After the 1987 coup, the Audit Office lost skilled and qualified staff 
because some senior audit staff moved to other Government Ministries and 
Departments. Those who held overseas qualifications migrated to other 
countries, as a result the operations of the Audit Office suffered. (Senior 
Officer Ministry of Finance, August, 2005) 
 
The cause lies in the 1987 political situation, which weakened Auditor-
General Datt’s capabilities and powers to audit and provide audit reports within 
the timeframe set in the 1970 Act.  In 1987, Fiji experienced its first military 
coup.  Due to the political upheaval and the introduction of the ‘positive 
discrimination’ policy implemented by the Rabuka led government there was 
mass migration of skilled and qualified individuals from the Fijian civil service to 
overseas countries (Kumar, 1997; Sharma 1997).    In providing racial ‘balance’, 
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the PSC employed indigenous Fijians in the civil service who did not necessarily 
have the qualifications for the job.  As a consequence of this policy the quality of 
audit staff at the Audit Office was affected (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1993, 
1990).  
The implementation of the positive discrimination policy caused another 
staffing issue for the Audit Office.  The staffing constraint was compounded when 
the PSC reshuffled the civil service.  The civil servants from the Audit Office 
were transferred to other government departments to balance staff numbers based 
on ‘ethnicity’.  Some of the qualified and senior audit staff were transferred to 
other government departments (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1990, p.5).  One of 
the senior Ministry of Finance employees expressed the following concern. 
After the 1987 coup, the Audit Office lost skilled and qualified staff 
because some senior audit staff were moved to other Government 
Ministries and Departments. (Senior Officer, Ministry of Finance, August, 
2005) 
 
  An interpretation of this is that keeping appropriately skilled and 
committed audit staff was clearly a problem in the context of a reluctant 
government and inhibited the ability of the Auditor-General to produce timely 
reports.  The Auditor-General perhaps offered an apparent transparency via 
delayed reports which obfuscated real accountabilities by exposing inaccuracies in 
record keeping and improper documentation (Roberts 2001, 2010).  Real 
accountabilities can be revealed if skilled and appropriately qualified auditors had 
performed financial attest and compliance to budget audits.  
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8.2.3.1 Funding 
Lack of sufficient funding kept Audit Office staff from travelling outside of the 
Central regions11.  Consequently, departments and local government authorities 
situated in some locations in Fiji were not audited in a timely manner.  One of the 
senior auditors expressed this concern:  
The Ministry of Finance did not provide us with additional funds to travel 
outside of the central region. (Senior Audit Office Staff, July, 2005)  
 
A similar view was iterated by another senior Audit Office staff member:   
We have to postpone travelling to other locations due to insufficient funds. 
(Senior Audit Office Staff, August, 2005) 
 
Lack of funding support from the Ministry of Finance under Minister Ah 
Koy (1990-1992) and Minister Kubuabola (1992-1997) prevented Auditor-
General Datt and his audit team’s effort to undertake audits in locations outside 
the central region during the 1987-1995 period (Annual Reports, Audit Office, 
1993. p 8).  The outlying regions were less held to account as a result.  These two 
Ministers would  have been motivated by their tribal affiliation. As such 
increasing the budgetary allocation to the Audit Office was not their prime 
concern.  For them the annual financial attest audit by the AG was a ritual left 
behind by the Colonial government.   
                                                 
11  Fiji consists of three major islands, Viti Levu, Vanua Levu and Tavenuni and various small islands with a total of 332 
small islands. The Audit Office is centrally located in Suva, Viti Levu whereas the Government Departments are spread 
over the two main islands Viti Levua and Vanua Levu. The Audit Staff have to travel to different parts of the two islands to 
undertake the audits. 
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Auditor-General Datt published his concerns on funding in his audit 
reports (Annual Reports, Audit Office, 1990, 1992 and 1993).  As a result, the 
Public Accounts Committee members (PAC) under the chairpersonship of 
Khaiyum (an Indo-Fijian) published the following in its Report indicating its 
support: 
The Committee also strongly feels that sufficient funding should be given 
to the OAG to ensure that the Office makes physical checks where 
appropriate in its investigation, especially where special projects are 
concerned. (Extract from Public Accounts Committee Report, 1992; 
Parliamentary Paper 70/1999, p.4) 
 
During the 1987-1995 period, the actions of the Ministry of Finance and 
the PSC inhibited the Auditor-General’s attempts to secure additional funding and 
appropriately qualified staff.  It was noted in the Annual Report - Audit Office 
(1993, 1994) and Parliamentary Paper 37/96 that the Ministry of Finance, 
responsible for the budgetary allocation of the Audit Office failed to increase the 
budget for the Audit Office despite repeated requests from Auditor-General Datt.  
 AG Datt (1984-1997) appeared to be more persistent with his requests for 
additional funding than AG Bhim (1970-1984).  Interestingly the former was 
doing this under the 1990 racial Constitution without any success.  An 
interpretation here is that Datt made repeated yearly requests, and the Rabuka 
government appeared to let the requests appear persistently, so that they could ask 
donor agencies such as the Asian Development Bank for funding.  The requests 
were expected to be fruitful, as during Datt’s tenure the international community 
was pressuring the Rabuka government to return Fiji to Parliamentary democracy.  
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The Ministry of Finance and the PSC’s association with the Audit Office 
can be understood in terms of their ‘power relations’.  The Audit Office relied on 
the Ministry of Finance for its budgetary allocation and on the PSC for recruiting 
and fulfilling their staffing needs.  Unfortunately:  
Both the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service Commission have at 
times exerted power and control over the Audit Office by withholding 
funds and by slowing the recruitment process. (Senior Audit Office Staff, 
July, 2005) 
 
The problem was compounded by the Ministry of Finance’s authority to 
control budgetary allocation for the Audit Office and by the PSC’s authority to 
redeploy staff from the Audit Office to other government departments.  Either of 
these two agencies could seriously constrain the Audit Office.  The extent of 
under-funding was not disclosed, but is indicated by the fact that during the 1987-
1995 period the staffing levels at the Audit Office ranged between 55% to 75% of 
the total staff required (Annual Reports, Audit Office, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993 and 
1995).  Although the Audit Office is constitutionally an independent institution, 
the PSC and the Ministry of Finance hold power over the Office in a number of 
ways.  Assertion of power by these two government agencies within a hierarchical 
accountability system (Roberts, 1996) lays the potential for an asymmetrical 
power relationship (Bleicher, 1980;  Prasad  & Prasad, 2002).  
The hermeneutic-dialectic approach, therefore allows the researcher to 
portray the ‘complexity of the Audit Office as a social, cultural and political 
system’ (Myers, 1994, p. 196).  A hermeneutic interpretation reveals that the 
performance of the Fijian Auditor-General’s Office during the 1970-1995 period 
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was affected by various events including delays in audit completions, the effects 
of the coup and weak support from the Ministry of Finance and the PSC.  
 The Ministers of Finance Ah Koy (1987-1990) and Ratu Kubuabola 
(1990-1997) failed to increase the funding to the Audit Office after the 1987 
coups.  Both were Ministers under the military backed, indigenous Fijian led 
governments.  As such, their interest was in promoting Fijian political 
paramountcy.  They were not keen to be held to account and therefore used the 
Audit Office to provide the appearance of being held accountable in a purely 
symbolic manner, thus creating the illusion of being held to account.  They did 
this by allowing AG Datt to perform financial attest audits, and publish and table 
the reports with the Minister of Finance without the funds or the authority to 
follow up.  AG Datt was in a weak position to hold them to account but attempted 
to do so.  
8.3 Theme 2: Exogenous Influence 
Despite these constraints, Auditors-General Bhim and Narain during their 
respective tenures (see table 7.1) were inspired by developments in public sector 
auditing such as the introduction of performance auditing in Australia and New 
Zealand.  Bhim expressed the view as early as 1981 that Fiji should follow these 
overseas trends (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1981).  He recommended that 
changes be made to the 1970 Audit Act to mandate performance audits 
(Parliamentary Paper 4/81):  
A number of countries, particularly members of the Commonwealth, have 
even revised their audit laws in recent years to give statutory support to 
performance audit. Auditing in the public finance sector is increasingly 
concerned with economical and effective use of public sector resources. 
(Parliamentary Paper 4/1981) 
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Bhim’s view on adopting such audit practice was not shared by the Ratu 
Sir Mara led Alliance government (1970-1987) or the PAC chaired by Mr Shah, 
an Indo-Fijian from the Indo-Fijian dominated National Federation Party (1970-
1987) which was in Opposition (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1982).  It appears 
that both the government and the opposition during 1970-1982 were satisfied with 
the Audit Office’s role of performing only financial attest and budgetary 
compliance audits.   
Yet the next Auditor-General Datt (1987-1997) reiterated the views of his 
predecessors in 1991: 
The extension of state auditor’s function into performance audit is to 
determine the value received from the application of resources or loss 
incurred by their non-application is not peculiar to Fiji alone but it is the 
trend in most Audit Offices of other countries. (Parliamentary Paper 
29/1991) 
Although neither the Ratu Sir Mara nor the Rabuka led governments that came 
into power after the 1987 coup respond to Datt’s suggestion, the PAC members 
under the Chairmanship of Khaiyum (the Committee was reinstated in 1992 after 
being suspended in 1987) showed support for it.  
The Committee strongly supports that value for money audits should be 
done so that Parliament can be informed whether or not expenditure of 
public funds has achieved the desired objective. (Public Accounts 
Committee Report for 1990/1991) 
 
In its role as an overseer of government accounts including audit reports, 
the PAC did not have the power to enforce the implementation of performance 
auditing or to change the 1970 Act to provide for such audits.  I can only 
speculate that the PAC members’ support for implementation of such audits were 
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motivated by international and national pressure on the Rabuka government to 
lead Fiji to Parliamentary democracy.  
Auditors-General Bhim’s, Narain’s and Datt’s  (refer to Table 7.1 for 
tenure) suggestion during the 1980-1991 period that Fiji adopt the practice of 
performance auditing was inspired by their respective associations with the 
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institution (INTOSAI) and the South 
Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institution (SPASAI).  The Fiji Audit 
Office became a member of the former association in 1987 and the latter in 1973 
(South Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institution Annual Report, 1995).  
As a member of these international public sector audit organisations, Bhim, 
Narain and Datt were aware of public sector audit developments.  These three 
Auditors-General and their senior audit staff attended the meetings and workshops 
hosted by these organizations (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1986, 1992, 1994).  
Bhim’s, Narain’s and Datt’s expressions of interest for performance auditing were 
inspired by the global developments in public sector auditing.  These three 
appeared to be seeking to promote their own self-identity as being successful in 
introducing such audits to the Fijian public sector.  This claim is made because the 
socio-political history of Fiji (1970-1995) indicates that they did not receive 
support from the successive governments (1970-1997) for funding and for staffing 
of the Audit Office yet they aspired to introduce efficiency audits.   
  The INTOSAI had a full membership of 189 countries and four associate 
members (International Organization of Supreme Audit Institution Special Report, 
2004).  This organisation concerns itself with public sector audit developments 
and holds workshops and seminars on developments in auditing for its member 
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countries.  To support the member countries’ participants to attend the seminars 
and workshops, INTOSAI provides funding sponsorships.  It meets on an annual 
basis and is a network of the Auditors-General.  Fiji is a member of this 
organisation and benefits from the training provided to audit staff (Annual Report, 
Audit Office, 1986, 1992). 
The South Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institution (SPASAI) is a 
public sector audit organisation with branches into 25 countries from the South 
Pacific Region, including Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, the Cook 
Island, Vanuatu, Niue and other island nations (South Pacific Association of 
Supreme Audit Institution, Annual Report, 1995).  The SPASAI actively 
promotes public sector audit and developments in public sector auditing in the 
island nations.  The Australian and New Zealand Audit Offices provide 
internships to audit staff from the Audit Office of the Island States and provide 
technical assistance to the Island Audit Offices on the request of the respective 
government.  The member countries also benefit by attending annual conferences 
and workshops hosted by SPASAI.  As a member of this Group the Fiji Audit 
staff have benefited from the Groups exchange scheme during the 1980-1995 
period (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1995).  
Staff employed at the Fiji Audit Office during the 1980-1995 period 
therefore came into their roles with both traditional learning experiences and the 
expectations of being involved with performance audit.  Some expect to get 
further training in such audits by attending workshops held by INTOSAI and 
SPAISAI.  
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One of the Audit Office Staff made the following point regarding 
exogenous influence:  
Fiji Audit Office is a member of International Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institution. Member countries of International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institution have been involved in performance auditing in 
their public sector to bring in greater public sector accountability. The 
International Organization of Supreme Audit Institution member countries 
revised their Audit Laws to make performance auditing mandatory. Here 
in Fiji we are still very much engaged in traditional audits, we need to 
move forward with the modern audit methodologies and the Auditor-
General is keen for us to undertake such audits so that our public sector 
can perform better. (Senior Auditor, Audit Office Staff, September, 2005) 
 
Auditors-General Bhim, Narain and Datt seemed to be influenced by 
INTOSAI and SPAISAI to introduce the practice of performance auditing in Fiji.  
They desired to be seen to be compliant with the practices of the important 
external organisations with which the Fiji Audit Office is affiliated (Annual 
Report, Audit Office, 1993).  Since other member countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand had adopted the practice of performance auditing under the New 
Public Management trend, Datt in 1991 made suggestions that Fiji was being left 
behind by not adopting the practice of performance auditing (Annual Report, 
Audit Office, 1992).  After all, Fiji had embarked on public sector reforms in 
1980 (Appana, 2003) and the adaptation of performance auditing could have been 
a part of the reform package.  Within the ambit of the social and historical events 
during the 1970-1995 period performance auditing was shaped as a social 
construct by the Auditors-General (Kinsella, 2006; Thompson, 1981). 
8.4 Theme 3: Revelations of Mismanagement    
In their Audit Reports during the 1970-1995 period, Auditors-General, Bhim from 
1970 to 1984, Narain from 1984 to 1987, and Datt from 1987 to 1997, revealed 
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and reported on the cases of misappropriation of funds, corrupt practices and 
mismanagement of public sector resources by the various government 
departments and Ministers (Annual Reports, Audit Office, 1973 to 1975,  1978, 
1983 to 1985, 1992, 1993).  Audit investigations disclosed that some public 
servants were able to use the public sector resources for their personal benefit 
such as using the ministerial cars for personal family outings and allowing their 
siblings to drive the ministerial vehicles without any authority to do so (Fiji 
Times, 1978, October 28, p. 3; Fiji Times, 1983, June 13, p. 3).  Accounting 
information (audit reports) as such is seen as ‘laying bare’ and making visible the 
auditee’s conduct.  These reports put pressure on the Fiji government to conduct 
performance audits in order to discover and reveal such problems.  In 1996 the 
Minister of Finance, Ratu Kubolobola approached the Auditor-General to 
undertake economy, efficiency and effectiveness audits of the Customs 
Department (discussed in chapter 9).  
Despite these revelations of corruption, the Ratu Sir Mara government 
(1970-1987; 1987-1992) and the Rabuka government (1992-1999) took no action 
against the offending parties.  Under a Westminster system of governance as 
existed in Fiji12 for most of 1970-1995 (despite the 1987 coup), the employees of  
respective Ministries are accountable for their actions to the Minister and the 
Minister in turn is accountable to the Prime Minister.  Apart from this hierarchical 
line of accountability, the employees in the public sector are accountable to the 
PSC (Public Service Act 1970) who is their employer.  If financial attest audits 
disclose mismanagement of public sector resources then the ‘controlling 
authority’ (Minister) and the employer (PSC) as the accountee are expected to 
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take action.  In the Fijian context, they did not however at any point (1970-1995) 
do so.  The AG, in the audit information provided to the Minister of Finance and 
the PSC, highlighted the misappropriation of funds without effect as they ignored 
this part of the report.  This, in terms of Roberts (1996) interpretation of 
accountability via accounting, indicates a failure to fulfill their moral obligation 
by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the PSC to the tax-paying 
public.  
8.4.1 Disclosure  
The Auditors-General Bhim, Narain and Datt during their tenures (Tables 8-1 and 
8-2) made the government and the Parliament aware of the practices of 
mismanagement of resources in the public sector through their audit findings and 
disclosures.  The media publicized these findings drawing the attention of other 
interested stakeholders:  
About $14 million of public funds had to be written off by the government 
during 1982-1986 according to the latest Auditor-General’s report released 
yesterday. Between 1982 and 1986 government lost $924, 000 through 
fraud, negligence and theft. Serious irregularities accounted for $70,000. 
Loss and theft through government stores amounted to $11.5 million. One 
of the employees used $18,358 under the Co-operative Loan scheme for 
personal loan. (Report: “$14 million written off’, Fiji Times, April 13, 
1989) 
 
The bureaucrats were able to misappropriate the public funds because of 
an apparent lack of control or actions against miscreants by the relevant Minister.  
This is an application of inconsequential accountability (Roberts, 2010) in which 
accounting disclosures are made but actions do not follow.  This was not for a 
lack of auditor disclosure:    
                                                                                                                                     
12 Refer to table 1 in chapter 1, for lines of political accountability in Fiji under the Westminster system. 
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The Audit Reports dated back to mid-1970s, 1980s and 1990s have 
contained detailed information on how the resources were managed. The 
Report described how some public servants and ministers used the 
resources for their personal use. The reports have quoted dollar amounts to 
indicate the extent of wastage. The extensive details in the audit reports 
constantly brought into open the inefficiencies and the wastage of 
resources by the public sector. (Interviewee, Senior Audit Officer, Audit 
Office) 
 
The inefficiencies and wastages referred to can be understood in terms of 
poorly managed spending and inefficient use of resources over more than thirty 
years under both  the Ratu Sir Mara led, democratically elected Alliance 
government (1970-1987), the interim caretaker government after the 1987 military 
coups (May, 1987-1992) and the Rabuka led- government (1992-1997) under the 
1990 undemocratic Constitution:    
Government department spent $39, 584 on equipment for undersea 
mineral exploration but never got the ship needed to use it. (‘Money 
wasted’, Fiji Times, October 9, 1975, p. 1) 
 
A (audit) check on 100 drums of bitumen had shown that when delivered, 
32 had been completely empty, others were half empty and none were of 
the full weight of 387pounds. The loss had been known for some time but 
the PWD had done nothing to stop it or find out what happened. (‘Money 
wasted’, Fiji Times, October 9, 1975, p. 1) 
 
Government lost $4000 in renting a building which was not used. 
(‘Account System at FAB Queried’, Fiji Times, June 13, 1983, p. 3)   
 
Major defects were noted in the expenditure of about $5 million allocated 
to the Ministry of Agriculture in 1993 after Cyclone Kina. The Audit 
Review of the project found defects in expenditure totalling $5,078,637 
which were incurred on activities not related to the Agriculture project for 
which the amount was approved.  (‘Agriculture Misused $5 million’, Fiji 
Times, 1996, October 30, p. 5) 
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Such revelation of misuse of public funds and corruption appears to be a 
norm in Fiji.  This has been a regular feature of the Auditors-General reports on a 
yearly basis (Fiji Times, 1995, October 28, p. 5).  This raises concerns about the 
purpose of public sector auditing and indeed whether it has a purpose in the Fijian 
context.  An interpretation offered here is that ‘auditing based on accounting’ so 
far appear to indicate a  deterioration in the morality of  the government, but is 
allowed because it is used by the government to give the faintest picture of being 
‘held to account’ therefore avoiding the real accountability that comes with action 
and consequence.  The indigenous Fijian dominated governments led by chiefs 
appear to be protecting their political supremacy.  The audit purpose, where the 
auditor holds the auditee to account is a colonial heritage and does not seem to a 
part of the tribal political culture.   
In such circumstances the Indo-Fijian Auditors-General (Bhim, Narain, 
Datt) are weak, have no political power and cannot demand accountability from 
the auditees.  However, they serve a useful political purpose for the racially biased 
and undemocratic government.  That is, in allowing the Indo-Fijians to hold the 
position of Auditor-General’s and allowing for the audit reports to be made 
public, the government is creating a perception for the international community 
that Fiji follows Parliamentary democracy.     
The PAC members’ raised concerns on disclosures of mismanagement 
contained in the Audit Report to the Parliament and noted: 
The Committee once again expresses its concern at the lack of interest 
displayed by a number of Heads of Departments in presenting full and 
accurate explanations on matters under investigation by the Committee. 
(Public Accounts Committee Report, 1992, p. 4) 
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The PAC under the Chairmanship of Shah had raised similar concerns in 
1985 (Public Accounts Committee Report, 1986).  Despite such concerns being 
about ten years earlier, not much appears to have changed in holding the auditees 
to account.   The PAC members’ claimed:  
We are disappointed to note that there are a few Ministries which have not 
given sufficient attention to the report of the Auditor-General. (Public 
Accounts Committee Report, 1992, p. 5) 
 
 
The bureaucrats’ disinterest was possibly due to a lack of sanctions 
imposed on their actions by the Ministers.  In 1993 the PAC noted:  
… reluctance on the part of some Permanent Secretaries and Heads of 
Departments to take appropriate recommended disciplinary or remedial 
action against the offenders. (Public Accounts Committee Report, 1993, p. 
4) 
 
  AG Bhim in 1978 claimed poor record-keeping by some of the Ministries 
also made mismanagement and fraudulent practices possible: 
The Auditor-General, Mr Bhim says in his Report that, Government 
departments have shown a lack of or complete break-down in control over 
their accounts due to their failure to keep proper accounts. There were 
losses and thefts amounting to $3,238 and $216, 743 which had to be 
written off.  (‘Accounts in chaos-Bhim’, Fiji Times, 1978, October 28 p. 
3)  
 
Almost twenty years later a similar claim was made by AG Datt in 1996:  
Government departments and their accounting officers fail to keep proper 
records and in most cases expenditure is not appropriately authorised. 
(Annual Report, Audit Office, 1996) 
 
It seemed that the record keeping techniques were not reviewed, allowing 
for sloppiness which in turn allowed for fraudulent practices.  
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In effect these bureaucrats were not held to account by the respective 
Ministers of Finance (Peter Stinson during 1970-1987), Ah Koy (1987-1992) and 
Kubuabola (1992-1997) for their responsibility to properly account for 
expenditures and by the respective Ministers for management of resources 
entrusted to them via Parliamentary appropriations.  The Auditors-General were 
able to reveal these practices but did not have the statutory powers to take any 
action against the offenders.  Hence transparency without authority to sanction 
conduct is an empty gesture (Roberts, 2001a) because the AG did not have the 
power to sanction the offenders and those who had did not impose the sanctions. 
Details provided by Auditor-General Datt in his Reports over the 1987-
1995 period appeared to be powerful revelations of a trend that the practice of 
mismanagement was acceptable.  The disclosures created a perception, perhaps a 
social reality that the public sector managers had little respect for accountability 
obligations (Herda, 1999).  This created a difficult environment for those who 
sought real audit and accountability.  Transparencies occurred making auditee 
conduct visible but, without consequences, resulting in unintelligent 
accountability (Roberts, 1991) because there was failure to hold the bureaucrats 
(auditees) to account.  
The media’s publicity of these disclosures raised alarm in some sectors of 
the public and calls were made for greater accountability (discussed in theme 8.5).  
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8.5 Theme 4: Lack of Action 
Despite the revelation of corrupt practices and mismanagement of funds in the 
Audit Reports and the media’s extensive publication of these events, the relevant 
authorities appeared to take little or no action.  The apparent disregard of practices 
such as the use of public sector resources for personal benefits instead of for 
public benefit created a lack of real accountability.  Transparency was there, 
sanction was not.  The lack of action on the part of the government or the Heads 
of Departments promoted the practices of mismanagement.  
8.5.1 Ongoing mismanagement  
The existence of mismanagement of resources continued even though it had been 
reported by the Auditor-General over a number of years (Annual Report, Audit 
Office, 1988).  Claims were made by some interviewees that despite these reports 
no action was taken and no-one was held accountable:  
The Auditor General provides details on how government departments and 
some government ministers waste and mismanage public sector  resources, 
for example the Auditor-General provided detail(ed) reports on how the 
managers at Fiji National Bank misused the public funds in assisting Fijian 
and Rotumans to participate in commerce from 1982 till 1993 but no 
action was taken during this period. (Senior Parliamentarian, August, 
2005) 
 
This interviewee expressed two concerns: (i) ‘no-one was held 
accountable’ and (ii) the case of waste and mismanagement was ‘not debated in 
the Parliament’ when mismanagement was disclosed during this period.  
An example is, the case of fraud and mismanagement at the National Bank 
of Fiji  (NBF). This was  initially revealed by Auditor-General Bhim during the 
Ratu Sir Mara led government’s time in power in 1982 (Annual Report, Audit 
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Office, 1983) and continued till NBF’s ‘near collapse in 1995’ (Asian 
Development Bank Report on NBF, 2002, p. 8) during the Rabuka led regime.  
All reports appeared to have been overlooked by the Parliament and the PAC 
during 1992-1995.  Despite having the role of an overseer of government accounts 
and audit reports the PAC failed to show responsibility by failing to  hold NBF 
managers to account during its audit deliberations with them and the Ministry of 
Finance officers.  Parliament’s reluctance to debate this issue or to instigate 
further action when both the Ratu Sir Mara and the Rabuka governments were in 
power cannot be explained as anything other than their effort to conceal this case.  
In May 1987 after the Rabuka led military coup, the PAC was suspended 
(Annual Report, Audit Office, 1993;  Public Accounts Committee Report, 1994) 
hence there was no Parliamentary Select Committee to oversee the government 
accounts and deliberate on the 1987-1991 audit reports.  During the 1987-1991 
period the audit reports and findings have been viewed as account keeping only, 
thereby creating an ‘appearance’ of accountability (Roberts, 2003).    
The Ministry of Finance, whose accounting officer’s responsibility was to 
hold the managers to account for improper record keeping appeared to overlook 
the findings of the audit reports.  As such, accounting took place without moral 
input from the source (Roberts, 1996) as the accounting officers appeared not to 
address the concerns of improper records keeping during the 1982-1994 period.  It 
was only after 1995 that the Rabuka led government instigated police inquiry 
amidst media reports of fraud at NBF (Grynberg, Munro, & White, 2002).  
The Auditor-General ‘acts on behalf of the Parliament’ (Fiji Constitution 
1970, 1990, 1997) and transmits his audit findings and opinions to the Parliament 
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for deliberation.  The expectation is that during and after the deliberations 
Parliament will hold the accountors to account and impose sanctions on improper 
conduct.  Unfortunately, the process of holding the accountors to account and 
imposing sanctions again appeared not to take place as illustrated by the concerns 
expressed by a senior member of the audit office staff and a media reporter: 
Compiling detailed audit report(s) takes resources and time. We did this to 
make the public sector effective but so far we have not been successful 
because no-one was held responsible for misuse of resources. (Senior 
Audit Officer, Audit Office, July, 2005) 
 
I have highlighted the extensive audit reports of mismanagement of 
resources by government departments for the benefit of everyone but 
neither the government nor the ministers have taken any action to improve 
on use of resources. (Senior Reporter, Media, August, 2005) 
 
The editor of Fiji’s premier newspaper the Fiji Times was of the view that 
no one was held accountable for the mismanagement of resources during the 
1990s: 
The rule of law apparently has not been brought to bear upon those who 
tried to subvert the system. There appears no inclination on the part of 
those who have been entrusted with managing public funds to be 
accountable. (Fiji Times Editorial Comment, 1996, October 31, p. 6) 
 
One of the participants pointed out that there was a lack of accountability 
following the 1987 coups and during the 1990s and suggested that the problems 
will be reduced only when the civil service becomes accountable.  It is the case 
perhaps because the ‘positive discrimination policy’ implemented in 1992 
discouraged civil servants from fulfilling moral obligations attached to their 
responsibilities.  
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The civil servants can become more accountable if a socialising form of 
accountability co-exists with the current hierarchical form, thus empowering frank 
and open discussion between the accountor and the accountee.  The government 
and the policy makers perhaps can consider setting rules, which allow the 
accounting officers or any civil servant to report misuse of public funds to a 
higher authority without fear of reprisals or dismissal. A senior member of the 
Parliament called for greater accountability in the Fijian public sector: 
The reports on mismanagement of public funds and resources will be 
reduced only when the public servants, the Ministers and the Government 
become accountable. We need accountability in the public service and it 
has to start from the government. (Senior Parliamentarian, August, 2005)  
 
A constant comparison of the text (Riceour, 1981) exposes that the 
Ministers and the Government overlooked the audit findings or did not take them 
seriously enough to take corrective action.  The responsibility lies with the 
Ministers to ensure that the resources appropriated to their ministries are used for 
the intended purpose.  If the resources in a Ministry are mismanaged then the 
Minister is empowered to seek answers.    The lack of action on the part of the 
Ministers and the government indicates that the Westminster system of 
accountability appears to have been used as a facade for real accountability.  The 
hierarchical reporting structure encrusted the real events allowing the Ministers 
and the government to use accounting reports as accountability (Roberts 1996) 
without being morally responsible for their actions.  
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8.5.2 Accounting system  
The 1983 Audit Reports recommended that the accounting system used by some 
public sector entities needed to be improved.  The Auditor-General Bhim (1970-
1984) made this recommendation because his investigations revealed that the 
system used by some of the entities slowed the processes of compiling data and 
the preparation of annual reports (Fiji Times, June 13, 1983).    
The media reported: 
The 1981 report -- The Public Accounts Committee has recommended that 
the Fijian Affairs Board’s accounting system should be updated and 
modernized so that proper records are kept and accounts are prepared 
before audits--. The Committee – says the Boards accounting system was 
unsatisfactory.  (Fiji Times, June 13, 1983, p. 3) 
 
The PAC members and the Auditor-General shared these concerns and 
suggested that there was a need to improve the accounting system in use.  The 
following comment was made by a participant on ‘how’ the existing accounting 
system of some of the public sector entities could be improved:  
During our compliance audits over the 1970-1993 period we have 
commented on the inappropriateness of the accounting system used by 
(the) majority of the entities. We have continuously recommended changes 
to the systems, like recording dates and actual amounts, doing 
reconciliations on a regular basis, updating journals, using ledgers,   even 
using computers. (Senior Audit Officer, Audit Office, July, 2005) 
 
Despite the concerns raised by the Auditor-General and the PAC that the 
accounting system used by some of the public sector entities needed 
improvements, the government took no action.  For example, Auditor General 
Bhim raised concerns as early as 1976 on the inadequacy of the accounting 
system used by the Public Works Department and the PSC (Annual Reports- 
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Audit Office, 1976; 1979).  Both Auditor-General Datt and the PAC members 
raised similar concerns about the Ministry of Education, Central Division 
Drainage Board and the Suva City Council (Public Accounts Committee Report 
1985; Annual Reports- Audit Office, 1983).  The Auditor-General can reveal the 
inappropriateness of the accounting system and the consequences of using them 
but is not in a position to impose any changes.  
While the audit reports have disclosed mismanagement of funds for more 
than twenty years, no one appears to have taken any action.  The participants 
claimed that there were no follow up actions taken on the Auditor-General’s 
suggestions for improvement.  This reinforces the perception that the veneer of 
accountability obfuscates real events with people failing to act on what accounting 
reveals.   
8.6 Theme 5: Call for Accountability    
In the process of discharging the accountability entrusted to the Auditor-General 
via the Fijian Constitutions (1970, 1990, 1997), the Auditors-General, (both Bhim 
and Datt) called for greater public sector accountability during 1970-1992.  They 
made these calls despite serving under indigenous Fijian governments (Ratu Sir 
Mara and Rabuka) and despite the military coups.  Such calls were  inspired by 
the results of audit investigations and outcomes (Annual Report, Audit Office, 
1994) and exogenous influences [trends in Australia and New Zealand] (Annual 
Report- Audit Office, 1993).  Other interested parties like the media and the PAC 
also called for the government to change the way in which public sector resources 
were managed:  
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On various occasions over the 1970-1995 period the media has published 
Audit Report excerpts containing irregularities found in the record keeping 
by government departments and mismanagement of resources. Such 
reports are common and such occurrences were a regular feature of the Fiji 
public service. The public servants should not have been allowed to 
continue like this for over two decades. Someone has to take some action 
to reduce the mismanagement and waste. (Senior Media Reporter, August, 
2005) 
 
The call for follow-up actions appeared to be weak because the ‘callers’ 
such as the media reporters’ and the Auditor-General were not able to effectively 
lobby for the support of the powerful authorities such as the Ministers and the 
Parliamentarians.  The two powerful groups appeared not to care because they 
used the audit reports to shield themselves from their responsibility to be 
answerable for their (in) actions.  These groups had the backing of the Fijian 
chiefs and after 1987 coup, the powerful Fijian military.  The Indo-Fijian Auditor-
General (Datt) did not have such support and therefore was comparatively weak, 
yet perhaps overly optimistic in the belief that he could hold the auditees to 
account and influence changes in public sector audit practices.  
The media claimed: 
the 1991 audit findings reveal that white collar crimes have reached 
alarming proportions and it is of great concern that there is a lack of action 
by the authorities and the government should be held accountable for this. 
(‘Auditor-General’s Report’, Editorial Comment, Fiji Times, August 14, 
1993, p. 3) 
 
The Auditor-General used accounting to reveal the conduct of the 
accountors to the government but the government failed to impose any sanctions.  
Members of the PAC supported the Auditor-General’s calls for follow up 
actions on the use of public sector resources as detailed in the contents of audit 
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reports.  The PAC’s recommendation for follow-up actions seemed to be ignored 
by the authorities:   
The Audit Reports have continuously over the 1970 -1995 period and even 
afterwards stated that the government departments and ministries need to 
better manage their resources, so that waste can be minimized and public 
resources used in a better way. We have supported this call by the Auditor-
General and have recommended that action be taken against ministers 
whose departments waste resources. (Public Accounts Committee 
Member, August, 2005) 
The PAC’s and the media’s support strengthened the Auditor-General’s 
position in calling for more public sector accountability during 1980-1990.  
8.7 Theme 6: Calls for Changes  
Auditor-General Datt called for changes to: (i) incorporate performance audits as  
part of public sector audits and  (ii) the 1970 Audit Act (Annual Reports-Audit 
Office, 1993, 1994).  
8.7.1 Incorporate performance audit   
Auditor-General Datt had recommended ‘performance auditing to promote public 
sector accountability in 1980 and reiterated the call in 1992 and 1993’ 
(Parliamentary Paper 26/92 p.2; Annual Reports- Audit Office, 1980, 1983).  The 
following claim summarises the views held by Audit office staff:  
To improve public sector productivity and to hold the civil servants 
accountable the Auditor-General has for quite some time suggested 
changes in the way public sector auditing is undertaken. His suggestion 
was to introduce the ‘value for money audit’. Such audits will report on 
how the public funds were used to achieve the set objective of the entity. 
This is one way of making sure that the department heads use the public 
funds for their specified purpose. (Senior Audit Officer, Audit Office.  
July, 2005) 
AG Datt claimed: 
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Audit would no longer be confined to accounting records but also in 
seeing that value for money is obtained from the expenditure of public 
funds. (Parliamentary Paper 26/92, p. 2) 
 
Datt aspired to expand financial attest and budgetary compliance audits to 
include performance audits in order to comment on effective and efficient 
management of public funds.  In the 1993-1994 period PAC members under the 
Chairmanship of Khaiyum (National Federation party) supported Datt in this:   
The Committee strongly supports that value for money audits should be 
done so that parliament can be informed whether or not the expenditure of 
public funds has achieved the desired objectives. It therefore recommends 
that budgetary provisions be made for such audits. (Public Accounts 
Committee Report for 1991/1990; Parliamentary Paper 36/94) 
 
Unfortunately, this view though published in Reports and tabled in the 
Parliament in 1994 was not strong enough to get an immediate reaction.  The Indo 
Fijian dominated Opposition, National Federation Party, was politically too weak 
to take up AG Datt’s call for changes.  
Datt’s calls for the introduction of performance audit were answered in 
1996 through the technical assistance provided by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) (Staton & Partners, 1997).  In allowing Datt to make such calls for 
changes to public sector auditing the Rabuka government attracted ADB funding.  
The Fijian Audit Office was used as a beacon of democracy to get financial and 
technical aid. 
The calls for expanding compliance audit to performance audit during 
1992-1995 period were made on the understanding that the changes would 
promote the management of public sector resources in an economic, efficient and 
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effective manner.  Accompanying the call for such audits was the suggestion for 
changes to the 1970 Act.   
 
8.7.2 1970 Audit Act change proposal  
Auditor-General Bhim proposed changes to the 1970 Act as early as 1981.  He 
claimed:       
It is important to note that since the Audit Act was legislated in 1969, 
various changes have taken place in the field of audit with increasing 
emphasis on the three E’s namely economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
of the public sector. (Parliamentary Paper 4/1981) 
 
 
A similar claim was made twelve years later by AG Datt in 1993: 
It was mentioned in para 1.3, Volume 1 of the 1992 Audit Report that 
correspondence and discussions had continued with the officers of the 
Ministry of Finance on possible changes to the Audit Act. These changes 
had been reported as far back as 1981, and repeated in 1984 and in 1990. 
(Annual Report, Audit Office, 1993) 
 
Both the AGs, although serving a decade apart, claimed that the 1970 
Audit Act was weak in mandating only financial attest and compliance to budget 
audits and should be reviewed to include performance audit.  To strengthen his 
argument, AG Datt pointed to international precedent:  
Particularly members of the Commonwealth have even revised their Audit 
Laws in recent years to give statutory support to performance audits. 
(Annual Report, Audit Office, 1992) 
 
As a part of the Commonwealth countries, the Auditor-General Datt opined that 
Fiji should not be left behind with respect to audit developments.   
In support of AG Datt’s call:  
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The Committee again recommended changes to the Audit Act when it 
considered the Audit Reports for 1990-1991 in October, 1993. (Public 
Accounts Committee Report, 1993) 
 
It is likely that both the Auditor-General and the PAC called for changes 
to the 1970 Audit Act because of their concern that the Auditor-General was not 
able to hold the public sector managers accountable for use of the budgetary 
appropriations as discussed in section 8.3.  The Auditor-General discharges his 
role through audit investigations, forming and presenting his opinions to the 
Parliament.  The PAC discharges its role by seeking clarifications from the 
managers of public sector entities on the concerns raised by the Auditor-General 
in the Audit Reports but neither have the power to impose sanctions on offending 
bureaucrats.  
Neither the Ratu Sir Mara led Alliance government nor the Rabuka led 
undemocratic government supported the call for changes to the 1970 Audit Act 
during the 1980-1995 period.  The lack of Government support for change in the 
provisions of the 1970 Audit Act indicates that there was no motivation to further 
investigate issues arising from the audit of the financial accounts.  That is the 
transparency in financial accounts was not matched by transparency in calls for 
statutory changes.  
8.8 Summary   
The textual interpretations reveal that Auditors-General (Bhim 1970-1984, Narain 
1984-1987, Datt 1987-1997) were constrained in holding the public sector 
managers and Ministers to account due to staff shortage and lack of funding.  The 
political instability caused by the two 1987 coups added to this.  The coups 
exposed the dominance of the tribal Fijian political structure.  The demands for 
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indigenous political supremacy over public sector efficacy indicated that the 
governments in power after the coup were not keen to be held to account by the 
Auditor-General.      
 During 1970-1984 AG Bhim disclosed a lack of compliance to the 
budgetary appropriations by the auditees.  He also exposed mismanagement of 
funds and the practice of inappropriate record keeping by performing the financial 
attest audits.  AG Narain made similar disclosures during his tenure (1984-1987).  
When AG Datt took Office in 1987, he continued with financial attest and 
budgetary compliance audits.  The findings and reports of these audits revealed 
the same trends that existed prior to his tenure.  These frequent revelations 
symbolised the insufficiency of financial attest and budgetary compliance 
reporting to hold the public sector managers accountable.  
During the 1970-1995 period, the three Auditors-General used accounting 
to make visible the conduct of the accountors (auditees).  Despite this neither the 
Government nor the Parliament appeared to take these visibilities created by audit 
reports seriously enough to sanction the conduct of the auditees.  This indicated 
that social structures contributed towards constituting the acceptance of 
metaphorical use of language (Myers, 1994). 
 From 1970 to April 1984, the indigenous Fijian dominated Ratu Sir Mara 
government appeared to overlook the visibilities laid out by the audit findings.  
The bureaucrats therefore were not sanctioned and audit reports were of no 
consequence.  The 1987 coups caused political instability, subjugating democracy. 
The interim caretaker government (1987-1992) and the Rabuka led undemocratic, 
military backed government (1992-1997) were not keen to be held to account by 
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the Auditor-General. Instead audit was used by the former to deflect 
accountability.   Auditor-General Datt’s effort to hold this government to account 
therefore was inconsequential.  Accounting took place but was not followed by 
sanctions thus subverting real accountability (Roberts, 1991).  
Auditors-General Bhim in 1980 and Datt in 1990 suggested that the Audit 
Office adopt the practice of performance audits.  They were drawing on their 
international associations (INTOSAI and SPAISAI) to place pressure on the Fijian  
government organisations to agree to performance auditing.  The PAC members 
and the media agreed with the Auditor-General that the Audit Office should adopt 
performance auditing.  
The evaluation of historical events (970-1995) reveal that Auditor-General 
Datt and his perception of a lack of public sector accountability drove the 
emergence of performance auditing.  The adoption of such audits would allow the 
Auditor-General to investigate the management and use of public sector resources 
in terms of identifiable outputs even though they do  not necessarily address the 
problems associated with corruption and mismanagement of resources.  
The interpretation of ‘accountability’ associated with performance auditing 
is furthered by extending the hermeneutic circle to incorporate implementation of 
performance audit in the Fijian public sector during the 1995-1997 periods.  The 
next chapter reveals the implementation process. 
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Chapter 9 Results and Analysis:  
Implementation of Performance Auditing (1995-1997)13 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the text and the contexts that led to the implementation of 
performance auditing are explored.  The explorations are presented under the 
theme ‘exogenous pressure’ and subsequent sub-themes.  These are the entry 
points to the hermeneutics circle.  The researcher’s pre-understandings of the 
Fijian socio-political history are fused with the text and the context for 
interpretations.  The explorations explicate what happened, and how and why it 
happened to provide an evaluation of the implementation phase thus closing the 
hermeneutic circle and allowing for critical reflections informed by Roberts’ 
expositions of critical accountability.   
9.2 Discussion and Analysis 
The analysis concerns the exogenous factors and events that influenced Auditor-
General Datt to implement the practice of performance auditing and how he put 
the practice in place.  The participants views on factors such as; the requirements 
of the funding agency (the Asian Development Bank), the Consultants hired by 
the Bank, public sector reform requirements are interpreted.  Both, the 
performance auditing implementation process and AG Datt’s reactions to these 
factors are evaluated to illuminate an understanding of how transparency was 
                                                 
13 The period 1995-1997 is considered as the implementation phase because it was in 1995 that ADB provided funding, and 
performance auditing was undertaken in 1996 and mid 1997; it was discontinued towards the end of 1997.  The 
implementation process was undertaken during Auditor-General Datt’s tenure.    
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substituted for accountability (Roberts, 1991, 1996, 2009, 2010).  The chapter is 
organised as follows.  The exogenous factors that influenced the implementation 
of performance audits are evaluated, followed by an analysis of the 
implementation of such audits at the Customs Department and Colonial War 
Memorial Hospital.  The final section provides a summary of the major findings 
of the implementation phase.  
9.3 Theme 1: Exogenous Pressure 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been an influential ‘change agent’ in 
Fiji by lending funds and providing technical assistance for major economic 
developments (Appana, 2003; McMaster, 2001).  As part of its lending 
requirements the Bank requires the recipient to demonstrate accountability by 
accounting for how they manage and use funds (Sarker & Pathak, 2003) thus 
seeking apparent transparency (Roberts, 2003).  As far as ADB-funded projects 
were concerned the Fiji Audit Office acted as a monitoring agent for the Bank by 
undertaking audits of Bank-funded projects (Asian Development Bank, Technical 
Assistance Report, [TAR] 1995a).   
 Sub-theme 1.1: Audit of ADB-funded projects 
The ADB required the Fijian Audit Office to audit the projects it funded in Fiji, 
under its ‘Project Administration and Technical Assistance Implementation 
Program’ (TAR 1995, p. 1).  Such an audit requirement was an attempt to foster 
accountability from the recipient and to monitor whether the project 
implementation met the ADB’s lending criteria (Knapman & Saldanha, 1999).  
The lending criteria generally required that the approved funds be spent to achieve 
project objective/s and completion within the specified time (ADB Report, 
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1995b).  The ADB was thus seeking apparent transparency as accountability 
(Roberts, 1991, 2010).   
The ADB’s internal auditor expressed reservations about the Fiji Audit 
Office’s capabilities of undertaking audits of Bank-funded projects.  In his 1994 
Report, he noted: 
Under the, “Auditing and Reporting Standards of Borrowers’ Auditors”, 
the Bank’s Office of the Auditor found that Fiji was a poor performer, 
with delayed submission of audited financial statements and uncertainties 
over standards used by auditors. (TAR, 1995, p. 1) 
 
In 1994 when the Rabuka led undemocratic government and the Fiji Audit 
Office jointly made a request to the ADB for funding to implement performance 
auditing (Annual Report- Audit Office, 1996), the Asian Development Bank made 
the following comment:   
Following a request made to the Bank in 1994 by the Fijian Government, 
[Rabuka led] a small scale technical assistance (TA) proposal to assist the 
Office of the Auditor-General in developing a performance audit system 
was included in the Bank’s 1995 program. Following further discussions 
in Fiji, it was agreed with the government that a larger project was more 
appropriate to address the needs more adequately, with a greater focus on 
improving current operations and strengthening the Office’s capabilities to 
audit Bank-funded projects. (ADB, TAR, 1995, p. 1) 
 
Instead of a small scale project, ADB provided the Fiji Audit Office with a 
larger project for two reasons.  These were: (i) to improve the capability of the Fiji 
Audit Office so that the Office could audit the Bank-funded projects and act as a 
monitoring agent for the Bank and (ii) to assist the Fiji Audit Office in developing 
a performance audit system.  The real transparency required was thus expanded.  
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 As the funding agency, the ADB played a significant role in the 
implementation of performance auditing in Fiji.  The following section focuses on 
how the Bank influenced the Fiji Audit Office and the Rabuka led government to 
implement performance auditing.  
 Sub-theme 1.1.1: Technical assistance  
In providing technical assistance to the Fiji Audit Office, the Asian Development 
Bank and the Rabuka led Government reached ‘an understanding regarding the 
objectives, scope, terms of reference and implementation and financing 
arrangements regarding the TA14 project’ (TAR, 1995, p. 1).  The discourse that 
follows will focus on: (i) what the objective, scope and implementation 
arrangements were and (ii) how these contributed towards the implementation of 
performance auditing.  It reveals an expanded range of information for which the 
Fiji government and the public sector managers were held to account.  
Sub-theme 1.1.2: Objectives of technical assistance  
The discussion here explains the objective of the 1995 Technical Assistance 
project to provide an insight into how the Asian Development Bank used, audit 
staff retraining, providing for professional development programs and proposing 
changes to the 1970 Audit Act   to serve the interests of the Audit Office, and in 
doing so served its own interests.  
The objective of the Technical Assistance project as agreed by the Bank 
and the Fiji Government was to: 
                                                 
14 The ADB had undertaken a ‘fact finding mission on the Fiji Audit Office’ before providing the funding for the technical 
assistance request from the Fijian government and the Fiji Audit Office.  During the fact finding mission the Bank had 
made several observations regarding the constraints faced by the Fiji Audit Office which contributed to the Office’s poor 
performance. These included staffing, structure of the Office, lack of planning and management. These findings were 
discussed with the Fiji Auditor-General (TAR, 1995).  
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Improve OAG’s 15  operations so that it can adequately discharge its 
constitutional, statutory, and public accountability obligations. These 
include completing audits and providing opinions, together with reporting 
on the performance of public sector entities and on the outcome of major 
aid-funded projects. (TAR, 1995, p. 2)   
 
In order to achieve this, the ADB and the Rabuka led government jointly 
identified and prescribed ‘three key activities’ which had to be addressed by the 
technical assistance team (TAR, 1995, p. 3).  This agreement between the two 
parties created an interdependency of the two in ensuring the successful 
completion of the project.  This also constitutes a political agreement between an 
indigenous Fijian government that is known for promoting the rights of native 
Fijians and a donor agency supposedly operating on the principles of democracy.  
The interactions and amongst these parties create the potential for conflicts and 
co-operation (Sud, 2008; Kinsella, 2006) and will shape the operations of the 
Audit Office.  
The first activity was to expand the Auditor-General’s mandate to 
incorporate performance auditing.  That is, the Auditor-General was to be 
constitutionally empowered to undertake traditional financial statement and 
compliance to budget as well as performance audits.  The latter served the interest 
of the Auditor-General in fostering accountability by public sector managers for 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness.   
The second was to improve the standard of auditing practices at the Audit 
Office by providing the audit staff with training to improve financial audit skills 
and acquire performance audit skills.   
                                                 
15 OAG refers to the Office of the Auditor-General.  
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The third was to perform ADB funded projects in Fiji. As such, the Bank 
was funding the technical assistance project to use the Audit Office to serve the 
Bank’s interests in seeking whether the Fiji government (recipient) had complied 
with the ADB’s lending criteria.  
The Bank and the Rabuka led government (in 1994) had agreed that the 
objective of the technical assistance was to improve the operations of the Audit 
Office.  This agreement is important in that it reduced the likelihood of resistance 
from the Rabuka led government to the demands of the Bank, and in particular 
that the Auditor-General be given the mandate for performance auditing.  Despite 
the existence of such an agreement the Rabuka led government did not pass 
legislation that gave the Auditor-General autonomous authority to override the 
objections of management to a performance audit (Annual Report, Audit Office, 
1997).  
Sub-sub theme: 1.1.2.1 Staff training and development 
One of the key findings of the previous chapter was that the Auditor-General’s 
authority was constrained by factors such as lack of staffing and funding which 
delayed the completion of some of the audits.  The 1993 Audit Report stated: 
Limited resources such as inadequate staff and fund(s) prevented this 
Office from auditing all of government as required by the 1970 Audit Act. 
(Annual Report, Audit Office, 1993, p. 18). 
  
The ADB-funded Technical Assistance project eased some of the 
constraints by providing resources for staff training.  The following is an analysis 
of events related to staff development and training that contributed towards the 
 260 
 
Auditor-General’s efforts to hold the public sector managers to account during the 
implementation of performance audits.  
Under the TA project, the Audit Office staff were trained in performance 
auditing.  The training was provided by consultants from Australia, who were 
‘selected in accordance with ADB’s Guidelines on the Use of Consultants’ (TAR, 
1995, p. 4).  The consultants were from the Australian accounting firm of Staton 
and Partners (Staton & Partners’ Report, 1997). 
Training was provided to the Audit Office staff so that they could acquire 
skills and familiarise themselves with performance auditing.  The ADB, in setting 
the scope of the technical assistance project, had demanded that the Audit Office 
staff be:  
----introduced and trained to use up-to-date audit techniques and 
procedures, increasing staff capability to undertake all aspects of auditing, 
including financial opinions and performance audit work. (TAR, 1995, p. 
3) 
 
Some of the Audit Office staff attended short-term courses in Australia:  
Australia is providing funding for short courses in effectiveness and 
efficiency auditing under its in-country training project. The content of the 
short course will be determined in consultation with the consultants16 for 
the TA project. (TAR, 1995, p. 3) 
 
Staton and Partners’ consultants based at the Audit Office in Fiji provided in-
house training to the audit staff (Staton and Partners, 1997).  A senior Audit 
Office staff member made the assertion:   
                                                 
16 The TA provided three-four consultants from Australia for both financial and performance auditing (TAR, 1995, pp. 5-
6). 
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We were provided with hands-on training; Mr Woodgate (consultant 
auditor) used performance audit manuals and case studies to illustrate how 
performance auditing was undertaken. We worked in teams and that was 
useful. (Senior Audit Staff, July, 2005) 
 
Another Audit Office staff member offered the following opinion:  
The Australian consultant Mr. Woodgate provided a group of us with 
hands-on training to undertake performance auditing. We used case studies 
and developed manuals. Once we acquired the skills necessary for 
performance auditing, only then did we engage in this type of audit. 
(Senior Audit Officer, Audit Office, July, 2005)  
  
Overseas training for staff in countries like Australia, New Zealand and 
the U.S. indicated that pressure for Fiji’s return to democracy from these countries 
was easing as overseas ‘aid’ to Fiji was suspended after the 1987 coups.  It also 
indicated the willingness of these countries to support the Fiji Audit Office to 
strengthen its oversight role.  
The audit staff were trained to improve their financial audit skills and to 
acquire practical skills such as auditing for managers performance based on 
resource management in terms of input, output and outcomes to undertake 
performance audit investigations.  The ranges of views expressed by the 
participants indicate that the Auditor-General’s accountability to Parliament was 
strengthened by these early steps to ensure that the staff were sufficiently skilled. 
These skills acquired by the performance auditors can be interpreted as the 
development of  the operational capability of the Fijian Audit Office (Sud, 2008).  
 Sub-theme 1.1.2.2: Exogenously imposed changes to legislation  
The Asian Development Bank required that the consultants from Staton and 
Partners and the Fijian Auditor-General provide a progress report on the 
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institutional strengthening activities of the Audit Office to the relevant authorities.  
The reports exposed the need for changes to policies and legislation relevant to 
the operations of the Audit Office (Staton & Partners, 1997).  This exposition 
provided strong support for changes to the 1970 Audit Act and to sections 167 and 
168 of the 1990 Constitution.  The proposed changes to the 1970 Audit were to 
empower the Auditor-General to undertake performance audits and changes to the 
sections of the Constitution were to empower him to submit the Audit Reports to 
the Parliament instead of to the Minister for Finance.    
The Technical Assistance Report under the section ‘Implementation 
Arrangement’, stated:      
The consultants, together with the Auditor-General, will review the 
success of each component (of the project). They will report to the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the Bank on the 
progress in improving the operations of the OAG. (TAR, 1995, p. 3) 
 
To meet this demand the Fiji government and the TA project team formed a 
Steering Committee.  The membership of the Committee was comprised of 
representatives from: (i) the Ministry Finance and Economic Development, 
responsible for developing and implementing economic policies on behalf of the 
government, implementing and monitoring the application of Public Finance and 
Management Act within the various government departments and ministries, and 
for developing the government budget; (ii) the Public Service Commission (PSC), 
responsible for the recruitment and dismissal of the employees of the public 
service and for the enactment of the various legislation in Fiji; (iii) Staton 
Partners’ consultants hired by the Asian Development Bank to execute the 
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technical assistance; (iv)  the Asian Development Bank representative and (v) the 
Auditor-General and the deputy Auditor-General (Staton & Partners 1997).  
The members of the Steering Committee met at regular intervals to discuss 
the progress reports  indicating  the possibilities of a socialising form of 
accountability (Roberts, 1996).  During their discussions the members of the 
Committee had the opportunity to engage in open dialogue, exchange ideas, ask 
questions and seek clarifications (Roberts, 1996) thus meeting the demands of the 
ADB to improve the audit capabilities of the Fijian Audit Office.    
The aim of the Steering Committee was ‘to deal with any policy issues 
that might arise from the assistance and to be informed of the progress of the 
technical assistance’ (Staton & Partners, Institutional Strengthening Final Report, 
1997, p. 6) provided by the Bank.  The Steering Committee therefore could 
influence changes to audit practices in Fiji.  
To carry out the TA project, Staton and Partners divided the ‘technical 
assistance provided by the Australian consultants to the Audit Office into five 
tasks’17, (Staton & Partners, Institutional Strengthening Final Report, 1997, p. 5).  
For each of these the Steering Committee was provided with reports before, 
during and after the completion of each of the tasks (Staton & Partners, Minutes 
of Steering Committee Meeting, 1997).   As such, this Committee appeared to be 
potentially influential in bringing changes at the Audit Office.  
                                                 
17 The tasks as stated in the Executive Summary of the Staton and Partners’ Final Report (p. 2) were: (i) enhancement of 
performance audit and performance management; (ii) enhancement of computer capabilities; (iii) a review of the OAG 
procedures and practices; (iv) improvement of financial audit capabilities; and (v) strengthening of the Office and audit 
portfolio management of the OAG’s capabilities. 
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During the meetings, the consultants and the Auditor-General reported to 
the Committee on the progress made in each of the tasks and on issues arising 
from the technical assistance requiring ‘policy changes’.  The first part of the 
minutes of the third meeting of the Steering Committee stated the progress with 
operational strengthening of the Audit Office was positive and was within the 
timeframe set by Staton and Partners’ (Staton & Partners, p. 34).  The second part 
stated ‘policy changes have to be made to the Constitution and to the 1970 Audit 
Act so that the changes to the Audit Office arising from the technical assistance 
could be sustained’ (Staton & Partners, Minutes of Meeting, July, 1996, p. 34). 
One of the policy changes suggested by the Australian consultant was 
amending the 1970 Audit Act to allow the Auditor-General to report directly to 
the legislature instead of the Ministry of Finance. This could have resolved the 
delay in submitting the Annual Audit Report to the Fijian Parliament.  
The Steering Committee was also instrumental in bringing the proposed 
changes to section (12) of the 1970 Audit Act which resolved the problems of 
delayed submission of Annual Audit Reports to the Parliament by the Minister of 
Finance.  In October 1998, the Parliament passed the Audit Amendment Act No. 7 
of 1998.  This amendment required the Auditor-General ‘to submit the Annual 
Audit Reports or any report made by him to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives who shall then lay it before the House’ (Audit Amendment Act 7 
of 1998).  The Auditor-General was responsible to the Parliament, not to the 
Minister of Finance, thus symbolizing the independence of the Audit Office from 
relying on the  Minister of Finance to table the Annual Audit Report (Prasad and 
Mir, 2002; David, 2001).   
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The Australian consultant and Auditor-General Datt had proposed changes 
to the 1970 Audit Act to the Steering Committee, to provide the Auditor-General 
with powers to undertake public sector performance auditing.  A discussion paper 
on this was presented to the Steering Committee Meeting in November, 1996.  
Upon receiving the discussion paper the Steering Committee suggested that:  
----the ‘discussion paper’ should be presented to the Ministry of Finance 
for further discussion and then tabled in the Parliament. (Staton & Partners 
Report: Steering Committee Minutes, November, 1996, p. 35) 
 
The ‘discussion paper’ included ‘the Audit Mandate to cover all public sector 
enterprises and encompass performance auditing’ (Staton and Partners, p. 34), 
was submitted to the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (Staton & 
Partners, 1997) and also to the Ministry of Finance by  Deputy Auditor-General 
Vatuloka (Auditor-General’s Annual Report, Audit Office, 1997).  The 
interpretation is that the submission to these two influential agencies is as much a 
political process as a procedural one.  Procedural in the sense that the Ministry of 
Finance is the government’s agency responsible for changes to financial 
regulations and hence is the first point of call. Political in the sense the Ministry of 
Finance (the Minister) can delay tabling the submission in the Parliament or even 
overlook the submission, as changes to the 1970 Audit Act would perhaps have 
budgetary implication. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the government 
budget which includes Audit Office budget. This practice emphasises the role the 
social structures and influential elements of public (audit) sector played (Riceour, 
1981) towards mandating performance audit. 
Despite the submissions by the Steering Committee and the Deputy 
Auditor-General to the Minister of Finance (Kubuabola) and the Chairman of the 
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Public Accounts Committee (Khaiyum), there was no revision of the 1970 Audit 
Act.  The following observation was made by the Project Team on the completion 
of the TA project: 
Most recommendations have now been implemented. However there are 
still two very important areas that require finalisation and these are review 
of the Audit Act and review of the Structure of the OAG. (Staton & 
Partners, 1997, p. 8) 
 
A senior Audit Office staff member claimed:   
The discussion document on the inclusion of performance auditing in the 
1970 Audit Act was submitted to the Ministry of Finance in 1996. The 
Audit Office and the Ministry of Finance held discussions on the 
submission but no decision was made. (Senior Auditor, Audit Office, 
August, 2005). 
 
The lack of any decision during 1996-1997 period on the amendment of 
the 1970 Audit Act to incorporate performance audit indicates the Ministry’s 
possibly the government’s reluctance towards implementation of such audits.  
This is possibly because the Ministry was not keen to increase the budgetary 
allocation to the Audit Office to sustain the costs of such audits.  As such, the 
Auditor-General and the Australian consultants efforts to seek accountabilities by 
including  non-accounting (Roberts, 1996) was prevented by the actions of the 
Minister of Finance.  
Despite the implementation of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act, which 
required that public sector entities publish auditable performance statements, the 
Ministry of Finance did not progress with the amendment to mandate performance 
audits.  This lack of progress can be linked to the fact that the Ministry was 
considering introducing the 1998 Public Finance Management Bill (the 1998 Bill) 
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which took their time and effort and it contained implication for public sector 
audit, hence the Audit Office.    The 1998 Bill contained clauses that identified the 
financial reporting requirements to be followed by the public sector entities and 
also outlined the powers and duties of the Auditor-General.  Using these 
arguments the Ministry appeared to apply delay tactics with respect to amending 
the 1970 Audit Act.  The Ministry’s actions such as delaying the revision of the 
1970 Audit Act and providing the Auditor-General with a performance audit 
mandate indicate how social structures can be used by powerful actors to 
condition and enable meaning (Myers, 1994).   
A hermeneutic-dialectic interpretation is that the Ministry of Finance 
created a problematic environment for the Audit Office to operate.  The former’s 
action prevented the Audit Office from using the new accounting such as 
performance audit, which could heighten levels of organisational transparency and 
improve accountability (Cooper & Owen, 2007; Power, 1994) by focusing on 
non-accounting measures of performance.    
Sub-theme 1.2: Exogenous influences on Audit Office reforms  
The Fiji Audit Office was influenced by contracted technical assistance providers 
in revising  the 1995 Corporate Plan and attempting the restructuring of  the Audit 
Office as required by the Asian Development Bank.  These activities were 
perceived as exogenous influences as these concerns had been raised in the 
ADB’s technical assistance report.  The Steering Committee had made 
recommendations that these be addressed by the Audit Office and the consultants 
(TAR, 1995; Staton & Partners, 1997).  The following is an analysis of how the 
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revision of the 1995 Corporate Plan and the restructure of the Audit Office 
expanded the implementation of performance audit.   
Sub-sub theme: 1.2.1 Corporate plan 
This section provides a narrative on how and why the TA project team revised the 
1995 Corporate Plan and how these events influenced the implementation process.  
The Technical Assistance Report stated:   
OAG has produced an outline of the corporate plan, but this needs to be 
developed further. (1995, p. 2) 
 
The Auditor-General and the Australian technical assistance consultants took up 
the suggestion:   
A corporate plan was prepared with subsequent amendments and handed 
over to the Deputy Auditor-General. (Staton & Partners, 1997, p. 16) 
 
A senior Audit Office staff member made the following claims regarding the 
revised corporate plan: 
The technical assistance consultants helped the senior staff to develop a 
corporate plan.  The Steering Committee endorsed the plan. We 
implemented some aspects of the plan. (Senior Auditor, Audit Office, 
August, 2005) 
 
A senior member of the Parliament made the following assertions:   
The Australian consultants developed the corporate plan for the Audit 
Office as part of restructuring the Audit Office. Scope for performance 
auditing was incorporated into the plan facilitating the Auditor-General’s 
ability to implement performance auditing. It was the influence of the 
Australian consultants. (Parliamentarian, July, 2005) 
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The revision resulted in ‘the operations of the Audit Office being divided 
into four business units’ (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1996, p. 18).  One of the 
units was called the ‘Performance Business Unit’, whose objective was to 
undertake performance audits (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1996).  
The revised corporate plan reflected Auditor-General Datt’s aspiration to 
hold the public sector managers to account using the indicators of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness.  To meet the expectations set by the revised 
corporate plan, a restructuring of the Audit Office was considered by the Project 
Team.    
Sub-sub theme 1.2.2: Attempts to Reorganise the Audit Office 
The Australian consultants and the AG Datt’s attempt to restructure the Audit 
Office was influenced by concerns raised by the ADB regarding its audit delivery 
services.  The discussion here explicates the events and how they influenced the 
implementation of performance auditing. 
  The Asian Development Bank in its ‘terms of reference’ for the technical 
assistance project stated: 
Technical assistance will advise on and support changes to the internal 
management structures and procedures designed to improve the delivery 
of audit services, and the quality of management in the Office. (TAR, 
1995, Appendix, p. 1) 
 
The consultants from Staton and Partners, while addressing the ADB’s concern, 
made the following comments: 
In the Inception Report it was indicated that the current organisation, 
structure, roles and responsibilities of line management needed to be 
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reviewed. In particular the issues that needed to be addressed regarding the 
reorganisation of the Office were: 
 the office structure should be re-organised so as to improve 
delivery of audit  services;  
 difficulties were experienced in recruiting staff with the 
necessary expertise and retaining graduates due to the lack 
of career paths; 
 a need to improve the accounting and auditing expertise of 
staff in order to deal with the complexities of the audit 
profession. An emphasis of recruiting should be based on 
University qualifications; 
 key positions were held by unqualified staff and in due 
course these should be occupied by staff holding the 
relevant qualifications who are members of the Fiji Institute 
of Accountants. (Staton & Partners, 1997, p. 31) 
 
These concerns indicate the limitations faced by the Audit Office in 
providing the audit services required of it.  Concerns regarding untrained and 
under-qualified staff were recurring (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1996) and had 
to be addressed. Reorganising the Audit Office with inappropriate staff would not 
improve the audit quality, and it would be highly unlikely that an inappropriately 
qualified person could effectively head a department.   
The Australian consultants presented these concerns to the Steering 
Committee members with 17 recommendations18 on how the concerns were being 
addressed (Staton & Partners, Minutes of Steering Committee Meeting, June, 
1997).  The Steering Committee agreed to most of the recommendations, with one 
exception, which was the implementation of the proposed restructure of the Audit 
Office.  One of the members of the Steering Committee brought to the 
Committee’s attention ‘that the request for the restructure should be processed 
through the Ministry of Finance’ (Staton & Partners, 1997, p. 32).   
                                                 
18 The text evidence I collected did not specify the 17 recommendations and I was unable to locate any documentary 
evidence of the actual recommendations.  
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One possible reason for this is funding.  The Ministry for Finance is 
responsible for the budgetary allocation and any increases would have to be 
sanctioned by the Finance Minister (Kubuabola) before Parliamentary approval is 
sought.  This provided the Minister with the right to hold back or delay approval 
for the restructure.  This is yet another example of how the Minister of Finance 
exerted power and influenced audit development in Fiji.  
The Report further stated that on the completion of the project ‘the issue of 
restructure was not resolved’ (p. 8).  The Ministry of Finance appeared to show a 
reluctance to support the restructure of the Audit Office, thus frustrating the Audit 
Office staff and perhaps the Australian consultants. This was a signal that the 
Ministry was not keen for performance auditing.   
A senior Ministry of Finance officer made the following comment 
regarding the restructure:   
It was the Auditor-General’s responsibility to ensure a resolution was 
reached on the restructure of the Audit Office in 1996. (Senior Executive 
Officer, Ministry of Finance, July, 2005). 
 
The Ministry of Finance was thus not taking ownership/responsibility for the 
restructure.  
A senior Audit Office staff member offered the following: 
The Ministry of Finance delayed the decision on restructure because the 
Audit Office had to be relocated, as the office space occupied by us was 
not suitable to set up different units. Relocating the Audit Office meant the 
Ministry had to provide us with additional funds. (Senior Auditor, Audit 
Office, August, 2005) 
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It appeared that Auditor-General Datt and the Minister of Finance 
Kubuabola did not communicate or consult with each other on how the cost of 
restructure would be financed.  Instead, each blamed the other without taking 
responsibility.  The hierarchical form of accountability allowed the Minister to 
inhibit Auditor-General Datt’s efforts to promote transparency by auditing for 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness.  The Minister’s self-serving behavior was 
possible due to asymmetrical distribution of power (Collier, 2005) that is because 
he had the ultimate authority for setting the budgetary allocation for the Audit 
Office.  
According to Staton and Partners Report ‘the Ministry of Finance and the 
Auditor-General were working on the restructure of the Audit Office’ (1997, p. 8).  
The Report contained the proposed organisational structure19 of the Audit Office.  
The proposed model indicated the need for a performance auditing department 
and its staffing needs.  
Despite the restructure plans not coming to fruition, the Auditor-General 
(AG) proceeded with performance auditing in some of the public sector entities 
(Annual Report- Audit Office, 1997).  AG Datt implemented performance 
auditing on the assumption that the restructure plan would be implemented in due 
course.  The assumption is rooted in the belief that since the proposed restructure 
was being discussed with the Ministry of Finance, the existence of the 
performance audit division would be formalised retrospectively.  
A senior staff member of the Audit Office claimed: 
                                                 
19 Attached as Appendix 4.  The restructure model has a section/division identified as performance auditing (PA) and lines 
of responsibilities and staff for the division.   
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The restructure and reorganisation plans of the Audit Office led to the 
identification of staff for the performance auditing division who undertook 
performance auditing under the leadership of Mr Woodgate, an auditor 
and consultant hired by Staton and Partners. (Senior Auditor, Audit Office, 
July, 2005) 
 
A senior media reporter observed the following: 
With the restructure of the Audit Office still under consideration, the 
Office decided to undertake performance auditing. (Senior Media 
Reporter, August, 2005) 
 
The reorganisation plan for the Audit Office was a direct outcome of the 
ADB’s concern about audit service delivery.  The Australian consultants and AG 
Datt probably assumed that the Minister of Finance (Kubuabola) would be 
influenced by the ADB’s concerns and approve the restructure but this did not 
happen.   Hence the indication is the government was deflecting Datt’s attempts to 
hold the auditees to account.  
Sub-theme 1.3: Public sector reforms - Audit requirements 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund influenced the public sector 
reforms in Fiji under the Ratu Sir Mara government (1980-1986), Ratu Sir Mara 
interim government (1987-1992) and the Rabuka government (1992-1997) 
(Kumar & Prasad, 2004).  One major outcome was the privatisation of the public 
sector commercial entities and the enactment of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act 
(McMaster, 2001).  Auditor-General Datt was influenced by the new legislation to 
proceed with the implementation of performance auditing.   
As part of the public service reforms led by the Ministry of Finance and 
the requirements of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act, the public sector entities had 
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to develop corporate plans with a focus on quantifiable objectives and outputs that 
could be measured and audited.  Within this context, the Auditor-General is 
provided with opportunities to audit the performance of the public sector entities 
under the guise of meeting the requirements of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act.  
The following evaluation explains how the requirements of the 1996 Act 
influenced the Auditor-General to do so. 
The Ratu Sir Mara government in the early 1980s initiated public sector 
reform in Fiji in an attempt to reduce the perceived public sector expansion and 
expenditure as claimed by the proponents of such reforms (McMaster, 2001; 
Sarker & Pathak, 2003; Sutherland, 2000).  In 1993, the Rabuka government, 
during its annual budget presentation, formally introduced the public enterprise 
reform package.  Fusing this text within the historical context of the 1987 coups 
and the formation of a military government, this action is interpreted as creating a 
(false) perception that the government is concerned about public sector 
expenditure.  
 There are claims that the Rabuka led government was influenced by the 
new public management trends (McMaster, 2001), and the Asian Development 
Bank’s willingness to provide technical assistance to support economic reform 
(Appana, 2003; Sarker & Pathak, 2003).  It appears that the Rabuka government 
was using the new public management phenomenon to attract funding agencies 
such as the ADB and probably others to fund economic developments in Fiji, thus 
portraying the image of a successful government that was trying to stimulate 
economic growth.  This perception was also a means of warding off international 
and national economic pressures for the restoration of Parliamentary democracy.  
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The claimed key objective of the Rabuka government’s public enterprise 
reform was to ‘ensure that public enterprises provide the taxpayers with maximum 
benefits through improved enterprise management’ (McMaster, 2001, p. 231).  To 
achieve this, the government set up a Public Enterprise Department within the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning headed by Minister Kubuabola.  The 
Department monitored the progress and performance of the public enterprise 
sector and developed policies for the implementation of its reform.  These events 
explicate how powerful elements such as the Rabuka led undemocratic 
government and Minister Kubuabola imitated public sector efficacy to appease the 
Fijian public, Auditor-General Datt, the international community and funding 
agencies (Myers, 1994).  
In 1996, the Public Enterprise Act was passed by Parliament and the 
Ministry of Public Enterprise was established.  This Act provided a legal 
framework for the public sector reforms and the government’s attempt at 
addressing three major aspects of public management: the civil service, public 
sector enterprise, and financial management.  Section 100 (subsections 1-6) of the 
1996 Public Enterprise Act is relevant to the Audit Office.  Section 100 of the 
1996 Act and its subsections state the audit requirements of state owned 
commercial companies and commercial statutory authorities, and the role of the 
Auditor-General. Section (100) (s. 5) states: 
 276 
 
---the Auditor-General can act as an auditor under subsection (3) (a)20 and 
in such cases the provisions of the Audit Act will apply. (Public Enterprise 
Act, 1996) 
 
 In providing financial statement audit services to the state owned 
companies and commercial enterprises, the Auditor General could also audit the 
performance of such entities (sections 50 and 79 of the 1996 Public Enterprise 
Act).  These sections require that the state-owned companies and commercial 
statutory entities develop and implement objectives and performance indicators 
which are output-based and are auditable.  The Auditor-General therefore, if 
required to audit state owned companies and commercial enterprises, could stretch 
his audit authority to perform audits of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
This would hold public sector managers to account in new ways.   
The provisions in section 100 (subsection 1-6) of the Public Enterprise Act 
‘do not provide a clear mandate for, and neither deny, the Auditor-General the 
power to undertake performance audits of public sector enterprises’.  However, 
the provisions of section 100 of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act specify that 
‘public sector entities prepare and submit a statement specifying quantifiable 
outputs and outcomes for audit on an annual basis’. This ambiguity can be 
interpreted as support for the ADB’s requirement that the Auditor-General be 
mandated to undertake performance audits.   
Section 100 (subsection 5, clause 3) of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act 
specifies that ‘the Auditor of a public sector enterprise shall be appointed by the 
Board of the relevant enterprise as directed by the Minister of Finance’.  The 
                                                 
20 Section 100 (s. 3 (a)) of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act states: ‘the Auditor shall be appointed by the Board and shall be- 
such person that the Minister of Finance directs the board in writing to appoint’. The Auditor-General does not have the 
power to audit the state owned enterprises and commercial companies. 
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implication is that the Board can appoint a private sector auditor and seek the 
Minister’s approval, thus excluding the Auditor-General.  
The public sector enterprise reform was taking place in the same period as 
the institutional strengthening of the Audit Office.  The ADB provided the 
technical assistance for both projects, therefore it can be reasonably construed that 
the Bank influenced section 100 (subsection 1-6) of the 1996 Public Enterprise 
Act to provide a role for the Audit Office.  
Auditor General Datt made a submission to the 1995-1996 Constitution 
Review Committee seeking a ‘mandate to audit [financial statement audit] all 
public sector enterprises in Fiji including commercial enterprises and companies’ 
(Reeves, Vakatora &Lal 1996, p. 540), and report the financial statement audit 
findings to the Parliament. In his submission Datt claimed:  
----under the 1996 Public Enterprise Act, the accounts of these entities are 
audited by private sector accountants appointed by the Board of Directors, 
whose accountability to the Parliament is not assured because the 
accountant does not report to Parliament. (Reeves et al., 1996, p. 539) 
In response to this submission the Review Committee composed of Sir 
Paul Reeves a New Zealander, Tomasi Vakatora, an indigenous Fijian and long 
serving political and Doctor Brij Lal, an Australian based academic, an  Indo-
Fijian and a former Fiji citizen, made the following recommendation.  ‘The 
Auditor-General be given these additional powers and be conferred with the 
authority to conduct modern forms of audits such as efficiency and value for 
money’ (Reeves, Vakatora, & Lal, 1996, p. 540).  Despite such recommendations 
the Auditor-General was not given the mandate for performance audit under the 
1997 Constitution, neither was the 1970 Audit Act amended to provide a mandate 
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for such audits during the 1995-1997 period by the Rabuka government.  This 
exposes the power the government has over the Audit Office and also reveals how 
a powerful institution such as the government can legitimatise its action (Sud, 
2008). 
9.4 Theme 2: Establishing Performance Audit Scope without a 
Mandate  
The Audit Office undertook performance audits in two public sector entities 
during the 1996-1997 period without a performance audit mandate; hence only 
these two entities’ reports are used as text evidence for interpreting what 
happened and why.  Senior managers at the Customs Department had raised 
concerns regarding such audits (Parliamentary Paper 60/1997, p. 15), but could 
not refuse being subjected to them because the Minister of Finance had asked for 
the audit.  Despite the absence of a mandate, the Auditor-General determined the 
audit scope using the public sector reform framework, and the audit team 
members focused on the contents of the corporate plan for both the entities they 
audited. 
The discussion in this theme focuses on how and why the implementation 
of performance auditing took place in the way it did.  Descriptions of what 
happened during the process and how it occurred will provide an insight into the 
scope of the performance audit and will reveal the power relationships pressing 
for and resisting accountability.   
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Sub-theme 2.1: Performance auditing - Customs Department21  
The Auditor-General conducted a performance audit at the Customs Department 
in 1997 on the request of the Minister of Finance Kubuabola (Parliamentary Paper 
60/1997).  The text and the context is fused with this researcher’s understanding 
of the Fijian (audit) public sector to provide interpretations of why the request was 
made, what was audited at the Customs Department, who decided what to audit 
and why, in order to reveal how the Auditor-General set the scope for such an 
audit. 
According to the Parliamentary Paper 60/1997, the Audit Office was 
approached by the Minister of Finance to conduct a performance audit into the 
affairs of the Customs Department amidst the following concerns:   
Over the past several years there have been numerous reported cases of 
poor management practices, and allegations of fraud and corruption 
occurring within Customs. Additionally there has been mounting pressure 
for improvements to be made to the operations of the Customs for other 
government agencies and industries within Fiji who are dissatisfied with 
the current levels of service. These factors have resulted in a poor public 
and stakeholder perception and an overall lack of confidence in the 
operations of Customs. (Parliamentary Paper 60/1997, p. 10)  
The following interpretation is offered.  The politically powerful Minister of 
Finance (Kubuabola) called for a performance audit of the Customs Departments.  
This Department was part of the Ministry of Finance and ultimately the Minister 
was responsible for the management and operations of the Department.  His 
action indicates that performance auditing was used in a ‘symbolic’ manner by 
him to safeguard his own reputation in the eyes of the public (Sud, 2008).  
                                                 
21 Customs was established in 1881. Customs derives its legislative authority from the Customs Act 1986, the Customs 
Excise Tariff Act 1986, and the Tax Free Zone Decree 1991. Customs also administers legislation on behalf of other 
agencies in relation to movement of goods and people into Fiji. In 1997 it was Fiji’s second largest source of income. It 
collected approximately one third of all internally generated government revenue (Parliamentary Paper 60/1997).  
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The Audit Office carried out performance auditing of the Customs 
Department for: (i) management activities and (ii) operational activities, to 
address the operational and management issues.  In order to address these issues 
the Auditor-General Datt determined: 
The primary objective for management issues was: to appraise the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the management functions at Customs. 
(Parliamentary Paper 61/1997, p. 10) 
 
He determined the scope as:   
----a review of management issues forming part of overall Civil Service 
Reform programme. (Parliamentary Paper 61/1997, p. 10) 
 
Datt’s choice of audit scope for management functions was driven by the 
public sector reform agenda because it ‘required public sector entities to develop 
and implement an output based corporate plan’ (Public Enterprise Act 1996).  As 
a result he chose to use the Custom Department’s corporate plan to determine 
whether the strategies outlined in the corporate plan were implemented 
(Parliamentary Papers 60 and 61/1997).  
In appraising the management functions at the Customs Department, Datt 
chose to determine how the corporate plan was developed and who was involved. 
The audit investigations revealed:  
The whole corporate planning process within Customs is driven by one of 
the Deputy Comptrollers. Line managers who were required to develop 
business/management plans were not actively involved in the corporate 
planning process, nor were they provided the plan or any corporate 
direction to assist them. Junior officers were not consulted at all. 
(Parliamentary Paper 61/1997, p. 13) 
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Although the Customs Department developed a corporate plan as required 
by public sector reforms, the audit revelations indicated a lack of communication 
amongst the managers and a lack of senior management’s involvement in the 
development of the corporate plan.  The revelations of a lack of cohesive group 
effort in developing the corporate plan indicated either senior management at 
Customs were not interested in the corporate plan or they were resisting the public 
sector reforms. Hence, it appears that some senior managers were resisting being 
held to account for their responsibilities as they failed to provide thus not 
committing to their unit/department’s future business plans, this in Roberts’ terms 
is obstructing transparency (1991).    
Despite being informed about the performance audit investigation, some 
senior managers had inquired about ‘the role of the Audit Office in undertaking 
such audits’ (Parliamentary Paper 60/1997, p. 15).  The inquiry was of concern to 
the Auditor-General Datt:   
Of particular concern to audit was senior managers’ view of our audit. 
Most were reluctant to formally provide information to the audit. 
(Parliamentary Paper 60/1997, p. 15) 
  
Since there was a lack of involvement of senior management in corporate 
planning, they were likely to raise concerns and to resist participating in the 
performance audit.  In their attempts to resist such audits the managers had: 
Directed some sections not to photocopy any documents under audit 
observation, and all requests for the release of files should first be directed 
to senior management. (Parliamentary Paper 60/1997, p. 15) 
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The managers’ actions indicated partial success; they could not completely resist 
participation since the Minister of Finance had directed this audit.  The Auditor-
General’s comments were nonetheless: 
My audit staff were hampered in the due discharge of their duties. 
(Parliamentary Paper 60/1997, p. 15) 
 
The lack of a performance audit mandate provided the managers with the 
opportunity to prevent full disclosures thus hindering the investigations.   
In choosing to evaluate how the corporate plan was developed and who 
developed it, Auditor-General Datt limited the scope of the performance audit 
within the requirements of the public sector reforms.  
The performance audit team did investigate the key performance 
indicators used by the managers of various units at the Customs Department to 
evaluate their performance and the performance of their divisions (Parliamentary 
Paper 61/1997, pp. 28-29).  The audit of the key performance indicators can be 
linked to the civil service reform requirements, which required the ‘public sector 
entities to develop and implement key performance indicators as part of their 
corporate planning and programme budgeting’ (Parliamentary Paper 61/1997, p. 
28), and to ‘report the performance measures to parliament at activity level in 
terms of output’ (Parliamentary Paper 61/1997, p. 29).  
The audit investigations of the performance indicators used by the 
Customs Department revealed that although Customs had set key performance 
indicators to assess its performance, the audit team ‘did not consider these as key 
indicators’ (Parliamentary Paper 61/1997, p. 29) of Customs’ performance.  The 
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audit team reached this conclusion because the indicators ‘showed the workload 
related to process instead of being output orientated and therefore their overall 
usefulness to Parliament was limited’ (Parliamentary Paper 61/1997, p. 32).  
The successful completion of the performance audit strengthened the 
Auditor-General’s ability to hold the auditees to account using both accounting 
and non-accounting measures.  This signalled to the government that the Audit 
Office could effectively contribute towards public sector efficacy and hence audits 
of economy, efficiency and effectiveness should be mandated.  This reveals that 
the Auditor-General will use his powers to influence and change the status quo 
(Thompson, 1980).  The completion also shows that performance audit can make 
real contribution to transparency by exposing how effectively the senior managers 
carried out the roles assigned to them. Such audit also has the potential to reveal 
whether the key performance indicators are suitable to measure the desired 
outcomes or not, as was the case in the Customs Department.  
Sub-theme 2.2: Implementation at the Colonial War Memorial Hospital22   
The Audit Office carried out a performance audit at the Colonial War Memorial 
hospital (CWM) in 1996, which focused on the following: 
 Hospital based manpower resources - planning and control 
of manpower needs. 
 Hospital medical and dental equipment - maintenance and 
replacement of equipment.  
 Hospital catering services - costs of meals and hygiene 
requirements for food preparation. 
 Hospital outpatient services. 
(Parliamentary Paper 8/1997, p. 2) 
 
                                                 
22 Colonial War Memorial Hospital (CWM) is the largest government owned hospital, situated in the capital (Suva).  
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This audit was undertaken against the backdrop of rising costs 23  of 
operating the hospital during the 1992-1995 period and public complaints 
regarding the services they received at the hospital (Parliamentary Paper 8/1997, 
pp. 2-3).  The exposition explains what was audited and how Auditor-General 
Datt determined the scope of the performance audit without a mandate by using 
the powerful status of the Audit Office.   
The Audit Office had liaised with the ‘Permanent Secretary for Health and 
the Medical Superintendent of the CWM Hospital to undertake performance 
auditing, and both were invited to comment on the audit findings’ (Parliamentary 
Paper 8/97, p. 3).  Such an invitation suggests the possibilities of a socialising 
form of accountability (Roberts, 1996) by bringing together the auditor and the 
auditee.  The parties have the opportunity to engage in frank dialogue on the 
objective of the audit and can come to a mutual agreement.  Documented evidence 
on whether the two parties agreed on what was to be audited could not be located, 
but during the interviews a senior audit officer claimed:  
We informed the auditee of our intention to undertake a performance audit 
at the CWM hospital. The auditee was also informed on why certain areas 
were of interest to the Audit Office. The auditee and the Auditor-General 
discussed the areas which were to be audited. (Senior Audit Officer, Audit 
Office, August, 2005) 
 
A senior Ministry of Health accounting officer commented:   
Before the performance audit, the Audit Office and our senior 
management staff had agreed on the areas of audit at the kitchen. We saw 
this as an opportunity to streamline the operations in the kitchen. (Auditee, 
Senior Accounting Officer, Ministry of Health, August, 2005) 
                                                 
23 Total operating expenditure for CWM in 1995 was $15.2 million, out of which $11.7 million were personnel costs. The 
costs of operating the Hospital had been increasing substantially since 1992. The Hospital is totally government funded, 
that is taxpayer funded (Parliamentary Paper 8/97).  
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In the absence of the mandate to undertake performance audits, Auditor-
General Datt liaised with the auditees to get their agreement on the areas to audit.  
In getting the auditees to agree to such audits the probability of the auditees’ 
resistance appeared to be reduced thus indicating the benefit of a socialising form 
of accountability.  
The Audit Office initiated the performance audit at the Colonial War 
Memorial hospital in 1996.  Although the auditees agreed to the audit being 
undertaken, the Auditor-General was instrumental in setting the scope despite not 
having the statutory power to do so.  By liaising with the auditees and setting the 
audit scope the Auditor-General was trying to create an acceptance of 
performance audit to make transparent the conduct of the auditees via non-
accounting.  
The audit team undertook an evaluation of the manpower resources at 
CWM with a focus on the strategic planning and control of manpower resources 
(Parliamentary Paper 8/1997, p. 4).  This decision was motivated by the 
requirement of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act.  The requirement was that ‘all 
public sector entities develop a corporate plan for a three to five year period’ 
(1996 Public Enterprise Act).   
Auditor-General Datt and his team performed the audit to evaluate 
whether the Hospital management had put in place a three to five year plan for the 
maintenance of existing and the demand for additional resources.  As part of the 
process of evaluating the strategic planning and control of manpower resources, 
the team compared the actual staff composition over a number of years with the 
corresponding established staff positions in those years.   
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The audit findings revealed: 
The Health Ministry did not have a long term medical manpower strategic 
plan to provide a satisfactory guide to future projections of demand on 
medical manpower. (Parliamentary Paper 8/1997) 
 
Since the auditee was invited to respond to the audit findings, the auditee (hospital 
management’s) response to the lack of planning was: 
Co-ordinated planning between the Planning Unit of the Health Ministry, 
Fiji School of Medicine, Public Service Commission (PSC) and the 
hospital was lacking in projecting target number of places for the medical 
students at Fiji School of Medicine to meet the medical manpower needs 
(Parliamentary Paper 8/1997, p. 5) 
 
The auditee response indicates that there was an opportunity for a 
socialising form of accountability between the Health Ministry, the Fiji School of 
Medicine and the PSC but the parties failed to use it.  As such this made 
transparent the lack of communication and long term planning by the relevant 
authorities responsible for the daily operation of the CWM Hospital.  
The Auditor-General recommended that the management of the hospital 
develop a long-term strategic plan for its manpower needs and the parties 
involved co-ordinate the planning and training of medical personnel.  The Health 
Ministry responded by stating that they were developing a ‘15 year Health 
Workforce Plan’ (Parliamentary Paper 8/1997, p. 5). 
The Medical Superintendent’s response to the Auditor-General’s 
recommendation was:  
More prominence needs to be given to the importance of improving the 
working conditions in order to attract and retain medical personnel. While 
Audit has highlighted the need to have a better co-ordination to train the 
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number of and type of workers the hospital needs, it would be a waste of 
resources if the hospital was unable to retain them in its system. The 
Medical Superintendent is sure a lot of private practitioners would re-join 
the service if they were offered better salaries etc. (Parliamentary Paper 
8/1997, p. 7) 
 
The Auditor-General did not have the right to determine the scope of 
performance audits but he used the requirements of the 1996 Public Enterprise 
Act to undertake an audit with limited scope.  The recommendation that the 
Hospital management develop a long term strategic plan was not only to improve 
the performance of the Hospital but was also a reinforcement of the requirements 
of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act. In doing this the Auditor-General was 
discharging his responsibility as the overseer of public sector resources.  He used 
non-accounting information to make transparent (Roberts, 2003) the lack of 
strategic planning for manpower needs by the CWM management.    
The audit staff conducted a performance audit of the ‘maintenance and 
replacement services’ of the medical and dental equipment at the CWM 
(Parliamentary Paper 8/1997, p. 8).  The audit focused on the ‘planning aspects of 
maintenance and replacement services of equipment used by the dental and 
medical departments’ (Parliamentary Paper 8/1997, pp. 8; 12). 
The performance audit findings revealed that the medical equipment 
maintenance and replacement services were provided by the ‘Biomedical 
Engineering Unit’.  The Unit had put in place ‘a Preventive Maintenance 
Programme’ and was providing the required maintenance services (Parliamentary 
Paper 8/1997, p. 8).  The Dental Department did not have any equipment 
maintenance and replacement services.  The Department did not have a workshop 
or a technician to carry out maintenance and replacement of dental equipment. 
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Dental equipment had remained unserviced over the years (Parliamentary Paper 
8/1997, p. 9). 
The Auditor-General recommended that the departments ‘develop a 
strategic plan for equipment servicing and replacement’. The Biomedical 
Unit was to be responsible for providing services to both the departments. 
(Parliamentary Paper 8/1997)   
 
The Auditor-General’s decision to focus the audit on the ‘planning 
aspects’ of services provided to the two departments is linked to the public service 
reforms that were being implemented in Fiji.  Despite having a ‘limited scope’ 
audit, Auditor-General Datt and his audit team managed to undertake performance 
audits. The completion of such audit establishes that non-accounting can 
effectively contribute in making transparent the conduct of the accountors 
(auditees). It also indicates that power relationships between the performance 
auditors and the auditees can be used to press for mandating performance audits. 
For example in the case of the CWM hospital performance audit the socialising 
form of accountability enabled the audit.  
9.5 Summary 
The interpretations provided on the implementation phase were a result of 
intertwining the text with the social, political and historical contexts and fusing 
these with this researcher’s pre-understanding of the Fijian audit environment.  
The interpretations revealed that Auditor-General Datt’s insistence on the 
implementation of performance auditing in the Fijian public sector was 
supposedly driven by exogenous factors such as the ADB’s funding requirements 
and the international public sector reform, known as New Public Management.  
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In the process of implementing performance auditing, the Steering 
Committee suggested changes to the 1970 audit legislation to mandate such 
audits.  This was met with resistance from the Minister of Finance (Kubuabola) 
who succeeded in preventing the mandate for such audit thus revealing the 
asymmetrical power relationship between the two.  
Despite the lack of a performance audit mandate and power to determine 
the scope of such audits, Auditor-General Datt and his team undertook 
performance audits in two major public sector entities: the Customs department 
and the Colonial War Memorial Hospital in 1996.  They demonstrated that they 
had the capability to effectively contribute towards improving public sector 
efficacy.  This was also a signal to the government that the Auditor General 
wanted support for performance audits to be mandated.  By undertaking such 
audits the Auditor-General used non-accounting to lay bare the activities of the 
two public sector entities (Roberts, 1991) and revealed the potential performance 
audits have for increasing transparencies.  Apparent transparency with limited 
scope occurred (Roberts, 2010) because what was audited was matched with  the 
requirements of the 1996 Public Enterprise Act and not the 1970 Audit Act.  The 
next chapter provides a discussion on how and why the practice of performance 
auditing was discontinued with accounting accepted as a substitute for 
accountability. 
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Chapter 10 Results and Analysis	
Discontinuation of Performance Auditing (1997-2000) 
 
10.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the text and the contextual stories fused with the researcher’s 
horizon are explored to explain how and why the practice of performance auditing 
was discontinued after 1997.  The exploration is organised as a theme and related 
sub-themes extending the hermeneutical enquiry to provide interpretations of how 
the proposal to empower the Auditor-General to undertake economy, 
effectiveness and efficiency audit was inhibited by legislation leading to 
discontinuation.  
In January 1998 the newly appointed Auditor-General (AG) Jacobs, like 
his predecessor, Datt, submitted a proposal for the amendment of the 1970 Audit 
Act (1970 Act) to the Ministry of Finance headed by Ratu Kubuabola.  
Simultaneously, the undemocratically elected and military backed Rabuka 
government was proposing the new 1998 Public Finance Management Bill.  The 
two proposals under consideration raised a debate on who should authorise 
performance audits, the Auditor-General or the Parliament thus creating potentials 
for tension between them. 
The events related to this debate and the roles played by parties involved 
in the enactment and the subsequent withdrawal of the 1999 Public Finance 
Management Act (1999 Act) are informed by Roberts’  (1991, 1996, 2010) 
interpretations of  critical accountability.   
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The chapter describes and evaluates the events and processes related to the 
Auditor-General’s efforts to seek a performance audit mandate, ending with a 
summary of the findings related to the discontinuation phase.  
10.2 Theme 1: Auditor-General’s Effort 
Auditor-General Datt and the Deputy Vakabua were both due to retire from the 
civil service by the end of 1997 (Staton & Partners, Steering Committee Meeting 
Minutes 11 0ctober, 1997).  They had served in their positions for almost ten 
years and appeared to be dedicated to public sector accountability.  Their 
dedication was thwarted to a large extent by the political instabilities caused by 
the ‘Rabuka led military coups in 1987 and his demands of Fijian political 
supremacy’ (Robertson, 1998. p.37).  
In anticipation of the retirement of both AG Datt and the deputy AG the 
Steering Committee members decided that the positions should be advertised 
(Staton & Partners, 1997. Steering Committee Meeting Minutes October 11, 
1997) and forwarded their proposal to the Rabuka government.  At this point in 
time and according to senior Audit Office staff, the Audit Office did not have a 
suitable candidate who could be promoted to the position of either the auditor-
general or the deputy.  
None of the Audit Office staff (were) qualified to take over as the auditor-
general or the deputy when Datt retired [1997] and Vakabua passed away 
before retirement. Vatuloka [another potential candidate] was transferred 
from the Ministry of Finance to the Audit Office. He did not have the level 
of experience required to run the Audit Office, so was not given the 
Auditor-General’s position but was appointed as the deputy. There was no 
choice but to recruit an experienced expatriate [Jacobs]. (Senior Auditor 
Audit Office July, 2005) 
 
 292 
 
The revelation here is that the Steering Committee’s agenda was to recruit 
an expatriate as the Fijian Auditor-General instead of appointing Vatuloka.  The 
decision was politically motivated and, as it was backed by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) hired consultants, the Rabuka led government 
accepted it. 
A long serving Member of the Fijian Parliament [1992-1999] made the 
following observation regarding Jacobs’s appointment:   
Jacobs was recruited with the help of the Australian consultants under the 
technical assistance project. Due to his experiences as a deputy auditor-
general in Australia he was able to provide leadership to the audit staff and 
continue with the development of public sector auditing. (Senior 
Parliamentarian, August, 2005) 
 
Auditor-General Jacobs submitted a proposal for amendments to the 1970 Act to 
the Fijian Ministry of Finance in January 1998 (Annual Report- Audit Office, 
1998.,p.13).  This new submission was made because the Minister of Finance, 
Ratu Kubuabola ‘did not respond to similar submissions made by Auditor-General 
Datt in 1996’ (Staton & Partners, 1997, p. 33).  Jacobs was continuing to seek a 
performance audit mandate which was part of the deal made by the Fiji 
government with the ADB in 1995.  He was attempting to influence changes to 
the 1970 Act.  This illuminates the hermeneutics of suspicion (Stewart, 1989), that 
is, communicative acts such as seeking revisions to legislation and involving two 
or more parties are necessarily political.  
Auditor-General Jacobs’ amendment required annual performance audits 
of all government departments and ministries, local government and provincial 
councils and public sector statutory bodies and companies a total of 136 
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government managed/controlled entities (Parliamentary Paper 8/2000, Appendix 
B, p. 6).  In his proposal he sought to secure the right to ‘select the audit subject’ 
and to ‘formulate other objectives for performance audits’ (Parliamentary Paper 
8/2000, Appendix B, p. 6).  In attempting to secure such rights the Auditor-
General would be able to determine the scope of such audits without the influence 
of a third party.  The independence of the Audit Office would be protected under 
law.  
This was indeed a unique proposal in Fiji’s audit history.  Prior to and 
since independence in 1970 and the coups of 1987, the Audit Act (1970 and the 
1956 Audit Ordinance) only allowed the AG’s to undertake cash flow, budgetary 
compliance and financial attest audits.  Fiji’s socio-political history is dominated 
by stories of indigenous Fijian rights and political supremacy secured via tribal 
warfare, coups and undemocratic governments.  Given Fiji’s socio-political 
history accounting reporting and auditing appears to have been used by the 
indigenous Fijian government to elude being held to account. Auditing 
(accounting) thus remains an artefact.  
A long sitting Parliamentarian made the following observations on the 
need to amend the 1970 Act: 
Unless the 1970 Audit Act is amended and performance audit is mandated, 
the auditees will continue to resist such audits. (Parliamentarian and 
Member of Public Accounts Committee, August, 2005) 
 
In submitting a proposal to amend the 1970 Audit Act, AG Jacobs’ was 
trying to reduce auditees’ ability to resist participating in performance audits.  The 
period (1998) during which AG Jacobs submitted the proposal to amend the 1970 
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Audit Act to mandate performance auditing was the same period during which the 
Ministry of Finance was considering the new 1998 Public Finance Management 
Bill. This Bill was introduced by the Rabuka government.   
The two proposals, the proposal to amend the 1970 Audit Act to mandate 
performance audit henceforth (proposal to amend the 1970 Audit Act and the new 
1998 Public Finance Management Bill (hence forth 1998 Bill) appeared to have 
been used as competing pieces of legislation by the Ministry of Finance.  
The series of events that significantly influenced the outcome of the 1998 
proposal to amend the 1970 Audit Act during the 1998-1999 period are 
summarised in Table 10.1. 
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Table 10-1: Time Frame and Summary of Significant Events  
Date/Year  Events affecting the two proposed legislation  
January 1998  Auditor-General Jacobs submitted a proposal for amending the 1970 
Audit Act to the Ministry of Finance during Rabuka led government. 
Purpose: seek a mandate for performance auditing.  
January 1998 Rabuka government proposed the New Public Finance Management Bill.   
Jan- Dec 1998 Ministry of Finance considered the New Public Finance Management Bill 
as the government’s agency for development and monitoring financial 
regulations for public sector.  
Jan –Dec 199 Discussions on proposal between the Ministry of Finance and the Audit 
Office. 
Nov 1998  Minister of Finance, Ratu Kubuabola, tabled the 1998 New Public 
Finance Management Bill in the Parliament.  
March 1999 Parliament enacted the 1999 New Public Finance Management Act. 
May 1999 Chaudry led Labour government came into power and withdrew the 1999 
New Public Finance Management Act. 
Sources: Annual Audit Reports, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Staton and Partners Report 1997; 
interview transcripts. 
 
 
 
 
 296 
 
The proposed amendments to the 1970 Act were discussed between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Audit Office between January and December 1998 
(Parliamentary Paper, 18/2000, p.3).  Minister Kubuabola (an indigenous chief) 
encouraged discussion without decision for the whole year, thus exposing how 
communicative actions were used to promote self-interest (Myers, 1994) by the 
two parties.  The proposal remained with the Ministry and was not forwarded to a 
Parliamentary sub-committee or presented to Parliament in 1998.  
The lack of progress on this amendment has been intended by the Minister 
of Finance (Kubuabola) to avoid mandatory performance audits.  This avoidance 
would have been an outcome of the Minister of Finance’s role (in 1998) as he was 
seeking Parliamentary approval for the proposed new Public Finance 
Management Bill (1998 Bill).  Section 86 1(b) of the 1998 Bill ‘empowered the 
Auditor-General to conduct performance audits but only with Parliamentary 
approval or agreement’.  As such this provision was alluding to accountability and 
transparency in the public sector by allowing for performance audits while 
holding on to tribal indigenous political power by requiring that the AG seek 
Parliamentary approval and agreement for such audits.  
The juxtaposition of the text and contextual episodes reveal that the 
politically influential Minister of Finance was legitimising the superiority of his 
Ministry’s position with respect to the 1998 Bill by including the powers and role 
of the Auditor-General and providing a clause which reduced the Auditor-
General’s powers to undertake performance audit.   The interpretation here is that 
the 1998 Bill was of greater importance to the Minister because if the 1998 is 
enacted by the Fijian Parliament it would limit the Auditor-General’s power to 
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undertake performance audit.  The discussion that follows will illuminate how the 
1998 Bill affected the proposal for changes to the 1970 Act. 
Sub-theme 1.1: Rabuka- Led Government’s Efforts to Dissuade  
The 1998 Bill was proposed by the Rabuka led government (Table 10-1) in 
January, 1998 as part of reforms to purportedly achieve ‘sustained improvements 
in allocation and utilisation of resources for economic growth’ (Sarker & Pathak, 
2003, p. 58).  The Ministry of Finance, the government agent responsible for 
financial regulations and policies in the public sector, was also responsible for 
seeking Parliament’s approval for the proposed 1998 Bill because as a future 
finance regulation it would affect the Ministry’s responsibilities.  The discussion 
in this section focuses on how and why the 1998 Bill, which was enacted in 
March 1999, affected the proposal to amend the 1970 Act.   
The 1998 Bill and the proposal to amend the 1970 Act to mandate 
performance auditing were both under consideration by the Ministry of Finance 
simultaneously in 1998.  In November 1998 the Ministry of Finance submitted the 
1998 Bill to a cabinet sub-committee for tabling in the Parliament’s March 1999 
sitting.   
The 1998 Bill specified the roles and duties of Parliament, the Cabinet, the 
various government ministries, departments, statutory bodies, government-owned 
enterprises and the Auditor-General.  Part 5, Divisions 1 and 2 of the 1998 Bill 
‘specified the responsibilities and the reporting requirements of the government 
Ministers’.  Section 37 of the 1998 Bill specified: 
Each government Minister was responsible for the preparation of an 
annual portfolio plan (corporate plan) and a budget for each portfolio for 
each financial year and for tabling in the Parliament.  
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The portfolio plan had to indicate the planned outputs in quantifiable terms 
so that these were auditable and performance could be measured.  Accounting 
numbers and reporting is being given prominence and therefore it follows that the 
intention of the 1998 Bill is to hold the public sector Ministers to account via 
accounting.  In this context  by simply complying (developing the plan) with these 
authoritative expectations the auditees were securing  legitimacy in an accountor-
accountee relationship (Roberts 2009, 2010).   
Section 39 of the 1998 Bill required ‘the Ministers to submit to the 
Auditor-General the annual financial statements together with their initial 
portfolio plans within 2 months after the close of the financial year’.  These 
statements had to be accompanied by a performance statement indicating the 
variances between the actual and planned outputs.  The Auditor-General was 
given only one month after the receipt of the financial statements to express his 
opinion. As such the time frame for completing the audits of about 136 public 
sector entities is very short (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1995).  This would 
perhaps constrain audit completions unless the Audit Office was appropriately 
resourced with skilled and qualified auditors which was doubtful given Fiji’s 
political instability.  
Part 8, Division 1, section 86 (1 a-b) of the 1998 Bill laid out the 
responsibilities of the Auditor-General.  Section 86 1 (a) stated:  
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----the Auditor-General is responsible for conducting audits of the annual 
financial statements required by this Act in respect of - 
(i) the whole of government 
(ii) every public entity.24 
(Public Finance Management Bill, 1998)  
 
 
With respect to financial statement compliance audits the Bill provided the 
Auditor-General with the same authority to select to review as is provided by 
section 12 of the 1970 Act.  So there is no change to the ‘object of audit’ and the 
AG will still be reporting on compliance to financial regulations and 
appropriateness of record keeping. With respect to performance audits section 86 
1 (b) of the 1998 Bill stated: 
-----at the request or with the agreement of parliament, the Auditor-
General is responsible for conducting investigations into- 
(i) the management of government financial transactions; 
(ii) the financial management of any public sector entity, 
(Public Finance Management Bill, 1998) 
  
This indicates that the Auditor-General has the authority for such audits but needs 
both Parliamentary approval and agreements thus reducing his rights.  Whereas 
the 1998 proposal to amend the 1970 Act, section 19(1 and 2) stated: 
(1) The Auditor-General may conduct performance audits to ensure 
government policies are carried out effectively, efficiently and with 
due economy. 
(2) The Auditor-General may formulate other objectives for 
performance audits.  
 
 
Both proposals, the 1998 Bill and the 1998 proposal to amend the 1970 
Act dealt with public sector management and allowed for performance audits.    
Should the 1998 Bill be passed in this form it would establish the government’s 
superior power over the Audit Office because the 1998 Bill limits the Auditor-
                                                 
24 The 1999 PFM Act Part 2 – Interpretation - Definitions state; ‘Public Entity means a Ministry, department, statutory 
authority, parliamentary body or government company’. 
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General’s powers to undertake performance audits. Whereas the proposal to 
change the 1970 Audit Act, provides AG autonomy for performing such audits 
which does not sit well with the tribal political structure and a government  
reluctant to be held to account.  The 1998 Bill in limiting the Auditor-General’s 
powers also creates less accountability than the proposal to amend the 1970 Act 
thus the former is created to divert attention from the proposal to change the 1970 
Act and empower the Auditor-General to undertake performance audits without 
reduced authority.  
The next theme provides a discussion on how the Auditor-General’s rights 
to monitor what to review during performance audits differed under the two 
proposals.   
Sub-theme 1.2: Incompatibility of the Two Proposals 
The distinction between the two proposals is in terms of the Auditor-General’s 
responsibilities for conducting performance audits with respect to the  right to 
choose: i) what to monitor;  ii) what to select to review; iii) what to report and iv) 
to whom to report, under the 1998 Bill  and the 1998 proposal to amend the  1970 
Act.  Table 10.2 summarises these rights and forms the basis of discussion in this 
sub-theme illuminating why the 1998 Bill was given priority by the Ministry of 
Finance and the Rabuka led government.    
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Table 10-2: Rights of the Auditor-General   
Proposed 
Legislation  
Choose what to Monitor- 
objective of the  audit 
(purpose) 
Choose what to Select  - 
subject of  the audit (theme 
question)  
Choose what to Report  Whom to Report to  
1998 Public Finance 
and Management Bill 
Yes, has the right to choose 
what to check during the audit  
per section 88.   
Needs both Parliamentary 
agreement to and approval for 
such audits.  
Yes, has the right to select.  
Needs both Parliamentary 
agreement to and approval for 
such audits. 
Limited authority.   
No, ‘what to report’ is 
restricted to management of 
government financial 
transactions25  and financial 
management of any public 
entity.26  
Requires the AG to report to 
Parliament within 1 month of 
receiving the financial 
statements.     
Proposal to Amend 
the 1970 Audit Act 
Yes, right to determine what 
to monitor.  
Has autonomy to make 
decisions.  
Yes, right to choose the 
subject of audit.  
Has autonomy to make 
decision.   
Yes. The right to report 
includes financial and non-
financial performance in 
terms of effective and 
efficient management of 
resources and achievement of 
policy.  
Report to Parliament as and 
when the AG determines the 
necessity for performance 
audit.  
                                                 
25 The 1999 Public Finance and Management Act defines government financial transaction as any financial transaction relating to government revenue, government expenses, government assets or 
government liabilities.   
26 The 1999 Public Finance and Management Act defined Public entity as ministry, department, statutory authority, parliamentary body or government company.  
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Sub-theme 1.2.1 Right to monitor: (Object of Audit) 
The 1998 Bill provides the Auditor-General with the right to choose what to 
monitor during a performance audit but only with Parliamentary agreement and 
approval.  This implies that Parliament  can  agree with the object for audit but 
has the right to deny approval, thus limiting the right.  What can be monitored 
during the audit is dependent on Parliamentary goodwill and decision.  
Furthermore in deciding what to monitor (the objective) the Auditor-General 
could only choose those activities which are financial in nature and monitor how 
the input in financial terms achieved the desired output in financial terms.  In this 
case, the Auditor-General did not have the right to monitor activities of an entity 
which did not have financial outputs or required outputs in terms of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness.  The interpretation here is that, he has to rely on 
financial numbers as a means of holding the auditees to account.  As such, 
accounting is once again substituted for real accountability by requiring that audit 
objectives be limited to financial activities only (Collier, 2005; Roberts, 1991, 
1996).  
In contrast, the 1998 proposal to amend the 1970 Act provided the 
Auditor-General with unrestricted rights to decide what to monitor during 
performance audits.  The Auditor-General could choose to monitor both or either 
one of the financial and the non-financial outcomes of any entity.  
In both the cases, the Auditor-General was required to and was  dependent 
on the accounting records and reports transmitted to him by the Minister of 
Finance (or whoever holds this position) to perform annual financial statement 
 303 
 
and undertake performance audits.  Hence his right to choose what to monitor is 
determined by financial accounting information.   
Section 69 of the 1998 Bill:  
authorises the Ministry of Finance to operate a centralised accounting 
system for the whole of government including the ministries, departments 
and other parliamentary bodies, to set accounting policies and regulate the 
management of public finance in public sector organisations.  
 
The Ministry of Finance was responsible for prescribing accounting 
standards and the generally accepted accounting principles to Ministries, 
government departments and the statutory bodies and monitor their 
implementation.  The Ministry of Finance therefore was responsible for ensuring 
that the financial statements and other reports including corporate plans, budget 
appropriation statements and variances analysis statements transmitted to the 
Auditor-General for financial compliance and performance audits complied with 
statutory financial requirements.  In undertaking these responsibilities the 
Ministry of Finance made visible to the Auditor-General how the government 
departments and ministries kept their accounting records and complied with 
financial regulations. Therefore the transparencies created will be what the 
accountor wants (Roberts, 2009) who in this case is the Minister for Finance.  
Sub-theme 1.2.2 Right to select the subject  
Under the 1998 Bill, the Auditor General would have been  provided with limited 
rights to select the subject of his audits.  Having made his selection, he would 
have had to seek both Parliamentary approval and agreement (Section 86 (1) 1998 
Bill).  In choosing the subject (topic) of his audits he would have had the right to 
consider the monetary aspects only.  He could not select to audit areas of policy 
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implementation as this does not fall under his powers.  Given Fiji’s socio-political 
history, allowing him to select policy audits is equivalent to elevating the AG’s 
status above and beyond that of the indigenous Fijian chiefs and taking control of 
the their rights.  
In his 1998 proposal to amend the 1970 Act, the Auditor-General sought 
to have complete autonomy in deciding the subject of his audits.  This would have 
given him an opportunity to audit beyond what was provided by the accounting 
numbers for that financial year, by selecting to audit projects and policies that 
extended beyond one year.  Instead of annual audits which would be limited to 
operational issues only, the Auditor-General would have been able to audit the 
efficiency and effectiveness of long term projects.  
Sub-theme 1.2.3 Right to choose what to report 
According to the 1998 Bill, the Auditor-General’s right to choose what to report is 
restricted to financial outcomes only.  This indicates reporting on non-financial 
outcomes is not perceived as significant or perhaps desirable thus limiting audit 
reporting.  Contextualising this within the broader Fijian political history, the 
Rabuka government was using the 1998 Bill to protect the political paramountcy 
of the indigenous Fijians.  The indigenous Fijian government could elude being 
held to account by restricting reporting to accounting numbers hence reducing 
auditing to a mere artefact of the Westminster principles of democracy.  The 
Auditor-General in this case would have been stretching the auditing rules to 
incorporate reports on management issues thus symbolising auditing as 
accountability.   
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One the other hand, the proposal to amend the 1970 Act would have 
provided  the Auditor-General with powers to report on both the financial and the 
non-financial outcomes achieved by the entities and the Ministers.  This might 
have been perceived by the Rabuka government as though the Auditor-General 
was given more or equal powers to those accorded to the Fijian tribal chiefs.  Both 
proposals allowed the Auditor-General the right to report, (but) the 1998 Bill 
discouraged him from reporting on non-financial performance.  Hence the 1998 
Bill ensured  that the auditee could secure legitimacy via producing and being 
audited only for accounting numbers (Roberts, 2009).  
Sub-theme 1.2.4 Whom to Report  
Both the proposals allowed the Auditor-General to report to the Parliament.  The 
Constitution as the supreme legislation demands that the Auditor-General acts on 
behalf of the Parliament providing assurances to the public via the Parliament that 
public fund are used for the purposes for which they are allocated.  Exogenous 
influence was however still active. 
Publicly voiced concerns by the Auditor-General over the incompatibility 
found in the 1998 Bill and the 1998 proposal to amend the 1970 Act acted as a 
catalyst for a decision to  prioritise one over the other (Annual Report-Audit 
Office, 1998, p. 18).   
Sub-theme 1.3: Pressure to Prioritise  
There was pressure from various stakeholders to prioritise one piece of legislation 
over the other to resolve the contradictions arising from the two.  The following 
reveals the stakeholders and the processes employed to resolve this. 
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Sub-theme 1.3.1: Authority led pressure  
The Rabuka led government (1992-1999) proposed the Public Finance 
Management Bill in 1998 (1998 Bill).  The following discussion reveals why and 
how the Rabuka government pushed the 1998 Bill through the Parliament and the 
results. 
Fiji was scheduled to have a general election in May 1999 under the new 
1997 Constitution.  The Rabuka government therefore rushed the 1998 Bill 
through Parliament in March 1999. It was the final quarter of its term in Office 
and the passing of the 1998 Bill would establish its authority.  An experienced 
media reporter made the following claim as to why the government promoted the 
1998 Bill:  
The Rabuka government proposed the Public Finance Management Bill 
for effective financial management and to control public sector spending. 
The government has not justified how this Bill meets the requirements of 
public sector financial management. Publicising this Bill just before the 
elections created the perception that the government was making attempts 
to control public sector spending. (Senior Media Reporter, August, 2005) 
 
A long serving Parliamentarian agreed:  
During Rabuka government’s27 eight year regime, the Auditor-General’s 
reports indicated gross financial mismanagement in the public sector. The 
government therefore rushed this Bill through the Parliament indicating its 
commitment to reduce and eliminate such practices. This will make the 
government look good to the voters. (National Federation Party 
Parliamentarian and Member of the Public Accounts Committee, 
September, 2005) 
    
                                                 
27 In 1987, Rabuka led the military coup in Fiji, overthrew the democratically elected Labour government and formed a 
military government. In 1992 with pressure from the international community, Fiji had a general election which the Rabuka 
led SVT party won under the undemocratic 1990 Constitution. In 1999 under a new democratic constitution, Fiji had a 
general election which was won by the Chaudry led Labour Party.  
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 In proposing the 1998 Bill just before the 1999 general elections the 
Rabuka led government was creating a perception that it was genuine in 
promoting public sector efficacy.   This perception, from this researchers pre-
understanding, is important as stimulant for economic growth, such as attracting 
overseas and local investors and improvements in tourism.  It would also 
encourage the United Nations to continue inviting the Fijian military for overseas 
peacekeeping duties.  This would project a positive image of the military.  
The timing of the 1998 Bill appeared therefore to be a political move by 
the government to appease public concerns of financial mismanagement.  The 
government was seeking accountability through accounting by mandating 
performance audits but limiting the focus of such audits on financial outcomes 
and providing the Auditor-General with limited powers for such audits (Roberts 
1996).  
Sub-theme 1.3.2 Pressure from auditees    
A few auditees like the managers at the Customs Department and the Colonial 
War Memorial Hospital had participated in performance auditing during the 1995-
1997 period.  During this period the Fiji Audit Office was undergoing an 
institutional strengthening programme funded by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB).  Most auditees resisted participation in performance audit after 1997 
(Annual Report, Audit Office, 1997).  Table 10.3 provides a timeframe indicating 
events related to amending the 1970 Act and the 1998 Bill which allowed 
auditees’ resistance to performance audits over the 1998-2000 period.  
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Table 10-3: Timeframe showing events that allowed Auditee resistance  
Date /Years  Events related to amending 1970 Act and 1998 Bill   
Jan-Dec 1998   Jacobs made fresh submissions to the Ministry of Finance seeking 
performance audit mandate.  
Jan-Dec 1998   Rabuka led government introduced the 1998 Bill and the Ministry of 
Finance was responsible to submitting this to Parliament.  
March 1999- 
May 1999  
 Parliament enacted the 1999 Public Finance Management Act.  
  Newly elected Chaudry led Labour government recalled the 1999 
Act.  
Nov 1999  Newly appointed Auditor-General Vatuloka made fresh submissions 
to the Ministry of Finance seeking PA mandate.  
Source: Annual Audit Reports, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and interviews.  
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Despite the ADB’s requirement that the Auditor-General be given a 
performance audit mandate, this did not happen (Annual Report, Audit Office, 
1997; Staton & Partners Report, 1997).  Since the Auditor-General did not have a 
mandate, the auditees refused to participate in performance audits initiated by 
Auditor-General Jacobs.  A senior auditor from the Audit Office expressed the 
following: 
During our compliance audits in 1998, we approached at least three 
government departments for performance audits. We informed the 
Department Heads why we wanted to undertake such an audit and how it 
would be useful for them. The Heads simply refused and told us that the 
1970 Audit Act does not allow for such audits (Senior Auditor, Fiji Audit 
Office, September, 2005) 
 
A former senior auditor from the Audit Office had this to say about why the 
auditees resisted:  
In early 1998, we wrote to a few government ministries, asking the 
Permanent Secretaries if the Audit Staff could undertake performance 
audits for some of their activities. The auditees informed us that there were 
no regulations which demanded such audits and therefore the answer was 
no.  They pointed out that the 1996 Public Enterprise Act does not 
mandate performance audits and neither does the 1970 Audit Act.    
 
This non-participation was sending a strong message to the Auditor-
General that he needed a performance audit mandate.  The  auditees were using 
the lack of mandate to evade being held to account and perhaps they did not care 
to be held to account for such audits.    
This was also observed by a Parliamentarian who was a member of the 
Labour party which formed the government after the April 1987 general elections 
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and lasted in Office for thirty days because Rabuka overthrew this government on 
14th May:   
The 1970 Audit Act, which governs public sector auditing in Fiji, does not 
empower the Auditor-General to engage in performance audit. The 
auditees therefore will not participate in such audits and the Auditor-
General cannot impose this on the auditees. (Labour Parliamentarian, 
Member of Public Accounts Committee, August, 2005) 
 
A long serving bureaucrat from one of the government ministries claimed: 
Unless the Auditor-General gets a mandate for performance audit, there 
will be no support of such audit from the government departments and 
ministries. (Auditee, July, 2005) 
 
So the auditees could resist participating in performance audits under the statute 
current at the time.  
Nonetheless some government departments and Ministries participated in 
performance audits in 1997 (Annual Report, Audit Office, 1997) as was noted.  It 
was therefore possible that some auditees might have continued to allow the 
Auditor-General to undertake such audits without a mandate.  In any case, a claim 
can be made that the practice of performance audits without the support of a 
mandate would not be effective.  This is because the auditees most likely to resist 
were also most likely to be hiding inappropriate practices such as mismanagement 
or misuse use of resources.  Hence transparency by accounting would have 
resulted in accounts produced but not real accountability (Roberts, 2010) as no 
follow-up action or consequences accompanied the resistance to audits.  
Given the Fijian political history and the researcher’s pre-understanding 
Auditor-General Jacob’s (1997-1999) insistence for a performance audit mandate 
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can be interpreted as overly optimistic.  This may have been a result of the 
forthcoming general elections at that time (March 1997) under the new 1997 
democratic Constitution.  Jacobs and his audit team appeared to have been 
motivated by the perceptions of democratic future created by the new 
Constitution.  It is rather surprising that the history of military coups and the 
dominance of the tribal Fijian political structure appeared to have been pushed 
aside.   
Auditor-General Jacobs and his audit team appear to have the view that the 
mandate for performance audit would be given and hence auditees’ resistance to 
such audits will be reduced.  The change of any law is a political process and such 
processes not only take time but there is always a risk that the more politically 
savvy individual/s can tamper with the process.  Therefore, a way forward for the 
Auditor-General and his team was  to convince more departments to agree to 
performance audits by using the socialising form of accountability.   Nonetheless, 
a corrupt manager is likely to resist such efforts.   
Sub-theme 1.4: Outcome of the Processes to Resolve the Incompatibilities  
The 1998 Bill was passed by Parliament as an Act in March 1999.  This provided 
the Auditor-General with limited powers to undertake performance auditing.  The 
newly elected Indo-Fijian dominated Labour government in May 1999 halted the 
public sector reforms upon taking Office and the 1999 Act was recalled, thus the 
implementation of the Act did not occur.  The Auditor-General’s performance 
audit mandate under the 1999 Act became void.  In effect the Labour government 
did not honour the 1996 agreement reached between the ADB and the Rabuka 
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government.  They ‘did not provide any reason for the recall’ (Reddy et al., 2004, 
p.5) but apparently acted in their own self-interest.   
Jacobs’s contract as the Auditor-General expired at the end of 1999.  In 
early 2000 Eroni Vatuloka (who was the deputy) was appointed as the Auditor-
General.  Vatuloka submitted yet another proposal seeking a performance audit 
mandate (Annual Report, Audit Office, 2000).  
The powers of the Auditor-General would have been extended with the 
1999 Public Finance Management Act. However, following the deferment 
of the commencement of the Act, the Office of the Auditor-General has 
submitted several proposals and recommendations to the Ministry of 
Finance to amend the 1970Audit Act. (Parliamentary Paper 18/2000, p. 2) 
 
Auditor-General Vatuloka continued pressing for a performance audit mandate as 
other Auditors-Generals had before him.  The Ministry of Finance was preparing 
to submit a paper to Cabinet for changes to the1970 Audit Act: 
The Ministry of Finance has been soliciting comments from interested 
parties on our proposed amendment and would submit a paper on the 
Amendment to Cabinet. (Parliamentary Paper 18/2000, p. 2) 
 
Unfortunately, the George Speight led coup in May 2000 put a stop to this.  
Amidst the chaos of the coup, the government was held captive for 56 days while 
Speight tried forming an illegal government.  This coup further disrupted the 
internal and external pressures to give the Auditor-General a performance audit 
mandate. 
The military, led by Commodore Bainimarama stepped in to defuse the 
coup and to get Fiji back to ‘normalcy’.  Laisenia Qarase was nominated as the 
interim Prime Minister by Commodore Bainimarama in August 2000.  The Qarase 
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led government passed decrees to govern and manage the public sector but 
reinstated the 1970 Act for public sector auditing.  The Auditor-General’s 
mandate for regulatory and financial statement compliance audit was re-
established, but no progress was made on performance audit.  
The processes employed to mandate performance auditing and honour the 
Fiji government agreement with the Asian Development Bank (technical 
assistance project) for a performance audit mandate did not take effect.  The 
contradiction regarding what rights the Auditor-General has, to monitor and select 
for review when undertaking a performance auditing, was not resolved in the 
period 1997-200028.  
10.3 Summary  
The interpretations provided in this chapter are drawn from the events that 
occurred during the 1997-2000 period in the public (audit) sector.  The fusion of 
the researcher’s pre-understandings of the Fijian socio-political history with the 
text revealed that the Auditors-General sought a performance audit mandate by 
proposing changes to the 1970 Act.  This did not eventuate, instead financial 
statement attest and budgetary compliance audits remained the primary focus of 
public sector auditing in Fiji during the 1997-2000 period.  
During the 1998-1999 period, Auditor-General Jacobs was pushing for 
amendments to the 1970 Audit Act, while the Rabuka Government was pushing 
for the 1998 Bill to be enacted, which had the potential to create tension in the 
accountee-accountor relationship.  The Rabuka government gave priority to the 
                                                 
28  It is important to note however that the Audit (Amendment) Act 2006 and the military coup led by Lieutenant 
Bainimarama in the same year would have an impact on the future of performance auditing in Fiji. 
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1998 Bill and passed it as an Act in March 1999 weeks before the general 
elections.   
The Labour government, which was in Opposition when the 1998 Bill was 
enacted came into power in May 1999 and recalled the 1999 Act.  The underlying 
message conveyed here is that powerful institutions such as the government will 
use their influence to serve their own interest, legitimatising a particular form of 
power (Herda, 1999; Prasad & Mir, 2002).  This is not always to the benefit of the 
accountability that can be provided through performance audit.  
The scope of public sector auditing therefore remained regulatory and 
financial statements compliance-based, with auditees resisting participation in 
performance audit during the 1998-2000 period.  The Auditor-General’s scope to 
hold the accountees (Ministers and public sector managers) to account was limited 
to accounting.  As such accounting was substituted for accountability (Roberts 
2003, 2010).  
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Chapter 11 Discussion/Conclusion 
11.1 Introduction 
The thesis aims to contribute to research on a developing country, Fiji.  It seeks to 
provide a theoretical understanding of how the socially and politically powerful 
elements of a society protect their self-interest by conveying certain messages 
using text information.  It draws on the expositions of critical hermeneutics to 
explore and interpret the events surrounding the emergence, implementation and 
discontinuation of performance auditing in the Fijian (audit) public sector during 
the 1970-1998 period. Roberts’ (1996, 2001a, 2010) interpretations of 
accountability are used to critically inform the hermeneutical explorations. 
Though public sector performance auditing is widely accepted in 
Commonwealth countries, the opposite proved to be the case in Fiji.  The research 
findings reveal why the practice was not accepted in Fiji.   
Prior studies (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Funnell, 1994; Guthrie & Parker, 
1999; Guthrie, 1990; Jacobs, 1998; Parker, 1990; Radcliffe, 1998; Scanlan, 1998) 
describe the socio-economic and political factors that influenced the emergence 
and acceptance of performance auditing in Commonwealth countries.  These 
studies also claim that the Auditor-Generals of the various jurisdictions were the 
most influential sources.  In countries like Australia, the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand, the audit acts were amended to mandate such audits.  These studies 
do not describe or provide an instance of a country where the practice of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness audit was not accepted; therefore, there is a 
gap in the existing literature.  
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This thesis fills such a gap in this context at least by exploring the Fijian 
situation where the practice emerged, was implemented, but was not accepted, and 
hence, discontinued. This thesis also contributes to the existing literature by 
tracing the emergence of performance audit in a Pacific Island country, and to 
date there has been no such study.  Moreover, this thesis makes a further 
contribution by informing the hermeneutical explorations using Roberts’ (1991, 
1996, 2001b, 2010) interpretations of accountability, thus revealing how 
‘accounting is substituted as accountability’. Real accountability is also 
obfuscated because tribal traditions that promote indigenous political supremacy 
override democratic principles.   
This chapter presents a discussion on research findings and outlines the 
contribution the thesis makes to the literature.  A conclusion is then proposed, and 
the limitations of and potential future research studies are identified.  This 
research was motivated by an interest in exploring and gaining a critical 
understanding of the processes that influenced the emergence and implementation 
of public sector performance auditing in Fiji during the 1970-1999 period.  A 
reflection on the research process is now presented. 
11.2 Reflections on the Research Process 
This study adopted a critical hermeneutics tradition of enquiry, where the 
researcher interprets the text within its context to gain an understanding of the 
phenomenon under study (Herda, 1999; Kinsella, 2006; Riceour, 1980).  The 
researcher’s reality is therefore based on textual interpretation for meaning.  This 
methodology provided the researcher with an opportunity to capture the 
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subjectively construed ‘objective reality’ through textual interpretations (Healy, 
1986; Kinsella, 2006; Riceour, 1980).   
It was a challenging task to collect text information such as archival 
documents and interviews.  The most challenging was collecting newspaper 
articles, as I had to personally sift through daily newspapers published in the 
period between 1970 and 2003 at the Fiji Archives in Fiji.  In doing this I 
mastered the art of skim-reading the newspapers, taking short notes, even coming 
to an understanding of which particular months of each year will contain articles 
on audit reports. 
‘Fear’ clearly was a factor influencing interviewees.  Almost all the 
interviewees asked for reassurances of confidentiality and were given the 
reassurance.  Knowing the interviewees made it easier for me and hopefully to 
them. Most willingly provided me with the names of potential interviewees and 
then telephoned them to arrange an interview.  This was unique as well as valued 
in bringing views to light.  
A critical perspective was added to this research by adopting Roberts’ 
interpretation of accountability (1991, 1996, 2001b, 2010).  The meanings 
construed from reading and interpreting the text within its context were critically 
informed to reveal the hidden meanings portrayed by the individuals and the 
institutions associated with public sector audits in general, and performance audit 
in particular.  This was a new experience for this researcher because the processes 
involved interpretations and informing these critically to comprehend how the 
social order within the Fijian (audit) society was either changing, or not, and why.  
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In the course of this project, I developed an understanding of how 
interpretation and language is used by individuals and institutions to portray and 
convey certain messages to the intended audience.  This was a move away from 
providing explanation and verification of facts to illustrate understanding, 
something that I was used to.  It also dawned on me that politically savvy and 
powerful individuals in society are able to protect their interests by using language 
in a metaphorical and symbolic manner, instead of having to verify the so-called 
facts in a normative manner.  
Through this critical-interpretive approach, I was able to construct an 
understanding  by interpreting documents and interview text within a contextual 
setting; thus putting forward the case of a socially constructed reality where 
meanings are built on other meanings, social practices and power relations. The 
next section briefly discusses the research findings.  
11.3 Research Findings  
The emergence, implementation and discontinuation of public sector performance 
auditing in Fiji during the 1970-1999 period was greatly influenced by individuals 
and institutions such as the Auditors-General (Bhim, Narain, Datt, and Jacobs), 
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) members, the auditees, the Ministers  of 
Finance, the Fijian Government, the contributions of the Asian Development 
Bank and the Australian consultants.  The media also contributed to this process 
by publicising the audit findings and creating a perception of a lack of public 
sector accountability.  Each of these parties, excluding the media, was associated 
with public sector (audit) accountability under the 1970 Audit Act.  
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11.3.1 The processes, accountabilities and power relationships in the 
Fijian public (audit) sector 
This section presents the research summary and conclusions drawn from the 
research empirics.   
During the 1970-1984 period, Auditor-General (AG) Bhim performed 
financial attest and compliance audits to hold the Ratu Sir Mara led indigenous 
Fijian dominated government to account.  In his audit reports he disclosed 
practices of mismanagement of funds and inappropriate record keeping in most 
public sector entities.  These revelations made transparent the conduct of the 
accountors.  The transparencies revealed by accounting were substituted as real 
accountability (Roberts, 1996).  Such transparencies were deteriorative for the 
Ratu Sir Mara Government and were overlooked.  As such the transparencies 
created by accounting were an empty gesture (Roberts, 1991, 2010) as 
consequences did not follow.   
In his Audit reports (1970-1984) Bhim frequently indicated that the Audit 
Office faced funding and staffing constraints and requested additional funding 
from the Ministry of Finance.  The then Minister of Finance [Stinson] overlooked 
the AG Bhim’s request and withheld the funding.  Similarly, the Permanent 
Secretary of the Public Service Commission (PSC) [Waqanivavalagi] overlooked 
the staffing request.  These two powerful government agencies exerted their 
power over the Audit Office and hindered Bhim’s efforts to effectively hold the 
auditees and the government to account.  
The media extensively publicised the audit report findings and disclosures 
of mismanagement and inappropriate record keeping practices.  This did not 
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appear to affect the behaviour of the bureaucrats or the government and created a 
perception of a general lack of accountability in the public sector. 
On May 14th 1987, the democratically elected Labour government was 
overthrown by the military coup led by Rabuka.  The nomination of an indigenous 
Fijian chief as the interim Prime Minister (Ratu Sir Mara) by Rabuka exposed the 
presence of tribal influence.  These events revealed the dominance of Fijian tribal 
leadership under a veneer of democracy. It also exposed the existence of a weak 
bureaucratic political structure in the Fijian public sector. So this combination was 
disastrous for real accountability. 
During 1987-1997 Auditor-General Datt like his predecessors, performed 
financial attest and compliance to budget audits and disclosed mismanagement of 
funds, fraudulent practices and the weak accounting systems used by most public 
sector entities.  The Ratu Sir Mara led and military backed interim government 
(1987-1992) and the Rabuka led undemocratic government (1992-1995) 
overlooked the audit findings and the bureaucrats were not chastised.  This 
practice thus failed to promote accountability via auditing. It also apparently 
indicated to the auditees that such lack of accountability was acceptable.   
Datt made frequent requests for additional funding to the Ministry of 
Finance and for adequate staffing to the PSC during 1987-1995.  Both the 
Minister of Finance Kuboabola and the Permanent Secretary to PSC overlooked 
this requests.  The actions of these two powerful individuals indicate how finance 
holders can suppress the AG’s efforts to audit.  
In 1995 AG Datt, with the help of the Rabuka led government, secured 
technical assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to strengthen the 
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operations of the Audit Office and to implement performance auditing.  The ADB 
hired the Australian consulting firm of Staton and Partners to undertake the 
Technical Assistance Project at the Fijian Audit Office.  The Australian 
consultants and AG Datt submitted a proposal to the Minister of Finance 
[Kubuabola] in 1996, seeking that the 1970 Audit Act be amended to mandate 
performance auditing, but did not receive a response.  This exposes how 
politically powerful individuals use the structures in place to legitimatise their 
actions (Herda, 1999)  
In 1995-1996 AG Datt, with the help of the Australian consultants, 
undertook performance auditing at the Customs Department and the Colonial War  
Memorial Hospital without a mandate to do so.   He used non-accounting 
measures to assess the performance of the managers in the two entities thus 
making visible the conduct of the auditees.  This reveals that performance audit 
has the potential to effectively contribute towards transparency and if mandated 
would be beneficial in promoting public sector efficacy.  
The new AG Jacobs an Australian expatriate made a new submission to 
Minister Kubuabola seeking changes to the 1970 Audit Act in 1998.  
Simultaneously, the Ministry of Finance was considering the 1998 Public Finance 
Management Bill.  While these two important proposals were under consideration 
by the Minister of Finance, the Auditor-General approached some auditees with a 
request to undertake performance audits.  Those who were requested declined the 
invitation to participate indicating that the Auditor-General did not have a 
mandate for such audits.  The auditees’ reaction indicates that they were not keen 
to be held to account via non-financial measures because they had something to 
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hide which may have been revealed via economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
audits.  The Auditor-General cannot impose such audits due to a lack of audit 
mandate.   
In his proposal to change the 1970 Audit Act, Jacobs was seeking 
autonomy in deciding to choose the subject and object of performance audits.  In 
the 1998 Public Finance Management Bill the Auditor-General’s rights for such 
auditing were  reduced.  He had to seek Parliament’s approval to undertake such 
audits.  These differences laid the potential for conflict between the rights of the 
Auditor-General and the Parliament.  Minister Kubuabola gave priority to the 
latter thus exposing the power of the military backed indigenous government.  
The 1998 Public Finance Bill was enacted as an Act in March 1999 just 
before the general elections under the new 1997 democratic Constitution.  The 
incumbent Chaudry led, Indo-Fijian dominated Labour government recalled the 
Act in May 1999.  As a result the, Auditor-General’s limited powers to undertake 
performance auditing was also withdrawn and compliance to budgetary 
appropriations and financial attest auditing remained dominant after 2000.  
The civilian coup led by Speight in May 2000 overthrew the 
democratically elected Chaudry led democratic government and caused further 
political disruptions.  Once again the presence of tribal Fijian politics dominated 
the structures of democracy indicating that politically savvy individuals will use 
their influence to promote their own self interest and are probably apathetic 
towards being held to account under the principles democracy.   
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11.4 Implications of the Research   
This section provides a discussion on the implications of the research findings.  
Auditors-General (Bhim, Narain and Datt) findings and disclosures of 
financial attest and compliance to budgetary audits served no purpose because the 
Ratu Sir Mara government (1970-1987) overlooked these and perhaps used it to 
elude being held to account.  As such public sector accountabilities in Fiji were 
inconsequential.  The implication here is that for the audit findings to be useful, 
the government should follow-up on the audit disclosures.  For this to occur the 
policy makers need to ensure that the public sector has established bureaucratic 
structures which are managed in such a  way that they ‘enable’ the accountee to 
hold the accountor to account.  The accountor-accountee relationship also be 
extended beyond the reporting stage to be effective.  A lack of firmly established 
political bureaucratic structures have weakened the Auditor-General’s ability to 
perform his role as an overseer of public funds and will probably continue to do 
so unless actions are taken by the government.     
The presence of tribal Fijian political structures eroded public sector 
accountability in Fiji.  The two military coups of 1987 led by Rabuka and the 
2000 civilian coup led by Speight exposed the existence and supremacy of tribal 
Fijian political leadership.  The implication to the policy makers and the 
indigenous Fijian dominated government is that if tribal systems of politics 
dominate they can override the principles of democratic accountabilities. 
Dominance of tribal political structures can also enhance tensions between the 
ethnic communities and lead to asymmetrical power relations amongst the actors   
in the public (audit) sector. Hence the accountor-accountee relationship in a 
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hierarchical structure remains weak.   A socialising form of accountability has the 
potential to reduce the asymmetrical power relationship between the accountor 
(bureaucrats and the government) and the accountee (Auditor-General) by 
encouraging open discussion and dialogue. During the discussions the accountee 
can influence the accountor to take responsibility for his/her their actions by 
seeking explanations for the accountor’s conduct.   
Fiji’s socio-political history indicates that the influence of the tribal 
structures will lead to resistance to any change which is  perceived by the 
indigenous community as a threat to their political supremacy.  The donor agency 
such as Asian Development Bank, the expatriate consultants and the Auditor-
General (Indo-Fijians and expatriates) need to be sensitive to the unique cultural 
and tribal political structures that dominate the indigenous Fijian society.   
The findings also revealed that without legislation, auditees resisted 
participating in performance auditing after 1997.  The implication here is for the 
policy makers and the Auditor-General that changes in audit scope be 
accompanied by changes in statutes such as the Audit Act and the Public Finance 
Regulations.   
The Auditor-General’s ability to hold the auditees and the government to 
account was also weakened by the actions of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Public Service Commission.  The former by withholding funds and the latter by 
failing to recruit appropriately qualified staff.  These two agencies have exerted 
undue pressure on the Auditor-General.  The implication here is that the 
Parliament be responsible for setting the budget for the Audit Office and not the 
Ministry of Finance. Similarly, the Auditor-General be allowed to recruit staff 
 325 
 
independently of the Public Service Commission.  The power of the Fijian 
Auditor General is significantly reduced by its dependency on these two 
government agencies.  
In the Fijian public (audit) sector, the parties such as the Auditor-General, 
the auditees, the Minister of Finance, the government  and others involved in the 
accountability relationship reported their conduct without regard to the 
responsibility and consequences of their actions on others.  Most sought their own 
self-identity by recording and reporting financial accounting transactions as 
required by the public finance regulations and the Ministry of Finance and used 
accounting to make visible their actions such as the government accounting 
officers recorded accounting information without proper documentation. For 
example Auditors-General (Bhim and Datt) revelations of inappropriate 
accounting records did not result in the offenders being penalised indicating a lack 
of follow up on these disclosures.  Roberts’ (1996, 2001a, 2009, 2010) 
interpretation that accountability is inhibited without moral obligations when 
applied to the Fijian situation, reveals the existence of faux accountability and a 
pretence of parliamentary democracy.  In the absence of accountability these 
parties were prone to fantasies of omnipotence such as the Ministers of Finance 
who with held funds, suppressing the Auditor-General’s efforts to audit public 
sector  entities with a concomitant denial of dependence on the Audit Office for 
example to promote public sector accountability via auditing  (Roberts, 2010). 
11.5 Contribution 
This study contributes to the existing literature on the socio-economic and 
political factors that contributed to the emergence and development of public 
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sector performance auditing by adding the case of a small developing island 
dominated by military coups and military backed indigenous Fijian led 
governments.  This study is unique in that it brings in a new dimension by 
providing empirical evidence and interpretations of how accountability was 
implicated by the socially and powerful elements of Fijian publics (audit) society 
to influence the non-acceptance of the widely acceptable practice of performance 
audits in the Fiji.  The study thus adds new knowledge.   
This research makes another contribution to the existing knowledge by 
exposing how public sector accountabilities are deflected by the presence of tribal 
political traditions when they override the democratic structures.  As such, those 
who seek accountability are suppressed by the very structures which are supposed 
to promote accountability.  Overall the study illuminates that the emergence, 
implementation and discontinuation of performance auditing in Fiji was shaped by 
the actors and social institutions associated with it.  
11.6 Limitation  
The critical hermeneutics methodology uses the concept of a hermeneutic circle 
where the text is analysed in parts and then related to the whole and vice versa. As 
such, new meanings are revealed each time the process takes place and this can be 
infinite (Prasad & Mir, 2002; Riceour, 1980).  Therefore, the onus is on the 
researcher to decide when to stop the process.  This is a subjective decision and 
different researchers can  decide differently when to stop the process.  To 
overcome this limitation the interpretations of text and contextual events were 
informed by Roberts’ (1991, 1996, 2001b, 2009, 2010) critical interpretations of 
accountability.  Despite this limitation critical hermeneutics’ explorations 
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informed by an accountability framework offer an insight into how human interest 
shaped accountability through communicative processes.  
11.7 Future Research  
This study sets the scope for future studies that can investigate how the Fijian 
experience compares with the development and emergence of performance audit 
in other Pacific Island countries.  The object of such studies would be to support 
theories capable of interpreting various observations, which have been made by 
research in developed countries (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 
1999).  Future research could be undertaken to compare the findings in this study 
with findings that relate to emergence of such audits in a country like Malaysia 
where the indigenous Malaysians dominate the government and the public sector 
bureaucracies.  Malaysia had also witnessed a coup (in 1967) where the 
democratic government was overthrown in the name of promoting indigenous 
Malay rights.  Such a study would improve the understanding of ongoing conflict 
/struggle caused by the presence of the indigenous tribal political structures and 
the promotion of the rights of the indigenous communities.  There is a need for 
more studies on how and who influenced the changes in public sector auditing 
within the context of less developed countries, as the socio-political history of 
these countries are different from that of the western developed democracies.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Timeline of Governments in Fiji after Independence 
Period  Type of Government and Leader/Prime Minister  
1970-March 1987  Elected democratic government – Alliance Party- Conservative –Ratu Sir 
Mara  
April 1987 - May 
1987  
Elected democratic government – Fiji Labour Party – Liberal – Dr Timoci 
Bavadra  
June 1987 -
September 1987 
Military appointed Interim Caretaker government - Nationalist –Ratu Sir 
Mara   
September 1987- 
December 1987  
Martial Law-  Nationalist –Military government : Rabuka as Prime 
Minister  
December 1987-
April 1992   
Military appointed Interim Caretaker Government- Conservative –Ratu Sir 
Mara  
May 1992 - May 
1999 
Elected government under 1990 undemocratic Constitution;  SVT faced 
budget challenges and resigned  -- Sitiveni Rabuka    
 
May 1999 - May  
2000 
 
Elected democratic government under the 1997 multiracial Constitution- 
Fiji Labour Party – Mahendra Chaudry  
May 2000 - July 
2000 
Terrorist government, (while democratic government held hostage ) 
George Speight self-elected Prime Minister  
July 2000 - March 
2001  
Military appointed government with Qarase as Caretaker Prime Minister. 
Court ruling declared the government illegal- so resignation followed   
March 2001 - 
September 2001 
Military appointed government with Qarase as caretaker Prime Minister.  
September 2001- 
December 2006  
Elected  democratic government – ‘Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewanivanua 
Party  (Nationalist  Nationalist- Qarase as Prime Minister  
December 2006 + Military appointed government- Brigadier Lt Bainimarama Prime Minister 
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Sources: Literature Review on Fiji, Fiji Times Articles, Annual Audit Reports  
 
 
Appendix 2: Interview Questionnaire 
 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview.  
Before proceeding with the actual interview, I would like to provide you with an introductory brief on 
my research project. The title of my research project is, Performance Auditing and Public Sector 
Accountability. A Fijian Case Study. 
The research intends to provide an understanding of the practice and the processes by 
which performance auditing was undertaken, maintained and withdrawn in Fiji by the Fiji 
Audit Office. It will provide a theoretically grounded understanding of the meaning and 
usefulness of performance audit programs. 
In the context of my study, performance auditing is viewed as an independent evaluation of the 
economy and efficiency of auditee operations, and the effectiveness of programs in the public 
sector. The terms economy, efficiency effectiveness are used to provide indications on how the 
managers have used the parliamentary approved resources to achieve the purpose for which the 
resources were given. 
Using archival documents, I have constructed a timeline that signifies major events and 
developments which led to the emergence of performance auditing in Fiji. The timeline indicates 
that during the mid 1990’s performance auditing was added to public sector auditing and towards 
the late 1990’s the practice fizzled out. The 2004 Fiji Public Finance and Management Act has 
brought performance auditing again on the agenda. The events depicted by the timeline are the 
focus of my study. The grey shaded arrows are the major focus of this interview. The timeline is on 
page two. 
The information provided during the interview and the interviewee details will remain confidential. 
The Waikato University’s  Management School Ethics’ Committee has approved this research and 
approval has also been obtained from the relevant Fiji authorities.  
Attached to this, you will find a participant information sheet and an outline of the issues I will be 
asking about. Please feel free to ask me any questions about the interview process. 
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Thank You 
 
Nirmala Nath  
 
 
TIMELINE OF INTEREST IN THIS PROJECT 
      1874-1955 
      Audit by British Law 
 
 
     1956 Audit Act 
     1970 Regulations Changed 
      Scope for performance auditing  
 
      Extent of audit reporting fluctuated 
     1996 Auditor-General required performance  auditing                                                        
     1997 Performance auditing withdrawn  
 
      1999-2004+ Focus on Performance Auditing  
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Interview Focus  
SECTION 1 
Interviewee background: 
This section explains the choice of selecting the interviewees. It indicates that the 
interviewees are either associated or have been associated with performance 
auditing and have contributed to the development of performance auditing. Specific 
group classification is to ensure that all possible groups are represented in the 
sample. 
1.  Which of the institution/s are you associated with?  Please tick the most appropriate 
box/es 
         
   Audit Office      Public Accounts Committee  Media 
       
  Ministry of Finance     Member of Parliament      Other (Specify) 
    
2.  For how long have you been associated with performance auditing?  
  
3. With reference to the years outlined on the timeline below,  
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  1970       1995   1996   1997   1998             2003       2004 
Discuss your performance auditing role/ s during each of the periods above insofar as you can 
distinguish them from each other, in terms of    
 What you had to do, discuss actions or activities. 
 Objectives of action/s or activity/ies. 
 To whom you had to report to. And on what 
 Who reported to you; And on what. 
 Did the scope of your role allow you to be effective in achieving 
objectives of your roles. Explain    
 
You would have worked with other individuals and groups in carrying out the 
functions/roles you discussed above. In what way did these relationships contribute (or 
not contribute) to implementing, discontinuing and then bringing back performance 
auditing in the public sector. 
4. What contribution do you believe was made by you or your department towards 
implementing performance auditing; Discontinuing performance auditing; and   
bringing back performance auditing in 2004. 
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SECTION 2 
 
Changes in performance auditing   
 
Referring to the timeline there were changes in the public sector auditing during the periods 
identified below. Performance auditing was implemented in 1995 and discontinued in 1998 
and following the new 2004 Public Finance and Management Act, performance auditing is 
again on the agenda. I would like you to share your views, thoughts and insights on:  the 
causes of these changes, why and how these changes took place and how these contributed 
to public sector performance auditing. To solicit your views I have written a few questions as 
a point of focus. 
 
 
1. From your understanding of performance auditing in Fiji what caused the changes in 
processes and practices of auditing during periods suggested by the timeline. Consider its 
implementation and discontinuation. 
 
1. In your opinion why did these changes occur? 
 
 
2. Who or what was instrumental in bringing about the introduction of performance auditing in 
1995, its discontinuation in 1997 and implementation in 2004. 
 
 
3. What caused the implementation of performance auditing in 1995 and 2004? 
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  Was it policy? Why? 
  Was it auditor-general’s initiative? Why? 
  Was it restructure of audit office? Why? 
          Was it some other reason? Explain. 
 
4 What was the benefit or cost of implementing performance auditing; its discontinuation. 
Explain. 
 
5. Currently the changes in the Public Finance and Management Act 2004 include performance 
auditing as a part of public sector auditing. In your opinion what may have led to the 
inclusion of performance auditing? 
 
 
6. Can you recommend any other source of information, documents or other potential 
interviewees who might help me in my investigations?  
 
 
Thank you for participating in the interview.  
 
Nirmala Nath 
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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE MEDIA.  
 
1. How do you get the information on the audit report? 
 
3. From your point of view do you feel that certain information regarding the audit reports are 
blocked from your view or are you able to get the information you requested for easily?  
Please explain. 
 
 
3.  From your point of view do you feel that all information regarding performance auditing 
during the 1995-1997 period was made available to you or was some information blocked? 
Please explain.  
 
 
4.  How do you decide what information is important to your the readers? Please explain   
 
5.  Why do you decide that the information you select to publish is important for your the 
readers? 
 
 
Thank you for participating in the interview.  
Nirmala Nath 
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Participant Consent Form 
Research Project Title: 
___________________________________________________ 
1. I have read the Information Sheet for this study and have had details of 
the study explained to me. 
 
2. My questions about the study have been answered to my satisfaction, and I 
understand that I may ask further questions at any time. 
 
3. I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, or to 
decline to answer any particular questions in the study. 
 
4. I agree to provide information to the researchers under the conditions of 
confidentiality set out on the information sheet. 
 
5. I wish to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the 
Information Sheet. 
 
6. I would like my information: (circle your option) 
a) returned to me  
b) returned to my family   
c) other(please specify)………………………………………………. 
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7.   I consent/do not consent to the information collected for the purposes of this 
research study to be used for any other research purposes. (Delete what does 
not apply) 
 
 
Participant’s Name:  _____________________________________ 
Participant’s Signature: _____________________________________ 
Date:     /     / 
Contact details:  _____________________________________ 
    _____________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s Name:  _____________________________________ 
Researcher’s Signature: _____________________________________   
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Appendix 3: Sample List of Interviewees – Reasons for Their Selection 
Interviewees Reasons for selecting these 
interviewees prior to the 
interview 
Purposive Sampling Choice - 
Explanations 
Purposive 
sampling: 
Number of 
interviewees 
Initial stage 
Additional 
interviewee 
Y (Yes) 
N (NO) 
Number 
Follow-up 
Interview 
Y (Yes) 
N (NO) 
Number of 
Participants 
No of 
interviews 
Per 
individual/ 
Auditor-General   Understudy to the Auditor-
General who implemented the 
performance auditing Project. 
 Been at the Audit Office in 
various capacities since early 
1990’s. 
 Submitted a draft paper to Ministry of 
Finance for a need to change the 1970 
Audit Act. 
1 N Y - 1  2 
Audit Office Staff   Involved with the 
performance auditing project.  
 Sent on overseas training  
 Provided training to other 
staff  
 with Audit Office when the 
performance audit project started,  
 still with Audit Office 
3 Y- I Y – 2 6 
Former Audit Office 
Staff 
 Involved with the 
performance audit project.  
 Moved to other government 
Ministries 
 Introduced by pre selected 
interviewees.  
 Trained by Australian Consultants.  
 sent to study performance auditing at 
GAO in- USA  
 Y-3 N 3 
Members of Public 
Accounts Committee  
 Deliberate and formulate 
Report for Parliament on 
OAG’s Reports. 
 PAC members on the committee 
during the 1996-1999 periods. 
 Introduced by pre-selected 
3 Y-1 N 4 
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Interviewees Reasons for selecting these 
interviewees prior to the 
interview 
Purposive Sampling Choice - 
Explanations 
Purposive 
sampling: 
Number of 
interviewees 
Initial stage 
Additional 
interviewee 
Y (Yes) 
N (NO) 
Number 
Follow-up 
Interview 
Y (Yes) 
N (NO) 
Number of 
Participants 
No of 
interviews 
Per 
individual/ 
 Responsible for seeking 
answers to questions raised in 
the Audit reports by the 
Auditor-General.  
 Responsible for seeking 
clarifications from the 
Government Dept and 
Ministries whose accounts 
were audited by the Audit 
Office. 
interviewees   
Ministry of Finance 
Personnel  
 Liaise with the Audit Office 
for budgetary allocations and 
funding. 
 Senior Finance Officer 
provide Guidance to PAC 
members on matters of 
compliance with Public 
Finance Regulations ..  
 Senior Officers-liaised with Audit 
Office on matters of funding.  
 Ensure- public sector institutions 
complied with the Public Finance 
Management Act 1980 and 2000. 
 One personnel was former OAG-staff. 
 One personnel - co-opted member of  
PAC- Public Finance regulations  
3 N Y - 1  4 
Auditees   Institutions which had 
participated in the project.  
 From entities that participated in 
performance audits  
 One was recommended by pre-selected 
group 
1 Y-1 N 2 
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Interviewees Reasons for selecting these 
interviewees prior to the 
interview 
Purposive Sampling Choice - 
Explanations 
Purposive 
sampling: 
Number of 
interviewees 
Initial stage 
Additional 
interviewee 
Y (Yes) 
N (NO) 
Number 
Follow-up 
Interview 
Y (Yes) 
N (NO) 
Number of 
Participants 
No of 
interviews 
Per 
individual/ 
Members of 
Parliament  
 Parliament  members when 
the first Performance Audit 
Report was presented to the 
Parliament   
 Members of Parliament and Also 
members of PAC  
 Two additional participants -
recommended by the media personnel, 
they were members of Parliament 
during 1992-1997 period. 
3 Y- 2 N 5 
Media   Print media journalists:- 
reported on the performance 
audit reports and the Audit 
reports in General  
 Publicised performance audit reports  
 Wrote editorial reports on performance 
auditing and auditing during 1992-
1996 period.    
3 N N 3 
Total    17 8 4 29 
Four follow-up interviews were undertaken and the total number of interviews was 29.   
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Appendix 4: Proposed Organisational Structure of the Audit Office 
 
 
 
